

# *Will the Surge in Iraq Work?*

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<http://www.psci.unt.edu/enterline/enterline.htm>

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April 27, 2009

# American Foreign Policy Issues & Social Science

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- Approach to Policy Problems
  - identify policy puzzles
  - develop causal explanations
  - make predictions based on historical evidence  
(assumption that most human behaviors are repeated)
  - use this knowledge to achieve preferred outcomes
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- Strategies & Expectations
  - Bush Plan:
    - add 21,500 troops
    - add civilians
    - economic development (e.g., jobs programs)
    - **result:** stabilize Baghdad & Iraqi government, build confidence; security is the linchpin of stability and durability
  - Critics of Bush Plan:
    - shift responsibility away from Iraqi government
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- Forecast Implications of Four Strategies for Conflict in Iraq:
  1. Surge
  2. Escalation
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  4. Shinseki (as a “retrocast,” or “what if,” strategy)

# Analysis Foundations

- Source Study & Compatibility
  - Original Aim
    - study historic performance of imposed governments & domestic conflict (years 1816–1994)
  - Central Policy Variable: **Policing**=Armed Forces Per Capita, or

$$= \frac{(American + British + Iraq)}{28,807,000} \times 100$$

- Forecasting of Events
  - input “Iraq-like” parameters (e.g., geographic size, foreign relations with neighboring states, freq. ethnic groups) into simulations grounded in statistical analysis

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Table 1. Force Levels.

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Strategy	Force Contributions			Total	Armed Forces Per Capita
	Iraq	British	American		

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*Note:* Iraq's population is set to 28,807,000.

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Insurgency



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Escalate I	134,000	7,200	500,000	641,200	2.23

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
Insurgency



Baseline (2006)

Surge (2008)

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
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Escalate II	134,000	7,200	1,000,000	1,141,200	3.96

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
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
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Withdrawal I	65,500	0	0	65,500	0.23


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
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Withdrawal I	65,500	0	0	65,500	0.23
Withdrawal II	134,700	0	0	134,700	0.47


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
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Shinseki I	0	8,900	500,000	508,900	1.77


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
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
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    - Are past patterns applicable to contemporary policy problems?
  - Forecasts
    - Can valuable policy recommendations be made before hand?
    - Weaknesses of the analysis?
      1. events analyzed are too imprecise (no sensitivity to fluctuations in frequency)
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