

Chinazambia & Boliviafranca:
A Simulation of Domestic Politics & Foreign Policy

Andrew J. Enterline
University of North Texas
Department of Political Science
Box 305340
Denton, TX 76203-5340
ajenter@unt.edu

Eric M. Jepsen
University of New Mexico
Department of Political Science
Social Sciences #2068
Albuquerque, NM 87131-001
ejepsen@unm.edu

August 16, 2005

Abstract

Despite a longstanding focus on the systemic distribution of power in the study of international relations, scholarship during the past twenty years increasingly emphasizes the role of domestic politics in foreign policy decision making and international outcomes. This simulation enables participants to experience negotiating an international issue—a territorial dispute between two states—in the context of this “two-level game” of domestic and international influences. As such, the simulation furnishes an excellent vantage point from which to assess realist, liberal, and alternative theoretical perspectives on international relations as they affect policymaking. The simulation is flexible, and can be executed under a variety of time and participation constraints. Additionally, the simulation provides ample opportunity for a number of enriching post-simulation activities, including a theoretically-inspired discussion and suggested paper assignments.

1 Simulation Parameters

Instructional Objective. To enable students to observe and utilize various theoretical approaches to bargaining in foreign and domestic policy;

Simulation Objective. Maximizing state interests while balancing domestic coalitions of support for foreign policymaking;

Target Audience. Undergraduate instructors and students interested in understanding political decision making at the national and international levels. Appropriate for introductory and advanced undergraduate international relations, U.S. foreign policy, and comparative politics courses;

Preparation Time. One half hour;

Playing Time. One and one half hour playing time. If a two and one half hour interval is unavailable (for both play and debriefing), the simulation may be implemented effectively over two to three class periods;

Debriefing Time. Twenty to 45 minutes;

Number of Players. Ten to 50 students. Simulation should be run with multiple sub-simulations which allows for smaller “state-teams,” greater levels of student participation, and greater variation in simulation outcomes; and

Participation Materials. Handouts provided by instructor, timer; writing implements and notebook paper provided by students. Sufficient classroom space to allow for individual state-team meetings with relative privacy.

2 Introduction

Oftentimes in introductory international relations and foreign policy courses, students are expected to critically evaluate theories such as realism and liberalism, and foreign policymaking concepts such as domestic coalition formations. The simulation outlined in the remainder of this article encourages students to incorporate knowledge from several introductory courses in international relations, comparative politics, and foreign policy by encouraging students to balance theoretical and conceptual ideas with the “real world” expectations of state foreign policymaking. During the course of the simulation, students will be able to decide on a course of action for their state while implicitly or explicitly pursuing a realist, liberal, or alternative strategy for gaining what they consider to be in their constituent and national interests. In doing so, the simulation provides a laboratory within which students can experience how abstract theories of international relations and foreign policy are manifested in decision making by their fellow students.

Unlike previous introductory international relations simulations that primarily concentrate on the balance of power among states (Chapin, 1998), or offensive strategies of power politics (Reilly, 2003), this simulation allows for the incorporation of the “two-level game” of foreign policy (Putnam, 1988; Russett, 1993), in which foreign policy making is a function of the manner in which decision makers integrate the costs and benefits of strategies given audiences in two arenas—domestic politics and international relations. In this way, students participating in the simulation experience firsthand the difficulties in balancing domestic political goals and constraints within the context of an external security environment. Furthermore, in this simulation students first determine the form of their own domestic policymaking institutions (i.e., the rules of democratic government.) In turn, students rely on these institutions when addressing the issue of a territorial dispute with a neighboring state. Thus, the simulation provides students with first-hand experience of the interplay between

domestic politics and foreign policy making in matters of international relations.

The remainder of this article is structured as follows. First, we outline instructions for the simulation facilitators and confidential instructions for the simulation participants. Second, we develop a participants' guide, including information about the territorial dispute at the core of the simulation, and the goals of the participants. Third, we provide and discuss a geographic map reflecting the territorial dispute. Fourth, we develop a set of questions that facilitators can employ during a post-simulation discussion with students, in addition to a set of paper topics for additional student activities. We close the article with a few observations about the flexibility and broader purpose of the simulation and post-simulation activities.

3 Facilitator's Guide

This simulation of a territorial dispute between two fictitious states, Chinazambia and Boliviafranca, is very flexible, and therefore can be tailored to fit most all time and participation constraints imposed on the simulation facilitator. To date, the authors implemented this simulation successfully under several time and participant conditions, including seminars of three hours and three 50 minute undergraduate lecture periods. Additionally, the authors implemented this simulation under various participant constraints, ranging from 20 to 60 students.

1. Prior to running the simulation, photocopies should be made of the following information:
 - (a) The *Participants' Guide*;
 - (b) The *Confidential Information* for each state-team;
2. For the purposes of sample size and comparison, it is fruitful to run at least *two simultaneous simulations* of the territorial dispute between the states Chinazambia

and Boliviafranca. To this end, subdivide the group of students into four (or six, etc.) equally-sized groups. Groups should have between 5-8 students, and students should be randomly distributed;

3. Direct the students within each group to move their chairs to the corners of the classroom and familiarize themselves with their fellow state members. Students should be reminded at this time that they should take care in guarding their strategy-making talks from members of their counterpart state;
4. Next, instruct each state to design the basic decision making institutions for a democratic political system (e.g., pure democracy via majority vote, super-majority), and record this decision making design on paper in the form of a constitution as well as ratification of the constitution by individual state members via signature;
5. Identify two groups of students as representing two separate states named Chinazambia, and the two remaining groups as representing two separate states named Boliviafranca. In turn, each Chinazambia state should be paired off with one Boliviafranca state to form two distinct Chinazambia–Boliviafranca dyads for two separate simulations (or 3 dyads, etc., depending on the number of students available for the simulation and preferred group size);
6. Identify the “minority factions” within each Chinazambia and Boliviafranca state. For each state Chinazambia, designate 30 to 40 percent of the student participants in the state as representatives of a political group, the “Farmers.” For each state Boliviafranca, designate 30 to 40 percent of the student participants in the state as representatives of an ethnic group, the “Hoodooos.” Inform the remaining 60 to 70 percent of the group that they represent the majority faction within the respective state. Stress to the students the need to protect the interests of their respective political

group when it comes to representing their sub-national political grouping during the policymaking process;

7. Distribute the *Participants' Guide* containing the scenario details for the territorial dispute between Chinazambia and Boliviafranca. Work through the scenario verbally, answering student questions where necessary;
8. Distribute the *Confidential Information* to each Chinazambia and Boliviafranca team;¹
9. Set and announce a time limit on the end of the simulation, and post the passage of time. The termination point is somewhat flexible, such that it can be extended, with this extension being explained to students as an example of chance or serendipity in international relations;² and
10. Upon the expiration of time, ask each state to report its final policy decision. If a state decides to engage in war, then decide the outcome by requiring a representative of each state in a dyad play the game “rock, paper, scissors,” with the representative achieving “victory” by winning a certain number of hands for its state. It is suggested that due to the “power” disparities between the two states, that Chinazambia needs to reach 7 rock, paper, scissors “victories” before Boliviafranca reaches 3 victories. This standard for war victory reflects the perceived 70 percent–30 percent chance of military advantage that Boliviafranca has over Chinazambia.³

¹To stimulate intra-group communication within each state, it is recommended that the facilitator distribute a single copy of the *Confidential Information* to each group, so that one member of the group is compelled to communicate the information to the remaining group members.

²If you are running the simulation in a three-hour seminar, the seminar setup (i.e., distribution of materials and establishment of democratic decision making rules) will require approximate 30 minutes, the remainder of the simulation can be carried out in one hour and a half, with the remainder of the simulation devoted to debriefing. If you are running the simulation across two, one hour and 20 minute periods, then the simulation can commence on the first day and continue through half of the second day, with the remaining time devoted to debriefing. Finally, if you are running the simulation across the three 50 minute periods, the simulation can be setup and commence on the first day, continue on the second and part of the third days, followed by debriefing on the third day.

³Clearly, the method and details by which a facilitator determines the outcome of a war is flexible. Herein,

3.1 Confidential Information

3.1.1 Chinazambia

As an active participant in the diplomacy of the democratic state of Chinazambia in the negotiations with Boliviafranca, you confront several issues, incentives, and constraints regarding your decision-making calculus. Therefore it is important that you keep the following in mind when devising your policy:

1. Your intelligence services estimate your chances of winning a renewed war with Boliviafranca as distinctly *less than even*. Additionally, the prevailing mood in your state is distinctly anti-war;
2. Although the ethnic Hoodoos have migrated in a pattern such that they are straddling the Curvy River, you cannot leave them unprotected, as their leaders are critical to the sustainability of your coalition in the fledgling national legislature;
3. You are aware that Boliviafranca is in need of oil in order to expand their profitable farming industry, because petroleum is essential for the production of fertilizer;
4. The slash and burn methods of the Boliviafrancan farmers that have moved into the forests is fouling the waters of Fish Lake and reducing the size of your catch per annum;
and
5. You desperately need to import food, as a string of prior governments failed to develop the agricultural sector of your economy, despite the fact that your population is growing steadily.

we merely outline one viable method for doing so.

3.1.2 Boliviafranca

As an active participant in the democratic state of Boliviafranca in the negotiations with Chinazambia, you confront several issues, incentives, and constraints regarding your position in the negotiations. Therefore it is important that you keep the following in mind when devising your policy:

1. Your intelligence services report that Boliviafranca has a military advantage over Chinazambia, and therefore you see war as a potentially feasible route to achieving your goals. Specifically, you place your odds of victory through war at *roughly 70 percent*;
2. While the agricultural sector in Boliviafranca is profitable, the supply of land is decreasing at the same time that the number of Farmers is increasing, and therefore land prices have soared. As a result, Farmers are migrating westward and are cultivating new farmland in the forests along, and to the west of, the Stalemate Line;
3. The aforementioned Farmers are potentially very powerful politically, so you must be very careful with how you accommodate their preferences during the negotiation;
4. You believe that Chinazambia is recklessly overfishing Fish Lake;
5. You believe that the Hoodoos have designs on your newly discovered diamond mines to the east of Curvy River; and
6. You are dependent on oil for machinery and fertilizer in your agricultural sector, but the current dispute has led Chinazambia to limit selling its high-grade, geographically proximate crude oil to you, thereby making the oil you do import more expensive.

4 Participants' Guide

The *Participants' Guide* identifies the basic parameters of the territorial dispute between Chinazambia and Boliviafranca. Again, virtually all of the details of the *Participants' Guide* are flexible and may be tailored with relative ease by the instructor.

4.1 Simulation Scenario

The border between the countries Chinazambia and Boliviafranca remains disputed despite repeated attempts to resolve this issue during the past fifty years. Prior efforts at resolution range from bilateral negotiations to several attempts at third party mediation via the good offices of the United Nations. The failure of these efforts is most apparent in the costly wars between the two states in 1960 and 1985, respectively, each of which resulted in considerable human and material losses to the two countries, and no decisive winner. These past failures notwithstanding, recent developments in international and local politics have pushed this border issue to the top of each nation's foreign policy agenda, and political leaders in each country are eager to reach a resolution. Specifically, these developments include:

1. *International Influences.*

- (a) An increase in the value of natural resources (oil and diamonds) on the global market in response to the collapse of technology stocks; and
- (b) An increase in pressure by the international community to cease destruction of the rainforests, particularly the slash and burn methods often used by farmers in the region.

2. *Local Influences.*

- (a) Depletion of fish stocks in “Fish Lake” (see map on p. 14), as a result of over fishing and pollution (in part, from deforestation and slash and burn methods);
- (b) Encroachment by migrant Farmers from Boliviafranca into forests claimed by Chinazambia, and resulting deforestation;
- (c) Movement by ethnic Hoodoos from Chinazambia east across the Curvy River into territories claimed by Boliviafranca and proximate to newly discovered diamond mines; and
- (d) The recent democratization of the political systems in each state.

You may pursue any strategy when negotiating this issue with representatives of your counterpart state. The outcomes of stalemate (i.e., continued hostility and the presence of a non-recognized border) or war are possible, in addition to any number of agreements in between these two outcomes. If your negotiations end in the decision to engage in war, your fate as a state, as well as the government (i.e., victory or defeat), will be decided through an impartial mechanism employed by the simulation facilitator. Finally, your state will be issued confidential information at the start of the simulation. You may use this information any way that you wish, although you are reminded that sharing this information with your counterpart state will obviously make it less confidential, and perhaps, less valuable to you.

4.2 Map of Disputed Territory

Figure 1 illustrates the disputed border area between Chinazambia and Boliviafranca. Chinazambia lies to the west and Boliviafranca to the east. Shapes and ovals in the figure represent the location and relative size of a given natural resource (e.g., oil) or geographic feature (e.g., Fish Lake). Numbers along horizontal and vertical axis represent geographic increments (50 miles between each increment) and are included as points of reference for negotiating territorial settlements. Note the dashed, gray “Stalemate Line” representing the

location at which the armies of the two countries fought to a stalemate in 1985, a line that is not recognized by the international community as the legal boundary between the two states, but rather is the de facto border. The “Curvy River” represents the lower portion of the Stalemate Line. Despite this stalemate, the armies of Chinazambia and Boliviafranca remain active along this de factor border, and therefore the probability of renewal of armed conflict remains significantly greater than zero.

[Figure 1 About Here]

5 Debriefing

This simulation is intended to focus student attention on several important concepts in international relations and comparative foreign policy:

1. The choices that states must make in light of the security dilemma facing all participants;
2. The adoption, or at least recognition, of participants’ strategies based on both liberal and realist perspectives on security. Participants will often voice opinions on their perceived beneficial strategy in light of international relations theory;
3. Experience with the two-level game “pulls” of intra-state politics and inter-state politics; and
4. Student reliance on the “jargon” of international politics (e.g., zero-sum behavior, reciprocity) when discussing the simulation.

After the simulation concludes, there should be 20 to 45 minutes devoted to discussion and evaluation of the simulation proceedings. Some questions for discussion are as follows:

1. How did your state's democratic decision making affect your negotiation strategy?
2. How did the different subgroups within the states interact over the course of the simulation? Did inter-group tensions arise? If so, why?
3. What were the major issues of contention within your state?
4. How does the "security dilemma" relate to your experiences in the simulation?
5. Did your state follow an explicitly realist or liberal-based strategy, or some alternative, for engaging the other state?
6. Describe concretely some of the tensions between what was politically viable domestically and what the other state desired during the negotiations. It helps to think of this utilizing a two-level game framework.
7. Did the "tragedy of the commons," the notion of scarce economic resources, and the prospects for future economic growth, affect your decision-making? How so?
8. What explains variation in the outcomes of negotiation across the set of two-state teams participating in the simulation? If variation is absent, what explains the uniformity of outcomes?

Finally, the simulation provides ample experience (i.e., data) that can be explored in the context of post-simulation student papers.⁴ Some ideas for student papers are as follows:

1. Analyze the dynamics of the "security dilemma," and identify actions by states that exacerbated or alleviated this dilemma;
2. Analyze the simulation through the lens of a basic "two-level game" framework. Give specific examples of how the game played out with this conceptual outlook;

⁴Making participants aware prior to the simulation that a simulation-related paper assignment will follow the simulation might result in increased rates of participation during the simulation.

3. Discuss how the simulation would might have evolved differently had the Hoodoos and/or Farmers represented 50 percent of the respective state's populations; and
4. Discuss how the simulation might have evolved differently if the odds of victory/defeat in war between the two states were reversed.


6 Concluding Remarks

One of the primary, and most difficult, tasks confronting instructors of international relations is to demonstrate to students how theoretical world views (e.g., realism, liberalism) translate into policy making. This simulation enables instructors and participants to evaluate these world views, and hybrid, or blends of the world views, in an applied setting. Furthermore, in addition to providing a vehicle for matching theoretical concepts with empirical, accessible behavior, the simulation enables students to assess the relative importance of domestic and international constraints and incentives in making policy. Also, the simulation provides a set of common experiences to which instructors and students can refer during the remainder of a course. Finally, the simulation is flexible in terms of fitting in with a variety of different courses that bear on policy making in international relations, comparative politics, and foreign policy.

References

- Chapin, Wesley D. 1998. "The Balance of Power Game." *Simulation & Gaming* 29:105–112.
- Putnam, Robert D. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organizations* 42(3):427–460.
- Reilly, David A. 2003. "The Power Politics Game: Offensive Realism in Theory and Practice." *Simulation & Gaming* 34(2):298–305.
- Russett, Bruce M. 1993. *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles For a Post-Cold War World*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University.

Figure 1: Territorial Dispute Between Chinazambia & Boliviafranca.



Photocopy Ready Forms

(The remainder of this page is left intentionally blank)

Facilitator's Guide

This simulation of a territorial dispute between two fictitious states, Chinazambia and Boliviafranca, is very flexible, and therefore can be tailored to fit most all time and participation constraints imposed on the simulation facilitator. To date, the authors implemented this simulation successfully under several time and participant conditions, including seminars of three hours and three 50 minute undergraduate lecture periods. Additionally, the authors implemented this simulation under various participant constraints, ranging from 20 to 60 students.

1. Prior to running the simulation, photocopies should be made of the following information:
 - (a) The *Participants' Guide*;
 - (b) The *Confidential Information* for each state–team;
2. For the purposes of sample size and comparison, it is fruitful to run at least *two simultaneous simulations* of the territorial dispute between the states Chinazambia and Boliviafranca. To this end, subdivide the group of students into four (or six, etc.) equally-sized groups. Groups should have between 5-8 students, and students should be randomly distributed;
3. Direct the students within each group to move their chairs to the corners of the classroom and familiarize themselves with their fellow state members. Students should be reminded at this time that they should take care in guarding their strategy-making talks from members of their counterpart state;
4. Next, instruct each state to design the basic decision making institutions for a democratic political system (e.g., pure democracy via majority vote, super-majority), and record this decision making design on paper in the form of a constitution as well as ratification of the constitution by individual state members via signature;
5. Identify two groups of students as representing two separate states named Chinazambia, and the two remaining groups as representing two separate states named Boliviafranca. In turn, each Chinazambia state should be paired off with one Boliviafranca state to form two distinct Chinazambia–Boliviafranca dyads for two separate simulations (or 3 dyads, etc., depending on the number of students available for the simulation and preferred group size);
6. Identify the “minority factions” within each Chinazambia and Boliviafranca state. For each state Chinazambia, designate 30 to 40 percent of the student participants in the state as representatives of a political group, the “Farmers.” For each state Boliviafranca, designate 30 to 40 percent of the student participants in the state as representatives of an ethnic group, the “Hoodooos.” Inform the remaining 60 to 70

percent of the group that they represent the majority faction within the respective state. Stress to the students the need to protect the interests of their respective political group when it comes to representing their sub-national political grouping during the policymaking process;

7. Distribute the *Participants' Guide* containing the scenario details for the territorial dispute between Chinazambia and Boliviafranca. Work through the scenario verbally, answering student questions where necessary;
8. Distribute the *Confidential Information* to each Chinazambia and Boliviafranca team;⁵
9. Set and announce a time limit on the end of the simulation, and post the passage of time. The termination point is somewhat flexible, such that it can be extended, with this extension being explained to students as an example of chance or serendipity in international relations;⁶ and
10. Upon the expiration of time, ask each state to report its final policy decision. If a state decides to engage in war, then decide the outcome by requiring a representative of each state in a dyad play the game “rock, paper, scissors,” with the representative achieving “victory” by winning a certain number of hands for its state. It is suggested that due to the “power” disparities between the two states, that Chinazambia needs to reach 7 rock, paper, scissors “victories” before Boliviafranca reaches 3 victories. This standard for war victory reflects the perceived 70 percent–30 percent chance of military advantage that Boliviafranca has over Chinazambia.⁷

⁵To stimulate intra-group communication within each state, it is recommended that the facilitator distribute a single copy of the *Confidential Information* to each group, so that one member of the group is compelled to communicate the information to the remaining group members.

⁶If you are running the simulation in a three-hour seminar, the seminar setup (i.e., distribution of materials and establishment of democratic decision making rules) will require approximate 30 minutes, the remainder of the simulation can be carried out in one hour and a half, with the remainder of the simulation devoted to debriefing. If you are running the simulation across two, one hour and 20 minute periods, then the simulation can commence on the first day and continue through half of the second day, with the remaining time devoted to debriefing. Finally, if you are running the simulation across the three 50 minute periods, the simulation can be setup and commence on the first day, continue on the second and part of the third days, followed by debriefing on the third day.

⁷Clearly, the method and details by which a facilitator determines the outcome of a war is flexible. Herein, we merely outline one viable method for doing so.

Participant's Guide

Simulation Scenario

The border between the countries Chinazambia and Boliviafranca remains disputed despite repeated attempts to resolve this issue during the past fifty years. Prior efforts at resolution range from bilateral negotiations to several attempts at third party mediation via the good offices of the United Nations. The failure of these efforts is most apparent in the costly wars between the two states in 1960 and 1985, respectively, each of which resulted in considerable human and material losses to the two countries, and no decisive winner. These past failures notwithstanding, recent developments in international and local politics have pushed this border issue to the top of each nation's foreign policy agenda, and political leaders in each country are eager to reach a resolution. Specifically, these developments include:

1. *International Influences.*

- (a) An increase in the value of natural resources (oil and diamonds) on the global market in response to the collapse of technology stocks; and
- (b) An increase in pressure by the international community to cease destruction of the rainforests, particularly the slash and burn methods often used by farmers in the region.

2. *Local Influences.*

- (a) Depletion of fish stocks in "Fish Lake" (see map on p. 21), as a result of over fishing and pollution (in part, from deforestation and slash and burn methods);
- (b) Encroachment by migrant Farmers from Boliviafranca into forests claimed by Chinazambia, and resulting deforestation;
- (c) Movement by ethnic Hoodoos from Chinazambia east across the Curvy River into territories claimed by Boliviafranca and proximate to newly discovered diamond mines; and
- (d) The recent democratization of the political systems in each state.

You may pursue any strategy when negotiating this issue with representatives of your counterpart state. The outcomes of stalemate (i.e., continued hostility and the presence of a non-recognized border) or war are possible, in addition to any number of agreements in between these two outcomes. If your negotiations end in the decision to engage in war, your fate as a state, as well as the government (i.e., victory or defeat), will be decided through an impartial mechanism employed by the simulation facilitator. Finally, your state will be issued confidential information at the start of the simulation. You may use this information any way that you wish, although you are reminded that sharing this information with your counterpart state will obviously make it less confidential, and perhaps, less valuable to you.

Confidential Information

Chinazambia

As an active participant in the diplomacy of the democratic state of Chinazambia in the negotiations with Boliviafranca, you confront several issues, incentives, and constraints regarding your decision-making calculus. Therefore it is important that you keep the following in mind when devising your policy:

1. Your intelligence services estimate your chances of winning a renewed war with Boliviafranca as distinctly *less than even*. Additionally, the prevailing mood in your state is distinctly anti-war;
2. Although the ethnic Hoodoos have migrated in a pattern such that they are straddling the Curvy River, you cannot leave them unprotected, as their leaders are critical to the sustainability of your coalition in the fledgling national legislature;
3. You are aware that Boliviafranca is in need of oil in order to expand their profitable farming industry, because petroleum is essential for the production of fertilizer;
4. The slash and burn methods of the Boliviafrancan farmers that have moved into the forests is fouling the waters of Fish Lake and reducing the size of your catch per annum; and
5. You desperately need to import food, as a string of prior governments failed to develop the agricultural sector of your economy, despite the fact that your population is growing steadily.


Confidential Information

Boliviafranca

As an active participant in the democratic state of Boliviafranca in the negotiations with Chinazambia, you confront several issues, incentives, and constraints regarding your position in the negotiations. Therefore it is important that you keep the following in mind when devising your policy:

1. Your intelligence services report that Boliviafranca has a military advantage over Chinazambia, and therefore you see war as a potentially feasible route to achieving your goals. Specifically, you place your odds of victory through war at *roughly 70 percent*;
2. While the agricultural sector in Boliviafranca is profitable, the supply of land is decreasing at the same time that the number of Farmers is increasing, and therefore land prices have soared. As a result, Farmers are migrating westward and are cultivating new farmland in the forests along, and to the west of, the Stalemate Line;
3. The aforementioned Farmers are potentially very powerful politically, so you must be very careful with how you accommodate their preferences during the negotiation;
4. You believe that Chinazambia is recklessly overfishing Fish Lake;
5. You believe that the Hoodoos have designs on your newly discovered diamond mines to the east of Curvy River; and
6. You are dependent on oil for machinery and fertilizer in your agricultural sector, but the current dispute has led Chinazambia to limit selling its high-grade, geographically proximate crude oil to you, thereby making the oil you do import more expensive.

Figure 2: Territorial Dispute Between Chinazambia & Boliviafranca.



Debriefing Questions

1. How did your state's democratic decision making affect your negotiation strategy?
2. How did the different subgroups within the states interact over the course of the simulation? Did inter-group tensions arise? If so, why?
3. What were the major issues of contention within your state?
4. How does the "security dilemma" relate to your experiences in the simulation?
5. Did your state follow an explicitly realist or liberal-based strategy, or some alternative, for engaging the other state?
6. Describe concretely some of the tensions between what was politically viable domestically and what the other state desired during the negotiations. It helps to think of this utilizing a two-level game framework.
7. Did the "tragedy of the commons," the notion of scarce economic resources, and the prospects for future economic growth, affect your decision-making? How so?
8. What explains variation in the outcomes of negotiation across the set of two-state teams participating in the simulation? If variation is absent, what explains the uniformity of outcomes?