

The Birth of Nations?
The Durability of Imposed Polities & the Future of Iraq
& Afghanistan

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Abstract

What makes an imposed polity more or less durable? The futures of the polities in contemporary Iraq and Afghanistan underscore the importance of this question, and we address it with a framework anchored to the policy choices made by the imposing parties, the political, social, and economic characteristics prevailing in the state hosting the imposed polity, and the international environment within which the imposed polity is nested. We use survival analysis and a sample of 60 imposed polities for the 1816-1994 period to test expectations derived with the framework. We conclude that while democratic institutions increase imposed polity durability, the converse effect obtains in ethnically heterogeneous host states. Imposed polities are less durable under conditions of domestic and interstate conflict, and when the state hosting the imposed polity is militarized, but bolstered by the cumulative presence of the imposing parties. Our analysis facilitates the development of forecasts of the likely durability of the democratic polities in contemporary Iraq.

1 Introduction

What explains the durability of political systems that are imposed from abroad? The necessity of answering this question is underscored by the contemporary cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, wherein the international community is cultivating fledgling democratic institutions. One perspective is that durable democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan are feasible, because aspirations for democracy are universal, and therefore the citizens of these two states will embrace and perpetuate democracy as a superior form of government, much like the durable post-WWII regimes in West Germany and Japan (Bush, 2003; Dawisha, 2004). An alternative perspective is more skeptical of the durability of democratic institutions in two states notable for their exiguous democratic traditions, strong ethnic divisions, weak or poorly diversified economies, and hostile regional environments (Diamond, 2005), a process more reflective of the short-lived democracy imposed by the British in Sudan in 1956 rather than the post-war West Germany and Japan.

Their plausibility notwithstanding, neither of the aforementioned perspectives is grounded in a rigorous, generalizable analysis of the durability of imposed polities. In particular, it is unclear whether the cases of West Germany, Japan, or even Sudan, are indicative of the durability of imposed democratic institutions. Contemporary policy prognostications suggest that, rather than polity durability flowing solely from regime type, imposed polity durability is a function of social, political, and economic conditions in the state hosting the imposed polity, as well as policy choices made by the imposing parties. For example, the degree of prior experience with democratic institutions (Byman, 2003; Dawisha, 2004; Ottaway and Lieven, 2002), economic prosperity (Dawisha and Dawisha, 2003; Marsden, 2003), ethnic heterogeneity (Byman, 2003; Wimmer, 2003), as well as the commitment of the imposing parties (Benomar, 2004; Carothers, 2003; Dobbins, 2003; Edelstein, 2004) each are anticipated to influence the durability of democracy in the contemporary cases.

Here, we present the first generalizable assessment of these policy claims by drawing on the insights from both the comparative politics and international relations fields to de-

velop a framework enabling us to study the durability of imposed polities. Specifically, our framework is anchored to three primary causal sources: (1) the policy choices made by the imposing party during the imposition process; (2) the political, social, and economic conditions in the state hosting the imposed polity; and (3) the international environment within which the imposed polity is nested.

Our study enables us to make contributions to the scholarly literature on institutional change and durability, in addition to gaining significant purchase on questions of contemporary policy import. Briefly, we conclude that while imposed democracies are often more durable in general, this durability erodes significantly in ethnically heterogeneous states. Additionally, we find clear evidence that while the commitment of imposing states increases the durability of the polities that they impose, domestic and interstate conflict (e.g., insurgency, war) undermine imposed polities. Finally, empirically-derived simulations indicate that the durability of the Iraqi democracy hinges on the capacity of an Iraq government and the coalition forces to reduce domestic instability in the form of insurgency and lawlessness. Under conditions of domestic or international peace, the predicted median durability of the Iraqi democracy is approximately 44 years; however, pervasive domestic or foreign conflict reduces the polity's expected durability to approximately 6 years.

Our inquiry into the persistence of imposed polities is structured as follows. In the following section, we discuss the prior treatment of domestic regime durability in the comparative politics and international relations literatures. Next, we develop a set of theoretically derived hypotheses corresponding to the aforementioned triad of causal sources. We set out our research design and execute our hypothesis tests in the following section. In turn, we rely on our statistical analysis to forecast the likely durability of the democratic polity in Iraq. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of the study for understanding polity durability, as well as the contemporary cases.

2 Regime Type & Durability

The study of the durability of political systems, one that is longstanding in the field of comparative politics, sits at the nexus of studies of polity persistence and regime change. Although early research focused on the centrality of legitimacy and capacity in the durability of political systems (e.g., Huntington, 1968), subsequent research on polity persistence centers upon the role of polity type, primarily the performance of democratic regimes relative to other regime types. Foundational research focused on the authority characteristics that correlated with the durability of a set of institutions, or polities (Gurr, 1974). Recent analysis by Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates and Gleditsch (2001) and Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi (2000) corroborate Gurr's (1974) conclusion that democratic polities are more durable relative to alternative institutional arrangements.

Regime durability is implicit in the study of the relationship between economic development and democratic institutions. The positive relationship between democracy and economic development emerges in several studies associated with the modernization approach to political development (e.g., Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, 1994; Cutright, 1963; Diamond, 1992; Jackman, 1973; Lipset, 1959). Yet, despite the fact that the positive relationship between democracy and development is robust in global samples, important temporal, regional and spatial variations (Mainwaring and Perez-Linan, 2003; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, 1994), as well as non-linearities (Mainwaring and Perez-Linan, 2003; Muller, 1985; O'Donnell, 1973), are identified in the literature, suggesting that the relationship is causally complex with important heterogeneity underlying aggregate uniformity.

Studies of regime durability dovetail with research on the causes of domestic regime changes. For example, early research suggested that splits within military governments contributed to transitions to democratic governments (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986), while subsequent work emphasizes, in part, the role of economic dependency (Evans, 1979). Some research underscores the presence of regional heterogeneity in terms of whether such transitions are elite- or mass-driven, with evidence of the former in Latin America (Bermeo, 1997),

and evidence of the latter in Eastern Europe and Africa during the post-Cold War period (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). The contextual conditions conducive to regime changes include poverty and economic prosperity (Londregan and Poole, 1990; Londregan and Poole, 1996), economic crisis (Bermeo, 1990; Haggard and Kaufman, 1995; Remmer, 1990; Remmer, 1991), and authority structures in authoritarian regimes Geddes (1999).

While the bulk of the research on regime type and transition emphasizes domestic sources of such changes, important research underscores the importance of international sources of domestic policy choices (Remmer, 1990). Additional research emphasizes the relevance of international sources of domestic regime changes. For example, geographic proximity to democratic regime changes (Colaresi and Thompson, 2003; Huntington, 1991; Starr, 1991; Starr, 1995; Starr and Lindborg, 2003), membership in international organizations (Pevehouse, 2002), the power of the democratic community in an interstate-system (Kadera, Crescenzi and Shannon, 2003), as well as the regional concentration of democracy (Cederman and Gleditsch, 2004; Gasiorowski, 1995; Gleditsch, 2002) each are identified as stimulants of democratization and democratic durability.

Given the extensive analysis of domestic regimes, research on political systems imposed from abroad is relatively scant. This might be attributed to the fact that the timing of foreign impositions is relatively unsurprising (Olson, 1993), as well the fact that this type of “constitutional engineering” fell from policy-making favor in the post-colonial period (Gurr, 1974), and therefore was unlikely to present a recurrent phenomenon necessitating scientific study. This said, scattered scholarly work does bear on the issue of imposed political systems. For example, while relatively rare events historically, Owen (2002) demonstrates that the imposition of domestic political systems is, in fact, a recurrent, even pivotal, event in the history of the international system. While myriad interests underly imposer motives—e.g., supplanting historically threatening regimes, facilitating access to resources, cultivating reliable allies, and proliferating similar political systems (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow, 2003; Liberman, 1996; Meernik, 1996; Peceny, 1999; Werner, 1999)—these interests

remain viable for states in the contemporary international system.

Despite the varying motives of imposing states and the dynamics that can undermine the cultivation of political institutions in another state, the process of imposition—essentially, “nation-building”—is distinct from the “butcher and bolt” strategy of punitive, often brief, military interventions characteristic of major power behavior in the nineteenth century (Boot, 2002, Ch. 2). Indeed, nation-building usually involves not only cultivating political institutions, but also creating social, economic, and security environments that positively reinforce said political institutions. As such, the process of imposition is generally costly to the state imposing the political institutions (hereafter, the *imposer*) in time and resources. Imposers must walk a fine line between cultivating a durable political system on the one hand, and generating public backlash in the imposed polity against the imposer’s presence, the imposer’s artificial supply of institutional capacity, and the imposed polity’s inherent lack of legitimacy (Linz, 1978; Shain and Linz, 1995). Here, we assume that implicit in an imposer’s decision to impose political institutions on another state is a *preference for durable political institutions*. How do the imposing states achieve the goal of durable imposed political institutions? We address this question in the following section.

3 Imposed Polity Durability

When imposing political institutions, imposers seek to implement policies that are likely to increase the chances that the institutions will endure, and neutralize those conditions that undermine durability. As such, imposing states can, to some degree, alter the odds of an imposed polity enduring through strategy and policy choice; at the same time, some causal conditions influencing imposed polity durability, such as the political culture of the state hosting the imposed polity, are generally immutable. Therefore, to study polity durability, we draw insights from the comparative and international relations literatures to develop a framework of imposed polity durability that is anchored to three general sources of causality: (1) the policy choices made by the imposing parties during the imposition process, such as

type of polity and level of commitment; (2) the political, social, and economic conditions prevailing in the state into which the polity is imposed; and, (3) the international security environment within which the state hosting the imposed polity is nested. We develop expectations derived from this framework in the following sub-sections.

3.1 Imposer Policy Choices

3.1.1 Regime Type

Given the emphasis on democracy in the contemporary cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, we focus on the imposition of this regime type here. Two general causal arguments link democratic institutions with imposed polity durability. The first argument is grounded in the idea that democratic institutions are universally appealing, as well as providing a set of formal, institutionalized mechanisms for relatively large electorates to engage the political process peacefully. In contrast to their autocratic counterparts, democratic institutions should encourage expressions of policy preferences through non-violent modes of participation, such as voting (McClintock, 1998; Snyder, 1992; Wickham-Crowley, 1992). Furthermore, democratic political systems are less likely to engage in repression (Poe, Tate and Keith, 1999), and as such are less likely to plunge into the vicious cycle of revolt, government repression, and further revolt (Hibbs, 1973; Moore, 1998; Schatzman, 2005). Following this logic, imposed democratic polities should facilitate peaceful political demands and avoid stimulating violent reactions by dissatisfied constituents; in turn, these polities should be more durable than alternative institutional arrangements.

Hypothesis 3.1 *Imposed democratic polities are more durable than alternative polity types.*

An alternative perspective suggests that democratic polities are less capable of assuaging the political, economic, and social demands from their publics. In part, this reasoning emphasizes the influence of institutional consolidation on political stability, with some evidence suggesting that poorly consolidated regimes are more likely to experience domestic political instability, even civil war (Ellingsen, 2000; Hegre et al., 2001). By definition, imposed

polities are nascent and institutionally unconsolidated. In general, these polities are less capable of responding to the demands of domestic constituencies (Deustch, 1961; Huntington, 1968; Tilly, 1978), central to which are low levels of political legitimacy and capacity (Jackman, 1993; Linz, 1978; Lipset, 1959; Shain and Linz, 1995). The problem of institutional consolidation initially might be exacerbated in imposed democratic polities, wherein policymaking power is diffused across potentially rival institutions, and the process of sorting out institutional prerogatives and precedents can further limit policymaking efficiency and implementation, particularly in the short-term. By this reasoning, imposed democratic polities are likely to be less durable relative to alternative polity types.

Hypothesis 3.2 *Imposed democratic polities are less durable than alternative polity types.*

3.1.2 Imposer Commitment

Central to the durability of nation-building is the commitment of the imposer. This contribution might, for example, consist of the degree to which an imposing party provides domestic or interstate security, the magnitude of material aid, the shepherding of a constitution, or the selection of political leaders. Research on nation-building suggests that the greater the magnitude, persistence, and diversity of the imposing parties' program of polity imposition, the greater the likelihood that nation-building will succeed (Dobbins, McGinn, Crane, Jones, Lal, Rathmell, Swanger and Timilsina, 2003; Edelstein, 2004). Therefore, greater imposer commitment should translate into greater polity durability.

Hypothesis 3.3 *The greater an imposer's commitment, the greater an imposed polity's durability.*

3.1.3 Militarization

Imposed polities initially have limited legitimacy and policy capacity, and as a result these polities are likely to experience domestic challenges to their power. Imposed polities often respond to this lack of legitimacy and limited capacity, and the domestic insecurity that

often flourishes in such an environment, by increasing the capability of the domestic security apparatus, such as the police and military agencies, the first step in establishing the rule of law and deterring political challenges to the polity. In addition to deterring such challenges, militarization can exert positive effects on other political, economic, and social processes associated with “nation-building” via the greater distribution of public funds (Dixon and Moon, 1986). In sum, by deterring challenges to the polity and increasing government intervention in the economy, militarization should increase a polity’s durability.

Hypothesis 3.4 *The greater the militarization of an imposed polity, the greater its durability.*

Alternatively, militarization might very well fuel a cycle of violence in which militarized agents in imposed polities overreact to non-violent manifestations of public discontent, such as protest, thereby exacerbating the degree to which this discontent is marked by violence (Gurr, 1970; Huntington, 1968), and a process that might spark the familiar cycle of protest, repression, and further protest (Lichbach, 1987; Moore, 1998). Furthermore, while the militarization of an imposed polity can provide short-term institutional backbone for the new imposed polity, militarization might inadvertently empower capable domestic challengers to an imposed polity, such as the military (Hibbs, 1973). Therefore, rather than increase an imposed polity’s durability, militarization might undermine durability.

Hypothesis 3.5 *The greater the militarization of an imposed polity, the less durable the polity.*

3.2 Political, Social, & Economic Conditions

3.2.1 Social Fabric

Differences between, as well as the relationships among, politicized groups are central to a society’s social fabric. For example, ethnic identities (i.e., the physical, cultural, linguistic, customary, and historical attributes associated groups of individuals) are visible symbols of

the varied nature of a society's social fabric, and as such provide ready vehicles for political leaders seeking to consolidate political power with appeals to nationalism accompanied by political, economic, and social discrimination (Fearon and Laitin, 1996; Gurr and Harff, 1994; Snyder, 2000). Nationalist appeals grounded in social differences, and the attendant emergence of “winners” and “losers” from these policies, are likely to increase the probability of political instability in an imposed polity, outcomes that challenge the polity's viability. In turn, challenges grounded in social fabric are likely to reduce an imposed polity's durability.

Hypothesis 3.6 *The greater the degree of heterogeneity in an imposed polity's social fabric, the less durable the polity.*

While Hypothesis 3.6 anticipates a general relationship between social fabric and imposed polity durability, this negative relationship may be a function of the type of regime that is imposed. Some scholars suggest that democratic political systems are prone to greater instability in environments characterized by heterogeneous social fabric, particularly when this heterogeneity is anchored to ethnic differences. Democratization of heterogeneous states, then, is likely to increase the probability of extreme political violence (Hibbs, 1973; Horowitz, 1985; Mousseau, 2001; Snyder, 2000). Here, we explore whether this expectation obtains for democratic polities that are imposed under conditions of social fabric heterogeneity.

Hypothesis 3.7 *Imposed democratic polities are likely to be less durable when imposed in states with heterogeneous social fabrics.*

3.2.2 Political Culture

Studies of regime transitions, particularly democratization, emphasize that civic culture conditions the success of new democracies (Almond, 1980; Diamond, 1993). This is due to the fact that norms of tolerance, trust in state institutions, egalitarianism, and willingness to compromise are essential for fashioning a political culture that can sustain a democratic polity. Despite the emphasis in the literature linking political culture with the success of

democratic polities, this dynamic is not exclusive to democratic systems. For instance, civic culture also develops in non-democratic political systems, wherein authoritarian regimes provide political and economic security, and develop legitimacy with constituents. As such, the civic culture associated with authoritarian regimes can be inculcated in a state's population, and in turn, increase the likelihood that subsequent authoritarian polities emerging, or imposed, in a state will be accepted by a population as legitimate forms of government. Political culture in the form of a population's prior experience with forms of government, therefore, increases the durability of imposed polities.

Hypothesis 3.8 *Political culture increases an imposed polity's durability.*

3.2.3 Economic Development

Economic prosperity and development serve to satisfy the material needs of the population in an imposed polity, bolstering the polity's legitimacy and political capacity (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Przeworski et al., 2000). The economic performance of a political system provides a key signal to the populace regarding a political system's capacity to govern, such that in order to persist, fledgling states must deliver security, stability, and economic growth (Easterly, 2001; Grindle, 1997; van de Walle, 2001). Central to this thinking is the idea that unmet expectations represent a fundamental source of overt challenges to a political system (Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970; Hibbs, 1973). Similarly, an imposed polity is most likely to be regarded as successful by its constituents by the degree to which it is able to deliver a relatively more prosperous economic environment for its citizens. Because satisfied citizens are less likely to engage in political challenges to an imposed polity than unsatisfied citizens, economic prosperity will reduce the occurrence of political conflict directed at the imposed polity, thereby translating into greater polity durability.

Hypothesis 3.9 *Greater economic development increases the durability of an imposed polity.*

3.2.4 Domestic Political Challenges

The emergence of overt forms of domestic political challenge, particularly those that are grounded in conflictual behavior (e.g., insurgencies, rebellions, assassinations), demonstrate the incapacity of the polity to deter such challenges and maintain public order, thereby eroding the polity's legitimacy. As the legitimacy of a political system erodes, citizens are less likely to participate in the new political institutions, and the cycle of challenges to a weakened polity is likely to be perpetuated. Under these conditions, citizens are likely to turn their support to political groups advertising alternatives to the status quo. This resort to alternatives is identified in the scholarly literature as a primary cause of domestic regime transitions (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Przeworski, 1991). As such, overt domestic political challenges are likely to erode the durability of imposed polities.

Hypothesis 3.10 *Domestic political challenges decrease the durability of an imposed polity.*

3.3 Foreign Policy Threats

Imposed polities are likely to have a strong impact on the degree of interstate security in the regional sub-systems into which they are imposed. Maoz (1996) contends that changes in domestic political regimes encourage the new revolutionary state or regime to resort to conflict abroad in an effort to mobilize domestic resources and provide domestic scapegoats. Such changes can stimulate neighboring states to target the new revolutionary state or regime as a threat to the regional status quo. Working from this reasoning, two arguments link foreign policy security with the durability of imposed polities. First, imposed polities that confront significant threats from abroad may be compelled to divert precious resources away from delivering public goods and resources. Doing so, however, decreases the capacity of the polity to satisfy its citizens' domestic political, economic, and social expectations. This security-driven incapacity, in turn, increases domestic dissatisfaction and increases the probability that dissatisfied elements will resort to domestic political challenges, and in turn decreases the expected durability of an imposed polity.

Hypothesis 3.11 *Foreign policy threats reduce the durability of an imposed polity.*

Alternatively, foreign threats to a state’s security may generate beneficial effects. Political leaders may prefer the presence of foreign threats because such threats afford the state a rationale for mobilizing domestic resources, increase political centralization, and stimulate the convergence of domestic preferences with respect to policy choice. In short, foreign threats, and war-making in particular, facilitate the state-making process (Maoz, 1996; Tilly, 1978; Thies, 2005). This logic suggests that imposed polities may benefit from the presence of foreign policy threats, as political leaders gain greater control over the political process, resources, and public allegiance, developments that translate into greater polity durability.

Hypothesis 3.12 *Foreign policy threats increase the durability of an imposed polity.*

4 Research Design

4.1 Externally Imposed Polities

We draw on the identification of polity origin in the *Polity III*d data set (version November 2000) (McLaughlin, Gates, Hegre, Gissinger and Gleditsch, 1998), in addition to cross-checking these cases with the *The Encyclopedia of World History* (Stearns, 2001), to identify a sample of imposed polities persisting in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Specifically, we rely on *Polity III*d’s coding of the variables *ORIG1* (Origin of New Nation’s Polity), *ORIG3* (Established Nations, External Conflict), and *MODEL* (Source of [Polity] Model) to identify our basic sample.¹ The variable *ORIG1* coding values of 1 and 2 reflect new polities imposed in *new states*.² Second, the *ORIG3* coding values of 2 and 3 reflect polities imposed in *existing states*.³ Finally, the variable *MODEL* coding value of 1 enables us to identify several additional cases of imposed polities.⁴

Relying on these coding rules for identifying imposed polities, we define imposed *democratic* polities as those polities receiving a coding value of greater than zero for the *Polity*

IIId composite regime score variable (i.e., *DEMAUT*). This standard for democracy is lower than the threshold of greater than six that is familiar in the international relations literature. However, we argue that imposed democracies, such as those potentially imposed in contemporary Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, often fall below this threshold while still reflecting distinct democratic institutions and authority patterns, and thereby constitute imposed democratic polities generally defined. We rely on the same logic to define imposed *autocratic* polities as those polities receiving a *DEMAUT* value less than zero for the variable. Based on these coding criteria, 62 imposed polities endure during the 1800-1994 period. Two imposed polities drop from our sample due to incompatibilities between the *Polity* and the Correlates of War (COW) samples.⁵ The remaining 60 cases of imposed polity are reported in the Table 1, of which 27 are democratic and 33 are autocratic.

[Table 1 About Here]

For each case of imposed polity, we assume that the polity endures until its respective *DEMAUT* score crosses the zero value on the *DEMAUT* scale, at which point we code the imposed polity as ceasing to endure.⁶ Therefore, an imposed polity can span several “polities,” or case numbers, as defined in the *Polity IIId* data. By way of example, we code the imposed democratic polity in Sri Lanka as enduring from 1948 through *DEMAUT* values of 7, 7, 8, -88, 5, 3, 7 until the terminal year of our analysis, 1994. The coding of the durability of imposed autocratic polities is carried out in analogous fashion. We rely on the spatial and temporal domain identified by the COW to drive our merge with data with the dates of democratic and autocratic imposed polities identified primarily with the *Polity IIId* data series. To do so, we employ the *EUGene* (version 3.40) data generation program (Bennett and Stam, 2000) to generate a sample based on the COW (Singer and Small, 1994) state membership list. This coding procedure results in a sample for analysis of 1,993 observations for the period 1816-1994. The unit of analysis is the *imposed-polity-year*.

In our sample, imposed democracies account for 822 (41 percent) of the observations in our data sample, while imposed autocracies account for 1,181 (59 percent) of the sample

observations. Fifteen imposed polities are created prior to the year 1900. The rate of polity imposition increases over time in the modern state system, with slightly less than half (28) of the 60 imposed polities commencing after 1945. The most recent imposed polity in our sample set is the democratic polity imposed in Panama by the United States in 1989. It is important to note that by terminating in the year 1994, our sample *excludes* information from the contemporary cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, thereby facilitating out-of-sample forecasts for these cases.

4.2 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable for this study is imposed polity *durability*. Eighteen imposed polities in our sample of 60 cases do not conclude prior to the terminal point of our analysis (the year 1994), thereby exhibiting right censoring. Several cases are also left-censored in that they are recognized and coded by the *Polity III*d project as polities before the COW sample treats the states hosting these polities as sovereign.⁷ In cases of left-censoring, we code the *elapsed duration* of the imposed polity based upon the start date of the initial polity imposition as coded by the *Polity* project, rather than the start data coded by the *COW*.

Among the 43 imposed polities that terminate during the 1800-1994 interval, the mean polity durability is nearly 34 years, with the least durable polity being the imposed democracy in Sudan that lasted three years (1956–1958), and the most durable polity being the imposed autocracy in Italy/Sardinia that endured 132 years (1815–1947). The most durable imposed polity in the sample that we employ for our statistical analysis, however, is the imposed democracy in New Zealand which endured for 137 years (1857–1994). Among polities that terminate during the 1816-1994 interval, imposed democratic polities are less durable on average, enduring slightly less than 28 years, while imposed autocratic polities persist on average slightly more than 40 years.

The Kaplan–Meier survival curves reported in Figure 1 indicate that the duration of these polity types is more complex than the information conveyed by the simple measure of the mean durability. Specifically, the trends reported in Figure 1 suggest that imposed

democracies exhibit a greater failure rate *early* in their existences. Specifically, by the tenth year following imposition, more than 30 percent of the imposed democratic polities fail, while only about 10 percent of imposed autocratic polities suffer a similar fate. In fact, this trend of greater polity persistence continues for a substantial period of time, with the survival curve for imposed autocracies only dipping below that of imposed democracies after the 40th year following imposition. Among those imposed democracies that persist to the 70th year following imposition, none terminate by the 140th year following termination. Imposed autocracies, by contrast, continue to fail following the 70th anniversary of imposition such that all fail before their 140th year.

[Figure 1 About Here]

4.3 Independent Variables

4.3.1 Regime Type

A dichotomous variable coded a value of 1 if an imposed polity qualifies as democratic (i.e., $DEMAUT > 0$), and zero otherwise. In our sample of 1,993 imposed-polity-years, 822 observations (41 percent) are coded as democratic.

4.3.2 Imposer Commitment

We rely on Stearns (2001) to identify the intervals during which the imposing state(s) are physically present with military forces in the state hosting an imposed polity. We approach the coding of an imposer's presence in three ways. We create a dichotomous variable identifying whether an imposer is present in the state hosting an imposed polity in a given observation. In our sample, the imposer is present in 541 observations (27.1 percent). Additionally, we wish to separate out the effects of *initial interventions* from subsequent interventions by the imposing parties, or what we refer to as *re-interventions*. To do so, we code a variable a value of 1 during observations in which an imposing state re-intervenes in a polity, and zero otherwise. In our sample, 278 of the observations (13.9 percent) constitute periods of initial intervention, while 266 of the sample observations (13.3 percent) constitute re-interventions.

4.3.3 Ethnic Groups

We operationalize social fabric by identifying the frequency of ethnic groups in the state hosting an imposed polity. An ethnic group is defined as a group of people who identify with one another based on common language, history, religion, and cultural heritage. We rely on primarily on *Countries and their Cultures* (Ember and Ember, 2001) and *the Encyclopedia of the World's Nations* (Kurian, 2002) to base our coding decisions. For information on groups within the Italian City States and France in the 1800s, we used country histories (Davis, 2000; Di Scala, 2004; Parry, 2002). The minimum value for logged frequency of ethnic groups is 0, the maximum is 5.5, and the mean is 1.55. To examine the joint effect of ethnic cleavages and regime type, we create a multiplicative term between these two variables.

4.3.4 Similar Prior Polity

We anchor our operationalization of political culture to the idea that similar prior experience with a polity requires that the prior polity be at least as democratic (or autocratic) as the polity being imposed. We code a dichotomous variable a value of 1 if an imposed polity had prior experience with a polity reflecting a *DEMAUT* score equal to, greater than (in the case of imposed democracies), or less than (in the case of imposed autocracies) the value of *DEMAUT* in the first year of an imposed polity's existence in our sample. Fifteen of the imposed polities (25 percent) exhibit prior experience with a similar polity.⁸

4.3.5 Economic Development

We rely on *EUGene* to calculate the natural log of the sum of two components of the Composite Indicator of National Capabilities (CINC) data (energy consumption and iron and steel production) for each observation in our sample.⁹ We add a value of 1 to the summed components to avoid calculating the natural log of a zero value. In our sample, the minimum value for this variable is 0, the maximum value is 13.36, and the mean value is 6.75.

4.3.6 Militarized

We rely on *EUGene* to calculate the per capita military personnel in each imposed-polity-year. For the purposes of readability, we multiply this proportion by 100 to obtain the percentage of an imposed polity's population that is part of a state's military. In our sample, the minimum value for this variable is 0, the maximum value is 16.8, and a mean value is .90.

4.3.7 Domestic Political Challenge

We include a broad range of manifestations of domestic political challenge to imposed polities, including insurgency, rebellion, riots, strikes, protests, anti-government demonstrations, and assassinations (successes and attempts). We use Stearns (2001) to identify intervals during which political challenges are ongoing. In turn, we operationalize a dichotomous variable coded a value of 1 in an imposed-polity-year in which any one of the aforementioned domestic challenge events occurs during the prior five-year period (to capture the lagged impact of these events), and zero otherwise. In our data sample of 1,993 imposed-polity-years, 584 (29 percent) of the sample is coded as having experienced a domestic political challenge within the previous 5 years.

4.3.8 Foreign Policy Security

We rely on three variables to assess the degree to which an imposed polity experiences, or is likely to experience, threats to its interstate security. First, we rely on *EUGene* to create a dichotomous variable identifying whether or not in an imposed polity participated in an interstate war at any point in the previous five years. In our sample, 268 (13.4 percent) imposed-polity-years have a war within this time frame. Second, we rely on *EUGene* to identify whether an imposed polity engaged in a defense pact with an original imposing state in each observation, and create a dichotomous variable coded a value of 1 when a defense pact is present, and zero otherwise. In our sample of 1,993 imposed-polity-years 668 (33.5 percent) reflect defense pact agreements between imposed polities. Third, to examine the effect that

the region in which a polity is imposed exerts on durability, we create a variable measuring the frequency of similar neighboring polities. This variable is calculated by counting the number of states within 500 miles sharing the same polity type as each imposed polity. We use *EUGene* (Bennett and Stam, 2000) to generate the distances between states. A state is coded as in the same region of an imposed polity if the distance between its capital and the capital of the imposed polity is less than or equal to 500 miles or if the two countries share a land border. We employ data from *Polity IV* (Marshall and Jaggers, 2000) to code the combined polity score for each state in an imposed polity's neighborhood. For democratic imposed polities, all states within the 500 mile range with a polity score greater than zero are coded as similar neighbors. For autocratic imposed polities, all states within 500 miles with a polity score less than zero are coded as similar neighbors. We calculate this variable for each year in which an imposed polity persists such that the number of similar neighbors of each imposed polity can rise or fall across time. This variable exhibits a minimum value of 0, a maximum value of 11, and a mean value of 2.46.

4.4 Method

To avoid the incorrect assignment of duration for left- and right-censored cases, we estimate a Cox duration model which correctly accounts for this phenomenon (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004).¹⁰ Due to the fact that the Cox model assumes proportional hazards, it is necessary that we test that this proportionality assumption is plausible for each covariate that we specify in our Cox models. In the event that we encounter a covariate that violates this assumption (i.e., exhibits non-proportionality), we correct for this non-proportionality by including an additional term in the model reflecting the interaction between the offending variable and the natural logarithm of elapsed time (in calendar years).

5 Analysis

The results of our analysis of the durability of imposed polities are reported in two models in Table 2.¹¹ Our analysis indicates that, in many cases, imposing a democracy significantly

increases the durability of an imposed polity. However, our analysis also suggests that the effect of democratic political institutions on imposed polity durability is contingent on the ethnic heterogeneity of the state hosting the imposed polity. As the frequency of ethnic groups in a state receiving an imposed polity increases, the stabilizing benefit of democracy not only declines but polity failure actually becomes more likely. For example, an imposed democratic polity in a state with four ethnic groups is 60 percent less likely to fail than an imposed autocracy in a similar host state. Our model, however, reflects a threshold point of about 29 ethnic groups after which imposed democracy makes polity failure more likely. An imposed democracy in a state with 40 ethnic groups is 17 percent more likely to fail at any point in time than an imposed autocracy in a similarly heterogenous state. The imposed polity established in Zimbabwe in 1965, a state with 5 ethnic groups, persisted for 23 years. By contrast, a similarly democratic polity established in Sudan in 1956, a state with 56 ethnic groups, only persisted until 1958, or three years. We illustrate the general interactive effect between imposed polity regime type, ethnicity, and polity durability in Figure 2.

[Table 2 About Here]

[Figure 2 About Here]

The relationship between democracy, ethnicity and polity durability suggests a tradeoff imposing powers make between legitimacy and political efficacy in efforts to impose a durable polity upon another state. On one hand, imposed democracies, by engaging large segments of the populace to participate in governance seem to facilitate a “buy-in” by the citizens in the imposed polity that functions to produce a durable political system. Yet, democracy also makes governance more difficult, particularly in ethnically heterogenous states, wherein ethnic groups may quickly conclude that the new polity lacks the capacity to restrain competing ethnic groups from engaging in intra-group violence. Our findings with respect to the effects of ethnic heterogeneity on the performance of imposed autocratic polities is consistent with this logic. We find that as the ethnic heterogeneity of a state increases, the durability of an

imposed autocracy also increases. This effect most likely reflects the increased difficulty in mobilizing effective opposition to an imposed autocratic polity in an environment of many competing ethnic groups.

Although policymakers and analysts alike often cite the importance of prior democratic experience for the development of democratic regimes, our analysis reveals a more general effect. Specifically, while prior democratic experience does increase the durability of imposed democracies, prior experience with autocratic polities also increases the durability of imposed autocracies. For example, a five year old imposed polity with previous experience with a similar polity is 84 percent less likely to fail than a polity without such experience. Although prior experience with a similar polity can promote the persistence of an imposed polity, this effect wanes the longer the polity persists such that a 15 year old imposed polity with a previous experience with a similar polity is only 17 percent less likely to fail than one without such a similar experience. Beyond 15 years, previous experience with a similar polity actually functions to increase the probability of polity failure. This curvilinear effect is illustrated in Figure 3.

[Figure 3 About Here]

Although we lack a clear explanation for the finding that previous experience with a polity type reduces the survival of older imposed polities, one possible explanation might be a differential effect between new and existing states in their responses to imposed polities. While imposed polities in new states begin with a blank slate and have little basis for comparison, older imposed polities bring with them the historical experience of previous polities that can serve as a basis for comparison. This comparison effect is likely to be particularly strong among imposed polities who have previously experienced a similar polity and have a stronger basis for comparison. Citizens in these states may, over time, become more likely to critically evaluate the performance of the imposed regime, hastening the polity's failure.

Clearly, the analysis reported in Table 2 underscores the central importance of domestic and interstate security to the durability of imposed polities. In the domestic realm, domestic political challenges significantly increase the likelihood an imposed polity will fail. Indeed, the occurrence of a domestic political challenge at any point during the prior five years more than quintuples the probability of that the imposed polity will fail. Similarly, in foreign policy, international conflict in the form of warfare between the imposed polity and other states more than triples the risk that an imposed polity will fail.

Interestingly, our analysis suggests that although domestic and international security threats erode the durability of imposed polities, the most concrete step that imposed polities can take to mitigate these threats, the militarization of the state hosting an imposed polity, also undercuts durability. For example, a one standard deviation increase in the level of militarization in the state hosting an imposed polity increases the probability of the polity's failure by more than 28 percent. This finding can be interpreted in two ways. First, as the proportion of the population in military service increases, the level of resource commitment to the military is also likely to increase. As greater resources are channeled to an imposed polity's military, fewer resources are available for distribution to the imposed polity's citizenry in the form of infrastructure and social spending. In this sense, as the resources with which an imposed polity can demonstrate its effectiveness in governance to the population declines, its durability is undermined. Considered together, these results suggest that imposed polities are most likely to persist when they are imposed in environments in which they avoid domestic and foreign security threats, and militarization is minimal.

Model 1 in Table 2 indicates that the presence of the imposer in the state hosting the imposed polity significantly reduces the likelihood that the polity will fail. Yet, our analysis indicates that while imposed polities often experience an initial intervention by the imposing power, these polities may also experience a re-intervention after the initial imposition forces withdraw. To determine whether re-interventions exert a differential effect on imposed polity durability, we decompose the variable measuring the presence of an imposer in an observation

into the sub-categories *initial intervention* and *re-intervention*, and report the results in Table 2, model 2.

Interestingly, the presence of the forces of the imposing power during the initial intervention is not significantly related to the durability of imposed polities. While this null finding is at first surprising, further consideration of the effect of an initial imposition force suggests an explanation. During the initial imposition period, the presence of the imposing power is likely to have two disparate effects upon the imposed polity. First, the presence of the imposing power furnishes valuable resources for the maintenance of security in an imposed polity, increasing the polity's durability. Second, the presence of an imposing power, particularly during the initial intervention, tends to serve as a rallying point for opponents of the new polity and nationalists seeking to the imposer's military forces. In this respect, the presence of an imposer during the initial period of imposition might stimulate opposition and undermine a new polity. Considered together, the antipodal effects of the imposer's presence provides a basis for explaining the general null effect that imposers appear to exert during the initial intervention period.

While imposing forces during the initial imposition period do not significantly influence the survival of imposed polities, re-interventions by imposing powers do significantly influence durability. Specifically, during the initial years of an imposed polity, a re-intervention by an imposing power significantly increases an imposed polity's durability. Indeed, a re-intervention during the first 10 years of an imposed polity's existence reduces the probability that the polity will fail during that year nearly to zero. This relationship suggests that when imposing powers contemplate the decision to re-intervene into in an imposed polity, they should do so in a way that compensates for the negative public backlash to the presence of the imposer.

However, the effect of re-intervention on the durability of imposed polities is temporally non-constant. Specifically, the longer an imposed polity endures, the more limited the positive impact a re-intervention by an imposing power has upon the durability of an imposed

polity. A re-intervention in a 35 year old polity only reduces the probability that the polity will fail during that year by approximately 36 percent. By the time an imposed polity reaches the 40th anniversary of imposition, a re-intervention by the imposer actually increases the probability of polity failure by 8 percent. By year 45 of an imposed polity, a subsequent re-intervention by the imposing power increases the probability of polity failure by nearly 70 percent. The curvilinear impact of imposer re-intervention on the durability of imposed polities is illustrated in Figure 3.

These results point to a more complicated effect of re-interventions upon the durability of imposed polities. Initially, during the first few decades of an imposed polity's existence, the re-intervention by an imposing state provides essential security for the imposed polity by deterring threats to the latter's existence. Yet, as an imposed polity persists, the presence of an imposing power begins to exert a very different effect on the domestic politics in the imposed polity. Rather than acting as a source of stability and security for the imposed polity, the presence of the imposer undermines the viability of the imposed polity by stimulating the public perception that the imposed polity is illegitimate. This logic suggests that imposer forces face a delicate balancing act between providing security to an imposed regime without undermining support for it. Interestingly, the ability of the imposing power to support the persistence of an imposed polity appears tied to the physical presence of military forces in the polity and not a security commitment by the imposing power, as evidenced by the statistically insignificant impact of the variable accounting for defense pacts in model 2.

Our analysis of the impact of regional similarity on the durability of imposed polities indicates that little significant linkage obtains. The absence of a regional effect on imposed polity durability also suggests that whatever threat neighboring states tend to pose to imposed polities tends to arise not from a dissimilarity in regime type, but perhaps other issues that historically are sources of interstate disputes, such as territory or resources. Finally, the level of economic development in an imposed polity appears to exert little impact on polity durability, although our operationalization of economic development is crude, and we

hesitate to draw firm conclusions from this variable's performance in Table 2.

6 Forecasting the Durability of the Iraqi Polity

As an illustration of the potential durability of democratic institutions in the contemporary cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, we use the model developed above to simulate four scenarios for polity survival in Iraq. In the first scenario, a democratic polity is imposed in Iraq and coalition forces withdraw from the Iraq by the start of the year 2007 (we refer to this scenario as *Democracy Imposed/Forces Withdraw*). In the second simulation scenario, an autocratic polity is imposed in Iraq with coalition forces also withdrawing by the start of 2007 (we refer to this scenario as *Autocracy Imposed/Forces Withdraw*). The third and fourth simulation scenarios are identical to the first two scenarios, respectively, save for the fact that coalition forces remain in Iraq throughout the year 2007 (we refer to these scenarios as *Democracy Imposed/Forces Remain* and *Autocracy Imposed/Forces Remain*, respectively).¹²

Figure 4 reports the results of the four scenarios in terms of the simulated survival of an imposed polity in Iraq. In a democratic Iraq following the withdrawal of coalition forces, our analysis suggests the very low probability of the democratic polity surviving beyond the 10 year mark (see the line plot labeled *Democracy Imposed/Forces Withdraw* in Figure 4). Some policy prognosticators argue that the durability of an Iraqi democracy might be significantly enhanced by the continued presence of coalition forces within the country as a means of stabilizing the regime. Consistent with the null findings of our general model, our simulations (see the line plot labeled *Democracy Imposed/Forces Remain* in Figure 4), reflect little support for this claim. Specifically, although the median expected duration of an Iraqi democracy increases in the simulation *Democracy Imposed/Forces Remain*, this median duration only increases to slightly more than 6 years, well within the confidence interval of the simulation in which coalition forces are absent (i.e., the line plot labeled *Democracy Imposed/Forces Withdraw* in Figure 4).

[Figure 4 About Here]

Our simulations of the expected durability of a hypothetical autocratic polity in Iraq (*Autocracy Imposed/Forces Remain* and *Autocracy Imposed/Forces Withdraw*) suggest that an imposed Iraqi autocracy is likely to be significantly more durable than an imposed democracy. Such a regime has nearly a 95 percent probability of surviving 10 years, a 90 percent probability of surviving 25 years, and nearly an 80 percent chance of surviving 50 years. As was the case in the democratic Iraq simulations, the continued presence of coalition forces in Iraq does increase the expected durability of an autocratic imposed Iraqi regime but not significantly. Therefore, regime type is a very strong predictor of polity durability, with autocratic polities proving more durable than are their democratic counterparts under conditions similar to those in contemporary Iraq.

Additionally, this prognosis for the survival of a democratic polity in Iraq is likely a function of two compounding causal forces. First, Iraq has little historical democratic experience to serve as a foundation for the rapid legitimation of these institutions in the eyes of Iraqi citizens. Second, the demographic characteristics of the Iraqi state, particularly its ethnic heterogeneity, negatively influence the durability of democracy. Indeed, while the average imposed polity in our analysis has about 4.6 ethnic groups, Iraq has 12 ethnic groups. Due to Iraq's significant degree of ethnic diversity, governance will be more difficult in the state and democracy is unlikely to persist.

Despite the difficulties inherent in creating a durable democracy in a state with characteristics like contemporary Iraq, the imposition of an Iraqi autocracy, even one favorable toward U.S. interests, is unlikely to be palatable either normatively or politically in the contemporary policy environment. Our empirical model, however, enables us to provide some insight into the conditions that are likely to promote a *more durable* democratic polity in Iraq. Figure 5 illustrates an additional run of the simulation in which we explore conditions that are likely to neutralize, in part, the fragility of an Iraqi democracy, thereby increasing its durability. The level of insecurity, both domestic and foreign, is central to an imposed polity's capacity to endure. The emergence of the insurgency in Iraq following the invasion

in 2003 underscores the primacy of domestic security in Iraq and its impact on the likely durability of democratic institutions. Eliminating domestic political challenges to the democratic institutions in Iraq, as well as avoiding war between Iraq and another state, over a five-year period of time (i.e., until the year 2012, 5 years after the end of the last domestic political challenge in 2007), significantly increases the durability of an imposed democratic polity in Iraq (see the line plot labeled *Domestic Conflict or Interstate War Absent* in Figure 5). Indeed, given the absence of domestic and interstate security challenges, the median expected duration of a democratic polity in Iraq in 2012 increases to nearly 44 years, or an approximately 633 percent increase in polity durability.

[Figure 5 About Here]

Our model suggests that the path toward enhanced stability in Iraq is one of tradeoffs in the imposition process. One way to promote domestic political stability and reduce the domestic and foreign policy challenges to the imposed polity is to increase the militarization of the state, developing a larger military force with which to respond to both domestic and internal challenges. Yet, our model shows that high levels of militarization in imposed polities function to undermine imposed polity durability. In this respect, policymakers face a delicate balancing act in constructing a democratic Iraq in which they must establish a sufficiently powerful military force to meet both domestic and international threats, without diverting too many of the resources necessary for reconstruction and social spending, or empowering domestic agents that might overwhelm democratic institutions.

7 Conclusion

Understanding transitions to, and the durability of, domestic political regimes is a long-standing question in political science. Yet, to our knowledge no study to date provides a rigorous analysis of the durability of political systems imposed from abroad. Thus, despite a bevy of prognostications regarding the likely fates of the democratic polities in contemporary Iraq and Afghanistan, these assessments are made devoid of a scientific foundation. Here,

we furnish such a foundation by formulating a framework anchored to policy choices made by states that impose such polities, the domestic social, political, and economic conditions prevailing in the state hosting the imposed polity, and the international environment within which imposed polities are nested. We test expectations drawn from the framework on a sample of 60 imposed polities enduring in the period 1816–1994.

Our analysis of the durability of imposed polities facilitates drawing several potentially important conclusions. On average, while imposed democratic polities are more durable than their autocratic counterparts, democratic polities are fragile during their initial period of existence, fragility that is exacerbated by ethnic heterogeneity. Prior similar experience with a polity type enhances durability, regardless of whether an imposed polity is democratic or autocratic. Alternatively, security threats, both domestic and foreign undermine the durability of imposed polities. However, the logical response by imposed polities to security threats—namely, militarization—reduces imposed polity durability as well. Finally, while the presence of an imposing state has no significant effect on the durability of imposed polities, subsequent re-intervention by the imposing state does increase the durability of adolescent imposed polities.

Ultimately, our study of the durability of imposed polities leads us to some sobering conclusions regarding the likely durability of democratic institutions in the contemporary cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, two states that are similar in a number of respects. Relying on parameters for the Iraqi case, we conclude that the median predicted duration of the Iraqi democracy is 6 years. However, if the domestic violence in Iraq abates significantly sometime in 2007, and Iraq avoids conflict in foreign policy, the Iraqi democracy has a predicted median durability of 44 years, a dramatic increase in polity durability. Therefore, unless the fledgling democratic polities in Iraq and Afghanistan gain a monopoly on the legitimate use of force domestically, the challenges to freedom in these two states might very well be insurmountable. In turn, the flame of freedom in Iraq and Afghanistan will burn ever so briefly.

Notes

¹Although our operationalization of imposed polities is unique, studies by Maoz (1996, 127-129) and Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003, 437) each rely to some degree on the *Polity* data sample for the timing and type of polity origination and termination.

²These polities are imposed under the following conditions: “(1) Polity imposed under the tutelage of the former occupying power, while still in authority; and (2) Polity directed by the former occupying power, or another country, after, or as part of, the attainment of formal independence” (Gurr, 1990, 33).

³These polities are imposed under the following conditions: “(2) Polity change directed or imposed by foreign power(s) (including international agencies and agencies like the CIA) without direct military intervention; and (3) Polity change imposed by occupying foreign power(s) (West Germany in 1949, for example)” (Gurr, 1990, 34).

⁴These polities are imposed under the following conditions: “The polity is one that is new to the country and is imposed or prescribed by external agents. Examples are the imposition of a new form of autonomous government by an invading foreign power, such as the Vichy Regime created in France after the German invasion in 1940-41; institutions created by a decolonizing power, such as the polities of all independent African countries; and institutions created under the tutelage of foreign commissions, e.g., in Albania in 1913 and in West Germany, 1949” (Gurr, 1990, 35-6).

⁵Norway, 1814-1873 and Yugoslavia/Serbia, 1838-1858.

⁶We do not code an imposed polity as ceasing to endure during periods of “interregnum,” “interruption,” or “transition,” as defined by *Polity III*d and *Polity II*.

⁷The *Polity* project codes *polities*, whereas the COW codes *sovereign states*. As a result, the *Polity* series includes semi-autonomous polities in territories prior to statehood (e.g.,

Canada in the nineteenth century), intervals excluded from the COW sample until, in some cases, a later point in time.

⁸This is a conservative strategy for operationalizing this variable. We also employed an operationalization in which any previously positive *DEMAUT* score (i.e., > 0 constituted prior experience for imposed democratic polities and any previously negative *DEMAUT* score < 0 constituted prior experience for imposed autocratic polities). Employing this strategy, 23 imposed polities (38 percent) have similar prior experience. The more liberal coding strategy generated similar results, so we report the results from the conservative operationalization in our analysis, below.

⁹To correct for missing values, each CINC component is interpolated forward from the nearest value temporally. In state-year series where no prior value exists, missing values are interpolated backward from the nearest value.

¹⁰For robustness, we also performed the subsequent analysis with a Weibull specification. The results were substantively similar between the Cox and Weibull models. Therefore, we report the results from the Cox model due to its greater generality and ease of interpretation.

¹¹ Due to their similarity, except where noted, all probability changes are calculated based upon the estimates corresponding to model 2.

¹²The following parameter values remain constant in order to derive forecasts from the estimated parameters in model 1, Table 2: *Ethnic Groups* = 2.485, *Militarization* = .201618, *Economic Development* = 10.48947, *Democracy in Iraq* = 0, and *Frequency of Similar Neighbors* for an autocratic Iraq = 7.

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Table 1: Imposed Polities, 1816–1994.

State	Autocratic		Democratic		
	<i>DEMAUT</i> [†]	Duration	State	<i>DEMAUT</i>	Duration
Italy/Sardinia	-10	1816-1947	Guyana	2	1966-1978
Modena	-10	1842-1860	Haiti	2	1918-1935
Parma	-10	1851-1860	Kenya	2	1963-1969
Tuscany	-10	1849-1860	Lebanon	2	1946-1990
Tuscany	-10	1816-1849	Cuba	3	1902-1955
Two Sicilies	-10	1816-1821	Canada	4	1920-1994
Two Sicilies	-10	1821-1860	Zimbabwe	4	1965-1987
France	-9	1940-1946	Honduras	5	1908-1936
Papal States	-9	1816-1850	Philippines	5	1946-1972
Papal States	-9	1850-1860	Syria	5	1946-1950
Zaire	-9	1965-1994	Panama	7	1989-1994
Chile	-7	1974-1989	Singapore	7	1965-1965
German Democratic Republic	-7	1954-1990	Sri Lanka	7	1948-1994
Hungary	-7	1919-1945	Uganda	7	1962-1967
Hungary	-7	1948-1989	Austria	8	1920-1934
Kampuchea	-7	1953-1993	Cyprus	8	1960-1994
Korea (North)	-7	1948-1994	Ireland	8	1922-1994
Poland	-7	1947-1989	Nigeria	8	1960-1966
Rumania	-7	1878-1947	Sudan	8	1956-1958
Rumania	-7	1947-1990	Lesotho	9	1966-1970
Bhutan	-6	1971-1994	Mauritius	9	1968-1994
Bulgaria	-6	1946-1990	Austria	10	1946-1994
Guatemala	-6	1954-1966	Botswana	10	1966-1994
Korea (South)	-6	1949-1988	German Federal Republic	10	1955-1994
Bulgaria	-4	1908-1918	Jamaica	10	1962-1994
France	-4	1816-1848	Japan	10	1952-1994
Iraq	-4	1932-1994	Malaysia	10	1957-1994
Greece	-3	1833-1864	New Zealand	10	1920-1994
Nicaragua	-3	1909-1990			
Paraguay	-3	1870-1937			
Albania	-2	1914-1925			
Iran (Persia)	-1	1941-1979			

[†] Initial *Polity III*d composite regime score.

Table 2: Cox Models of Imposed Polity Durability, 1816-1994.

	(1)	(2)
Regime Type	-1.559** (0.69)	-1.548** (0.71)
Ethnic Groups	-0.718*** (0.24)	-0.717*** (0.24)
Ethnic Groups \times Regime Type	1.135*** (0.32)	1.179*** (0.33)
Similar Prior Polity	-4.755** (2.14)	-4.282** (2.03)
Similar Prior Polity \times Time	1.673*** (0.65)	1.513** (0.62)
Economic Development	-0.0260 (0.039)	-0.0257 (0.038)
Militarized	0.211*** (0.073)	0.200*** (0.076)
Domestic Political Challenge (in last 5 years)	1.464*** (0.43)	1.430*** (0.43)
Imposer Present	-14.23*** (3.66)	
Imposer Present \times Time	3.962*** (1.01)	
Initial Intervention		-0.463 (0.75)
Re-intervention		-14.18*** (4.05)
Re-intervention \times Time		3.864*** (1.10)
Interstate War (in last 5 yrs)	0.862** (0.42)	0.832** (0.42)
Defense Pact with Imposer	-0.634 (0.53)	-0.641 (0.54)
Similar Neighboring Polities	0.00121 (0.085)	0.00116 (0.087)
Wald χ^2 ($df = 16$)	73.00***	73.32***
p of χ^2	<0.000	<0.000
N	1993	1993

Note: Coefficients with robust standard errors in brackets.

Two-tailed significance. * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%.

Figure 1: Kaplan-Meier Survival Curves for Imposed Democratic & Autocratic Polities




Figure 2: Regime Type, Ethnicity & Imposed Polity Durability




Figure 3: Prior Experience with Polity, Imposer Re-intervention & Polity Durability




Figure 4: Survival of Democratic & Autocratic Imposed Polities in Iraq (Four Scenarios)




Figure 5: Survival of Iraqi Democracy (With & Without Security Threats)

