This
page contains replication datasets and do files from
selected publications. Unless otherwise noted, these data are in Stata
10.0
format, compressed as Zip files. To request a different
format, send an
email to pmcollins"at"unt"dot"edu.
The U.S. Supreme Court Confirmation Hearing Database. With Lori A. Ringhand. 2013. Data. (Note: These data are in Excel, R, SPSS, and Stata formats).
Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings and Constitutional Change. With Lori A. Ringhand. 2012. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Data and Do Files.
Friends
of the Supreme Court: Interest Groups and Judicial Decision Making. 2008.
New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Data and Do File.
(Note: This folder contains The U.S.
Supreme Court Amicus Curiae Database, 1946-2001).
The
U.S. Supreme Court is a public
policy battleground in which organized interests attempt to etch their
economic, legal, and political preferences into law through the filing
of
amicus curiae ("friend of the court") briefs. In Friends of
the
Supreme Court: Interest Groups and Judicial Decision Making,
Paul M.
Collins, Jr. explores how organized interests influence the justices'
decision
making, including how the justices vote and whether they choose to
author
concurrences and dissents. Collins presents theories of judicial choice
derived
from disciplines as diverse as law, marketing, political science, and
social
psychology. This theoretically rich and empirically rigorous treatment
of
decision making on the nation's highest court, which represents the
most
comprehensive examination ever undertaken of the influence of U.S.
Supreme
Court amicus briefs, provides clear evidence that interest groups play
a
significant role in shaping the justices' choices.
On
the Relationship between
Public Opinion and Decision Making on the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
With Bryan Calvin and Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha.
2012. Political Research Quarterly 64(4): 736-748.
Data and Do File.
The
authors explore
whether the federal courts act as countermajoritarian institutions by
investigating the influence of public mood on decision making in the
U.S.
Courts of Appeals from 1961 to 2002. The results indicate that public
opinion
affects courts of appeals decision making indirectly through judicial
replacements and institutional constrains from Congress, but the
authors fail
to uncover evidence that courts of appeals judges respond directly to
changes
in public opinion. They conclude that, absent membership turnover in
the circuit
or in Congress, the courts of appeals are not responsive to the will of
the
public.
Lower
Court Influence on U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Content.
With Pamela C. Corley and Bryan Calvin. 2011. Journal of
Politics 73(1): 31-44
Data
and Do File.
Despite
the importance of Supreme Court opinions for the American polity,
scholars have
dedicated little systematic research to investigating the factors that
contribute to the content of the justices’ opinions. In this
article, we
examine the ability of lower federal courts to shape the content of
Supreme
Court opinions. We argue that lower court opinions will influence the
content
of the Court’s opinions to the extent that the justices
perceive that
integrating language from lower court opinions will aid them in making
efficacious law and policy. Utilizing plagiarism detection software to
compare
lower federal court opinions with the majority opinions of the Supreme
Court
during the 2002–2004 terms, we uncover evidence that the
Court systematically
incorporates language from the lower federal courts into its majority
opinions.
Cognitive
Dissonance on the U.S. Supreme Court.
2011. Political
Research Quarterly 64(2): 362-376. Data and Do File.
This research examines the applicability of cognitive dissonance theory to explain a judge’s decision to author or join a separate opinion. The author proposes that, when a judge casts a counterattitudinal vote, that judge will endeavor to reduce the aversive consequences of being viewed as an inconsistent decision maker by justifying his or her attitudinally incongruent vote choice to the public in a separate opinion. The author tests this possibility by examining U.S. Supreme Court justices’ decisions to author or join concurring and dissenting opinions during the 1946 to 2001 terms. The empirical results provide qualified support for the use of separate opinions as dissonance reduction mechanisms, suggesting that dissonance theory both is applicable to the actions of elite decision makers and enjoys validity outside of a laboratory setting.
The Small
Group Context: Designated District Court Judges in the
U.S. Courts of Appeals. With
Wendy L. Martinek. 2011. Journal of
Empirical Legal Studies 8(1): 177-205. Data and Do File.
Decision
making in the
U.S. courts of appeals occurs primarily in three-judge panels. A
substantial
number of cases are decided by panels that include a judge who is a
district
court judge serving temporarily on the appeals bench. This means that
court of
appeals decision making is often a function of small groups with
temporary
members. Here, we examine whether designated district court judges
behave
differently than their court of appeals colleagues when they cast their
votes
in cases they are deciding as members of three-judge appellate panels.
In doing
so, we suggest a profitable direction for theory building
vis-à-vis judicial
decision making. Our analysis of the ideological direction of the votes
judges
cast, as well as the variance in those votes, indicates that judges on
three-judge panels are influenced by the preferences of their fellow
panelists,
and that designated district court judges, while no more variable than
their
court of appeals colleagues, are more susceptible to the influence of
their
peers than are regular members of the courts of appeals in a nontrivial
number
of cases.
Counteractive Lobbying in the U.S.
Supreme Court.
With Lisa A. Solowiej. 2009. American Politics Research 37(4):
670-699. Data. (Note:
These data are in Stata 10.0
and Gauss formats).
Theories
of counteractive lobbying
assert that interest groups lobby for the purpose of neutralizing the
advocacy
efforts of their opponents. We examine the applicability of
counteractive
lobbying to explain interest group amicus curiae participation in the
U.S.
Supreme Court’s decisions on the merits. Testing the
counteractive lobbying
hypotheses from 1953 to 2001, we provide strong support for the
contention that
interest groups engage in counteractive lobbying in the
nation’s highest court.
Our findings indicate that, like the elected branches of government,
the
Supreme Court is properly viewed as a battleground for public policy in
which
organized interests clash in their attempts to etch their policy
preferences
into law.
The Consistency of Judicial Choice. 2008.
Journal of Politics 70(3): 861-873. Data and Do File.
Despite
the fact that scholars of
judicial politics have developed reasonably well-specified models of
the voting
behavior of U.S. Supreme Court justices, little attention has been paid
to
influences on the consistency of the choices justices make. Aside from
the
methodological problems associated with failure to account for
heteroskedasticity with regard to the justices’ voting
behavior, I argue that
variance in judicial choice is also of theoretical import. Simply put,
by
uncovering influences on the stability of judicial choice, a more
complete
understanding of judicial decision making is provided. I explore this
possibility by developing a theoretical framework that identifies
influences on
the consistency of judicial choice, which are then subjected to
empirical
testing. I show that the stability of judicial decision making is
affected by
attitudinal and strategic factors, as well as the Court’s
informational environment.
The result is a more fully integrated model of Supreme Court decision
making.
The Solicitor General’s
Amicus Curiae Strategies in the
Supreme Court. With Chris
Nicholson. 2008. American
Politics Research 36(3): 382-415. Data and Do File.
Scholars
have devoted a great deal of
research to investigating the role and influence of the U.S. solicitor
general
(SG) as amicus curiae in the Supreme Court. Yet, we know little about
the SG’s
decision to file an amicus brief and how this relates to the
SG’s success on
the merits. We fill this void by examining legal, political, and
administrative
factors that affect the SG’s decision to participate as
amicus curiae. We
subject our hypotheses to empirical testing using data on the 1953 to
1999
Supreme Court terms by linking the SG’s decision to file an
amicus brief to the
SG’s ultimate success on the merits, employing a
Heckman-style selection model.
We find that the SG’s decision to file an amicus brief is
influenced by legal,
political, and administrative considerations, suggesting that the SG is
best viewed
through the incorporation of a variety of theoretical perspectives.
Amici Curiae and Dissensus on the U.S.
Supreme Court.
2008.
Journal of Empirical Legal
Studies 5(1): 143-170. Data and Do File.
A
great deal of empirical research has
focused on explaining why U.S. Supreme Court Justices partake in
nonconsensual
opinion writing. However, little attention has been paid to the role of
organized interests in contributing to a Justice’s decision
to write or join a
separate opinion. I argue that a Justice’s decision to engage
in this behavior
is a partial function of interest group amicus curiae participation in
the
Court. By providing the Justices with a myriad of information regarding
how
cases should be resolved, organized interests create ambiguity in the
Justices’
already uncertain decision making, at the same time providing them with
a
substantial foundation for concurring or dissenting opinions. I subject
this
argument to empirical validation by examining the Justices’
decisions to author
or join regular concurring, special concurring, and dissenting opinions
during
the 1946–1995 terms. The results indicate that organized
interests play a
considerable role in increasing dissensus on the Supreme Court.
Transforming the United States Courts
of Appeals Data Bases
in Stata.
2008.
Law & Courts 18(1): 19-22. Data and Do File.
Scholars
studying the U.S.
Courts of Appeals overwhelmingly employ one of two publicly available
datasets
(Kuersten and Haire 2007; Songer 2007). While these data bases contain
a
treasure trove of information, they are organized such that the unit of
analysis is the case, which makes some research questions more easily
tackled
than others. This article provides easily implemented Stata codes to
reliably
transform the unit of analysis in these datasets from the case to the
judge-vote, thus allowing scholars to investigate Court of Appeals
decision
making at the level of the individual judge.
Towards an Integrated Model of the
U.S. Supreme Court's
Federalism Decision Making. 2007.
Publius: The Journal of Federalism 37(4): 505-531. Data and Do File.
Disputes
involving the boundaries of
state versus federal power make up a substantial portion of the U.S.
Supreme
Court’s docket and have undergone extensive analysis. Yet,
the conventional
wisdom regarding the justices’ choices in these cases is that
they are highly
inconsistent. I argue that this is primarily a function of the failure
of
scholars to develop a comprehensive model of the justices’
federalism decision
making. To remedy this, I introduce an integrated model of the
individual
justices’ choices in these cases, which is then subjected to
empirical testing
in the Rehnquist Court era (1986-2004). I explore a host of
determinants of the
justices’ decision making, including attitudinal,
institutional, legal, and
personal attributes, as well as the role of organized interests in the
Court.
The findings reveal that the choices justices make in these cases are
not as
discordant as most commentators suggest. Rather, they are relatively
predictable through the application of an integrated model of judicial
choice.
Lobbyists before the U.S. Supreme
Court: Investigating the Influence of
Amicus Curiae Briefs. 2007.
Political
Research Quarterly 60(1): 55-70. Data and Do File.
Despite
the fact that amicus curiae
participation is the most common method of interest group activity in
the
judicial arena, there is little consensus as to whether this means of
participation influences the decision making of the U.S. Supreme Court.
To
redress this state of affairs, this research investigates the affect of
amicus
briefs on the ideological direction of the Court’s decisions,
with particular
attention given to theoretical and methodological issues that have gone
unexplored in previous studies. Analyzing group influence during the
1946 to
1995 terms, the results provide particularly robust evidence that
pressure
groups are effective in shaping the Court’s policy outputs.
These findings
therefore indicate that elite decision makers can be influenced by
persuasive
argumentation presented by organized interests.
Transforming the Original U.S. Supreme
Court Judicial
Database: An Alternative Approach for use with Stata. 2006.
Law &
Courts 16(1): 22-24. Data and Do File
One
of the most commonly
employed datasets on the U.S. Supreme Court is ALLCOURT, the Original
United
States Supreme Court Judicial Database. Yet, the
structure of
ALLCOURT is set up such that the case is the unit of analysis, which
makes
certain types of research questions more easily broached than
others.
This article provides an easily implemented code for Stata that allows
users to
reliably transform the unit of analysis in ALLCOURT from the case to
the
justice-vote.
Friends of the Court:
Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae Participation
in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation.
2004.
Law & Society Review 38(4): 807-32.
Data and Do File
Amicus
curiae participation is a staple
of interest group activity in the U.S. Supreme Court. While a
reasonably large
body of scholarship has accumulated regarding the effectiveness of this
method
of participation, little attention has been paid to examining the
reasons why
amicus participation might increase litigation success. In this article
I test
two separate, but not mutually exclusive, theories as to why amicus
briefs may
be effective. The first, the affected groups hypothesis, suggests
amicus briefs
are influential because they signal to the Court how many groups and
individuals will be potentially affected by the decision. The second,
the
information hypothesis, proposes that amicus briefs are effective
because they
provide the Court with added information that buttresses the arguments
of the
direct parties. When subjected to empirical verification the results
indicate
that, not only does amicus participation increase litigation success,
but also
that this influence may be best explained by the information hypothesis.