

To Live & Let Die?
Democratic Third Parties & the Cost–Benefit Feedback
from Intervention into Intrastate Conflicts

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Abstract

We argue that the proclivity of third parties to intervene in civil wars is rooted in the domestic political utility that third parties derive from interventions. We examine how said cost-benefit feedback influence executive turnover in democratic third-parties during the 1816–2000 period in the context of civil and extra-systemic wars. Despite the potential benefits of intervention, such as preventing or stopping genocide, domestic audiences in democratic third-parties generally interpret these interventions as costly ventures and punish their leaders for involvement in foreign intrastate conflicts by removing democratic leaders from office. Our analysis underscores that, historically, the reluctance by democracies to intervene into civil wars is grounded, in part, in the rational assessment of the negative consequences that accrue to chief executives for undertaking such interventions, negative consequences that must be balanced in order to generate the political willingness to respond to humanitarian crises similar to that occurring in contemporary Darfur, for example.

1 Introduction

In 1994, the international community watched in horror as ethnic Rwandan Hutu extremists launched a wave of systematic genocidal killings that ultimately cost the lives of approximately 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu Rwandans. This event was tragic not only because of the number of casualties inflicted, but also because the leading democratic states in the international system failed to preempt, or limit, the bloodshed in Rwanda (Carlson, Sung-Joo & Kupolati 1999). Currently, similar questions are raised by the mounting human costs of the conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan, which according to the United Nations, has exceeded 300,000 deaths and resulted in the displacement of 2.45 million Sudanese (Farley 2008). Why do the leading democratic states, states with the political and military capacity to influence intrastate conflicts, as well as political institutions anchored to individual rights and liberties, refrain from military intervention?

Several plausible explanations suggest themselves. First, this reluctance of democratic third parties might be traced to the absence of a direct threat from said conflicts, as these contemporary intrastate conflicts generally occur in developing countries, which are typically distant from the shores of potential intervening states (Huth 1998). Second, a collective-action problem emerges among democratic states with the capacity to intervene in which no one state prefers to bear the potentially significant and open-ended costs associated with intervention, despite a consensus that civil wars are detrimental to the international system, both normatively and strategically (Dowty & Loescher 1996).

A third explanation for the absence of international intervention into civil conflicts can be found in the accountability that domestic political audiences of third-party democracies exert on their policymakers for undertaking such interventions. The nature of these conflicts is often characterized by significant length, the loss of considerable blood and treasure, the absence of decisive and stable outcomes, and perhaps most important, few direct benefits to the domestic audiences. Taken together, this dynamic generates risk-averse behavior

by political leaders in potential democratic third parties, a dynamic that is most visibly documented in Power's (2002) moving book, *"A Problem From Hell"*.¹

Despite the reluctance of third parties to intervene in intrastate conflicts, historically third-party states *do* intervene in civil conflicts. We surmise that interveners are motivated by either the benefits of intervention, or the costs of non-intervention. Benefits might be derived from a number of sources, including strategic or political interests broadly defined. For example, a previous connection to the state hosting the conflict, such as a former metropole-colony relationship or a military alliance (Huth 1998, Yoon 1997), may provide significant strategic benefits to the third-party state. Intervention may also serve as a diversionary outlet for the leadership of the intervening state, an indirect way of potentially improving the popularity of the executive by simultaneously creating a "rally-'round-the-flag" effect and diverting public attention from domestic economic woes and political scandals (Ostrom & Job 1986, Howell & Pevehouse 2005). Even the decision to not intervene may bring costs in the form of international criticism and increasing instability in a neighboring state (Dowty & Loescher 1996).

We are intrigued by this tension between the seeming high cost and low payoff for intervention into civil conflicts, coupled with the observation that third parties do intervene in intrastate conflicts historically. Failure in interstate war increases the likelihood of violent regime change for direct participants, (Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson & Woller 1992), but less is known of the risks facing third parties. Even less is known about the cost benefit structures of interventions in intrastate conflicts for third party states. To date, few if any studies of third parties and civil wars examine in generalizable fashion the translation of the costs and benefits emanating from an intervention into civil war to the domestic political arenas in third-party states. Here, we assess the costs and benefits of intervention in civil conflicts

¹For a further example, consider the infamous "Black Hawk Down" (Bowden 2000) incident in Somalia in which deceased American Army Rangers were paraded through the streets of Mogadishu in 1993. This incident resulted in tangible domestic political costs early in President Bill Clinton's administration, and a rapid disengagement of American military forces from the United Nations peacekeeping operation, despite the fact that stabilizing the failed state of Somalia might very well have served American national security interests.

for democratic third-party governments by exploring the following research question: *What domestic costs and benefits accrue to third-party regimes from intervention into intrastate conflicts?* We argue that studying this question is important, because it might reveal causal processes that lead policymakers and advocates to understand patterns in intervention by democratic states, and why imploring intervention by democratic leaders often appears to fall upon deaf ears.

The remainder of our study is laid out in the following manner. In the next section we briefly discuss scholarship pertaining to war involvement and regime change, as well as our existing understanding of third-party intervention into civil wars. The subsequent section addresses the cost–benefit relationship between third-party intervention into civil war and third-party domestic outcomes, and distills a set of expectations pertaining to incentives and disincentives for democratic intervention. In turn, we develop a research design suitable for testing these expectations, and execute the analysis. We close the article with a discussion of the implications of our analysis for the study of third-party intervention into intrastate conflicts, as well as issues relevant to contemporary policymaking.

2 Prior Research

To date, the analysis of the relevance of third parties to intrastate conflicts broadly defined focuses on two primary, and related, research foci. First, extant research examines the conditions associated with intrastate conflicts that *stimulate* third-party involvement in these conflicts. Second, research examines the impact of third-party intervention on the *evolution* of intrastate conflicts, particularly their duration and outcome. In deciding whether or not to intervene in an intrastate war, leaders are plagued by two concerns: On the one hand, it is within their fiduciary role to consider the long-term interests of the state when deciding whether or not to intervene in an intrastate war; on the other hand, domestic constituencies may punish leaders who appear to have used resources for intervention when these resources could have been used for other purposes. Public perception of the purpose

behind intervention, the costs of intervention, as well as whether the intervention was a “success” or “failure” have direct implications for the leaders’ political survival. The question then becomes not only how proficient leaders are in conveying to the public why intervention is important, but also in making sure that they have correctly assessed the costs, benefits, and likelihood of success of intervention. Where they have been shown to be wrong in their assessments, the consequences can mean removal from office.

Our inquiry into the feedback of domestic costs and benefits to third parties that intervene into intrastate conflicts parallels a relationship that is of longstanding interest—the impact of interstate war involvement on domestic politics. Although the exact linkage between international politics and domestic outcomes is a major source of debate in international relations, a number of scholars have found evidence that involvement in war may have extreme consequences for the regime in power, including the potential for both violent and non-violent removal from power (Brinton 1965, Johnson 1966, Skocpol 1979, Lichbach 1995, Dunn 1972, Francisco 2000). As war involvement pertains to non-violent removal from power, a number of scholars argue that political survival is best guaranteed when the leader is perceived by the domestic audience to have exhibited leadership prowess and experience during involvement in an international war or crisis (Bienen & van de Walle 1991, Bueno de Mesquita & Siverson 1995, Chiozza & Goemans 2004, Smith 1998).

The evidence in these studies indicates that while success brings benefits, defeat entails significant audience costs, as it demonstrates an inability to manage the reins of power, which in turn signals weakness. Such weakness invites opposition and leads to punishment by the domestic audience. Given this dynamic, political leaders vulnerable to audience costs select conflicts they are more likely to win in order to maximize the benefits of war and retain power (Bueno de Mesquita & Siverson 1995, Gelpi & Griesdorf 2001). This selection effect, therefore, suggests that democratic leaders who fail in such foreign policy endeavors will be the most likely to lose power.

Although the studies presented above pertain to involvement in interstate war and political survival, it is assumed that the theoretical foundations provided by this set of literature may also be applicable to interventions in intrastate war, as well. That is, one would also expect the costs and benefits of intervention in intrastate conflicts to translate into political consequences related to political survival. In the remaining sub-sections, the potential strategic costs and benefits, material costs and benefits, and symbolic costs and benefits of third party intervention are discussed, in turn.

2.1 Strategic Costs & Benefits

Strategic costs and benefits represent those which either strengthen or weaken a state's geo-political status. In this sense, leaders consider potential courses of action, including military intervention, according to how such action will either maintain or improve the state's strategic interests. Rival states generally pose a significant threat to a state's strategic interests, and thus, intervention into an intrastate conflict may be perceived as necessary to reduce this threat, whether the target state itself is a rival, a rival third-party intervenes in the intrastate conflict, or one of the parties to the conflict is an ally to a rival.

In Akcinaroglu & Radziszewski's (2005) analysis of the link between enduring interstate rivalries and civil war duration, for instance, the authors conclude that, given the target state is a rival, third-party states are more likely to intervene in a civil conflict when a rebel group presents a viable challenge to the target state government. Accordingly, other scholars find that the bulk of American interventions during the Cold War, the third-party state which intervened most frequently in intrastate conflicts during that time period (Regan 1996, Regan 1998, Regan 2000), were undertaken to contain the Soviet Union and thwart potentially hurtful alliances between the Soviet Union and others (Yoon 1997, Mullenbach & Matthews 2008, Fordham 2008). Extant research suggests that additional conditions influence third-party intervention, including military ties between the target state (or its challenger) and the intervener, the strategic location of the target state for the potential intervener, as well as a shared adversary (Huth 1998).

Less direct strategic costs relate to those which pose threats to international stability. Regan, for example, reasons that ongoing intrastate conflicts are generally costly to third-party states in terms of the strategic instability that these conflicts create (1996, 1998, 2000). Given this dynamic, third parties have a general preference for intervening to “stop the killing” sooner rather than later (Licklider 1995). Furthermore, civil conflicts are generally costly to the international community at large because of their potential contagion effects; that is, they may stimulate conflict in neighboring states by generating refugee flows and combatants seeking sanctuary (Moore & Shellman 2007), as well as fueling interstate conflicts Salehyan & Gleditsch (2006). Yet, despite the costs of civil conflict for the international community, third-party states still often refrain from intervention. Regan (2000) in particular finds no evidence that significant refugee flows encourage intervention. Assuming that strategic interests are important, one may assume that more direct threats to interests posed by rivals weigh more heavily on the minds of third-party leaders and their publics than indirect threats to the international community at large.

Given the role of the state in protecting strategic interests, one would expect leaders to intervene for the purposes of protecting these interests. There is a dilemma faced by political leaders, however. On the one hand, publics may not grant support to leaders for intervening in civil conflicts to serve strategic interests, as the further these conflicts are from home, the less important they are perceived to be (Jentleson & Britton 1998). On the other hand, publics may also punish leaders for inaction that is believed to have hurt strategic interests (e.g., Truman’s “loss of China,” a factor argued to have contributed to the Republican win of the presidency in 1952.) Leaders’ decisions to intervene are often partially based, then, on their perception that their publics will interpret intervention or non-intervention to serve strategic interests.

2.2 Material Costs & Benefits

Material costs present another element for leaders to consider when deciding whether or not to intervene in intrastate wars, costs which may have implications for their political survival.

Material costs represent the tangible costs of the intervention and may be in the form of the monetary resources directly expended on the intervention, as well as human lives lost. In order to assess the potential material costs, leaders may look to the characteristics of the conflict and the parties involved. Regan (2002), for example, finds that third parties are less likely to intervene in conflicts with higher levels of intensity, measured by the number of casualties per year. This finding indicates that leaders attempt to avoid wars which signal embroilment, as more intense conflicts may signify greater resentment among parties and a lower likelihood of settlement. A lower likelihood of settlement indicates the potential for a longer war, and longer wars are more costly. Additionally, the more distant an intrastate conflict, the more expensive an intervention.

Thus, distance may not only be important for strategic concerns, but because of the more direct costs involvement in distant conflicts entails. Empirical evidence illustrates, however, that the way political leaders assess the potential costs associated with distance may be somewhat tempered by capabilities. Yoon (1997) and Mullenbach & Matthews (2008), for example, find no empirical support for the notion that further distances make U.S. intervention in civil conflicts less likely. This finding may be explained by pre-existing U.S. capabilities, and distance may be a more important consideration for third parties with fewer capabilities.

However, it is also possible that U.S. leaders are underestimating how important such costs are for their publics, since resources spent on intervention are resources that could have been exerted elsewhere. Furthermore, citizens of democracies are highly sensitive to the loss of their own in fighting “someone else’s war.” Given the uncertainty of war, this leaves a significant margin for error by political leaders in assessing the potential material costs of intervention, and thus leaders put themselves at considerable political risk. American President Bill Clinton’s reluctance to intervene in Rwanda reflects his concern of how such an intervention would affect his political prospects.

2.3 Symbolic Costs & Benefits

When deciding whether or not to intervene, leaders also attempt to assess the likelihood of a successful outcome (Regan 2000, Regan 2002), since whether or not the outcome is perceived by the public to be successful has potential implications for the political survival of the regime. Research indicates that past intervention outcomes affect later decisions to intervene, in which past failures deter, while past successes encourage, subsequent interventions (Khong 1991, Khong 1992, Nevin 1996, Pickering 2001, Pickering 2002, Record 2002, Vertzberger 1998). The primary question then becomes how success is defined, as well as how leaders determine the potential for success.

According to Regan, success is itself defined by the cessation of conflict (2000, 2002). There is an inherent assumption here on the part of the leader that such an intervention can indeed stop the fighting. Yet, in analyzing how intervention affects conflict duration, several studies demonstrate that third-party intervention prolongs civil war, as intervention may change the expected-utility calculations of the parties involved. Mason (2004) and Mason & Fett (1996), for example, use a rational choice approach to explain that parties to a conflict continue to fight as long as the benefits of fighting outweigh the costs, and they perceive a high likelihood of success. These authors contend, and Akcinaroglu & Radziszewski (2005) empirically support, that merely the expectation by a civil war rebel group that a third party may intervene on its behalf encourages rebels to continue fighting government forces in anticipation of third-party resources.

Along similar lines, Balch-Lindsay & Enterline (2000) find that third-party intervention on opposite sides of a conflict further perpetuates hostilities, as one would expect that both the government and rebel groups perceive a greater likelihood of success given the support provided by third parties to both combatants. Indeed, in a subsequent study, Regan (2002, 70-1) observes that the opposed intervention–duration link is so robust that “one can only conclude that opposing interventions exacerbate a conflict and cannot be driven by a motive of conflict management,” which leads him to the sobering conclusion that any opposing

intervention by third parties perpetuates civil wars. This positive relationship between the involvement of opposing third parties and civil conflict duration is neatly codified in the veto-player theory of civil wars formulated in Cunningham (2006), wherein the author finds empirical support for the expectation that the number of veto players influences positively the duration of civil war.²

Pessimism regarding the impact of third parties aside, Regan & Aydin (2006) suggest that the well-documented, positive relationship between third-party intervention and civil war duration is a function of an over-emphasis on military and economic interventions. Indeed, Regan & Aydin (2006) report that well-timed interventions, particularly those that are diplomatic or combine a variety of approaches, can exert a dramatic, negative impact on the duration of civil wars. Interventions, however, are inherently linked to the volatile escalatory dynamics of civil war, adding to the uncertainty of success in such ventures (Garrison 2008). Taken together, the findings above indicate that it is important for third-party leaders to consider how intervention might affect the expected-utility calculus of the parties involved, as well as to consider the timing of intervention. If intervention indeed prolongs war, this could have dire consequences for third-party political survival, as longer wars are inherently more costly in both monetary resources and human lives, leading to the potential of domestic disapproval of the intervention.

The cessation of conflict is but one determination of success, however, as who wins, the terms of a resulting settlement, and the duration of a peaceful settlement are also important indicators of success. Particularly, where a third party intervenes on behalf of one side, it would prefer that side to win. Mason, Fett & Weingarten Jr. (1999) demonstrate that biased interventions eventually increase the likelihood that a civil war government prevails, leading one to believe that perhaps intervening on the side of the government increases one's chance

²This said, it is interesting to note that Cunningham's (2006) analysis suggests that the positive link between veto players and civil war duration is absent when one considers the contributions of third-party states.

of attaining a successful outcome, while intervening on the side of a challenger decreases those chances.

Pertaining to how a conflict is resolved, early research by Mason & Fett (1996) located little evidence that intervention by third parties influenced the settlement of civil wars, but subsequent work reveals that third-party intervention has tangible influences on civil war dynamics. DeRouen Jr. & Sobek (2004), for instance, find that intervention by the United Nations enhances the likelihood of attaining a civil war truce or treaty, though Greig & Diehl's (2005) analysis of the impact of peacekeeping on the probability that combatants will reach a negotiated settlement suggests little evidence that this relationship obtains during the post-WWII period. Thus, although the terms of the settlement itself may have important implications for an intervener, there is little evidence to support that interveners have much influence over the settlement. If third-party interveners can demonstrate to their publics that they supported the winning side, and that they assisted in attaining a favorable settlement, they may enhance their political prospects. However, one would assume that supporting the losing side or the inability to attain a settlement with favorable terms would have negative implications for their political prospects. These factors, again, represent the considerable risks of intervention for third-party leaders, particularly given the uncertainty of war.

Other scholars point to the effects that intervention may have on the duration of peace following the cessation of hostilities, indicating that strong predictors of post-civil war peace are the degree to which the peace agreement is characterized by institutionalized power-sharing between former combatants, as well as the presence of a third-party enforcer (Walter 1997, Walter 1999, Hartzell 1999, Hartzell, Hoddie & Rothchild 2001, Hartzell & Hoddie 2003). These findings lead one to conclude that third-party intervention may have a positive impact on the cessation of hostilities following settlement. Furthermore, Fortna (2004) finds ample evidence that peacekeeping missions, be they of the observer, traditional, or multidimensional variety, reduce the likelihood that civil war combatants will resume fighting. Interventions linked to longer-term peace in the target state may enhance the po-

litical prospects of third-party leaders, while those demonstrating no, or a negative, impact on longer-term peace may hurt the political prospects of third-party leaders.

Success as it is defined above ignores another indicator of success which may simply be defined as the mitigation of further loss of life, assuming that is the primary objective of the intervention. Empirical evidence suggests that the presence of humanitarian crisis in the target state is a statistically significant determinant of U.S. intervention in civil conflict in the post-cold war context (Mullenbach & Matthews 2008). Likewise, U.S. citizens appear to base their support for intervention in civil conflicts on the intended purpose of intervention, showing the greatest support for those interventions perceived to be for the purpose of alleviating humanitarian crisis (Jentleson & Britton 1998). This implies that if third-party leaders can demonstrate that intervention mitigated the loss of human life, that alone may enhance leaders' political prospects.

Given the importance of a successful outcome for the political survival of third-party leaders, one must consider the elusiveness of success. Successful interventions are rare, as Regan (1996) observes that “[o]f the 196 cases of intervention, only about 30% were considered successful.” This may be a function of the motives of third parties, with mischievous third parties making matters worse (Regan 2000, Regan 2002), or it may be that even well-intentioned third parties are undone by the group dynamics of civil conflicts, where conflicts involving multiple actors can stimulate collective-action dilemmas and costly gridlock (Cunningham 2006).

Whatever the reasons for the low success rate of interventions, this low likelihood of success implies that intervention is extremely risky for a third-party leader. Second, even if an intervention is successful in ending conflict, its success in bringing about peace can only be assessed with the passage of time, and executive terms in democracies are limited. Such success can only be retroactively assessed, thus leaving publics to assess the interventions by shorter-term standards. Therefore, even if an intervention has a successful peaceful outcome in the long run, given an ongoing conflict, publics may only observe the shorter-term costs.

Finally, as previously mentioned, publics are highly sensitive to material costs, making them somewhat fickle when it comes to the longer term, collective goal of world peace. This implies that even where third-party leaders have demonstrated a successful peaceful outcome, their publics may punish them for expending resources on intervention rather than on domestic problems.

The literature presented above highlights factors that help us understand both the decision to intervene as well as the effects of intervention, and their interrelationships. To date, one causal effect of third party intervention into civil wars has received scant attention—the causal link between intervention into civil wars and domestic political audiences in the intervening states. In the next section, we explore the domestic implications of third-party interventions into civil wars as a way of understanding patterns of third party intervention into intrastate conflicts.

3 Theory

Although interstate wars are fundamentally different than intrastate wars, we imagine that the cost-benefit structure for domestic regimes is roughly similar in that costly failures are more likely to produce domestic political change while success should correlate with the political durability of domestic political regimes in third-party states. In fact, it is plausible that given the lack of clarity regarding the threat to the domestic audience of interveners in many intrastate conflicts historically, particularly with respect to colonial (i.e., extra-systemic) wars, the domestic-feedback costs may be more pronounced, as domestic audiences punish their domestic regimes for generating non-essential costs in the form of military personnel and taxes, for example. While we anticipate that we will observe nuanced differences between the impact of the costs and benefits of involvement by democratic third parties on the domestic political regimes in these states, we develop our theoretical expectations along lines similar to those of studies that examined the domestic cost-benefit feedback mechanisms associated with involvement in interstate wars (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson &

Woller 1992). We reason that the costs and benefits to third party domestic regimes from third-party intervention into civil wars are of three general types: (1) strategic; (2) material; and (3) symbolic. We identify hypotheses associated with each category.

First, strategic costs and benefits are related to the geo-strategic relationship between a potential democratic third party intervenor and an ongoing intrastate conflict. Intrastate conflicts that are geographically far removed from the sovereign boundaries of a potential third party intervenor are likely to be considered irrelevant endeavors by domestic audiences, while geographically proximate intrastate conflicts are likely to be deemed relevant to national survival by the domestic audience. In addition to distance correlating with a domestic audience's perceptions of strategic relevance, as well as a political regime's capacity to convince the audience of such, distance is also positively correlated with transportation as well as the overall costs of an intervention into an intrastate conflict. This line of reasoning suggests that interventions, such as the South African intervention in the Angolan civil war or the Indian intervention in the Sri Lankan civil war, would be less likely to stimulate negative domestic feedback than interventions such as the U.S. in South Vietnam or the French in Chad.

Hypothesis 3.1 *The greater the geographic distance to an intervention into an intrastate conflict, the greater the likelihood that a democratic third party will experience a domestic regime change.*

While geographic distance increases the material costs to a domestic political regime for executing an intervention, as well as raising the difficulty of convincing a domestic audience of an intervention's strategic necessity, the involvement, or even plausible probable involvement, of third parties that are traditional security threats, might increase the tangibility of an intervention to domestic audiences. In turn, leaders of domestic political regimes in potential third party intervenors may gain domestic political benefits in the form of greater durability in office. As such, the intervention of a state that is a strategic rival to a poten-

tial democratic third party state in the civil war, (e.g., Cold War proxy wars between the United States and the Soviet Union) amplifies the strategic value of an intrastate conflict, its outcome, and its implications for the overarching strategic rivalry, thereby translating into domestic political benefits for democratic third party regimes in the form of greater political durability. Presence of rivals such as Syria in the Lebanese civil war or the Soviet Union in the Vietnamese and Laotian civil wars may have influenced the degree of domestic opposition to these political endeavors. Contrast this with the U.S. and British intervention in the Russian civil war that lacked a direct rival, interventions in which the political leaders were not willing to sustain the costs of continued engagement.

Hypothesis 3.2 *Intervention into an intrastate conflict by a strategic rival decreases the likelihood that a democratic third party will experience a regime change.*

The material costs of a third party intervention are likely central to the costs and benefits that feedback to third party domestic political systems. Similar to the analysis of involvement in interstate wars, third party intervention into intrastate conflicts is likely to generate material costs, such as the loss of blood in the form of combat losses and wounded, in addition to the economic costs that accrue to the third party for executing the intervention. Thus, as third party costs mount, so too mount the domestic political costs to the political regime in a democratic third party. Multiple simultaneous interventions can further magnify these material costs. Ongoing conflicts such as the Portuguese colonial conflicts in Angola and Mozambique, or even the U.S. interventions in Cambodia and Vietnam grew increasingly unpopular as the costs accumulated, leading to domestic pressure on the regime. This is in stark contrast to short, less costly conflicts such as the U.S. intervention in the Lebanese civil war of 1958 that did not produce domestic opposition.

Hypothesis 3.3 *The greater the material costs of a third party intervention into an intrastate conflict, the greater the likelihood of a domestic regime change in a democratic third party.*

Last, third party interventions into intrastate conflicts might also reflect symbolic costs and benefits that redound to the third party domestic political regime. In interstate conflicts, while warring parties stand to gain (and lose) materially and strategically from their involvement, they also gain (and lose) by successfully asserting themselves internationally and building a reputation of success in such conflicts. Although we anticipate that translation costs will be higher in intrastate conflicts, in the main we anticipate that third parties that are on the victorious side of an intrastate conflict will enjoy the benefits of triumph, and that said benefits will feedback to the third party regime. For instance, U.S. domestic opposition to the Somalian intervention increased quickly following the failed Black Hawk Down mission, as the public perceived that military objectives were not being met. Contrast this with the domestic response in Great Britain to the completion of the Greek civil war that saw the British backed Greek Nationalist forces prevail.

Hypothesis 3.4 *Democratic third party interventions into an intrastate conflict resulting in a victorious outcome decrease the likelihood of a regime change in a democratic third party.*

While military victory provides the most visible symbolic cost–benefit accruing from a third party intervention into an intrastate conflict, we argue that state involvement in interstate and intrastate conflicts is, in part, a function of moral justness. Specifically, states engage in such conflictual endeavors to right wrongs and rectify justice when norms and standards of conduct between and within states are violated. During the 1991 Gulf War, for example, Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait violated the norm concerning the latter’s territorial integrity, thereby providing justice-related basis for the formation of the United States-led coalition against Iraq. We argue that a similar dynamic obtains with intrastate conflicts, in which third party interventions can occur under conditions that are plausibly related to issues of justice, such as under conditions of atrocity (e.g., genocide) or politically sensitive killings (e.g., massacres of third party ex-patriots.) Under such conditions, we expect that potential third party intervenors can rally public support—i.e., generate domestic political

audience benefits—from an intervention in the form of more durable governance. The killings of French in Algeria in the 1950s or Belgians in the Congo were used by political leaders as justification for military interventions, interventions that were widely supported initially. Ongoing mass killings in Somalia and Chad were also used as justification for U.S. and French interventions, an argument that was supported by the domestic audience.

Hypothesis 3.5 *Democratic third party interventions into intrastate conflicts carried out under the banner of rectifying violations of justice are more likely to translate into greater durability for the third party regime.*

4 Research Design

4.1 Sample

Key to our research design and sample identification is our adoption of the core research design formulated in Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson & Woller (1992), in which the authors examine the incidence of violent regime changes in each interstate war participant during an interval following the conclusion of a given war. Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson & Woller (1992) examine two-, five-, and ten-year post-war windows to determine the incidence of violent overthrow of a domestic regime. Given the mean length of electoral cycles in the third parties that are central to our study, i.e., democratic regimes, we begin with a ten-year post-intrastate war intervention window.³ A fixed observation window is used to control for differences across democratic regime type given that Parliamentary systems do not hold elections at fixed intervals and that some interventions may lead to unscheduled democratic regime changes. We rely upon the Correlates of War (*COW*) data on extra-systemic (i.e., colonial and territorial) and intrastate (i.e., civil) wars (Sarkees 2000) to identify 185 instances of third-party involvement in these conflicts (121 extra-systemic and 64 intrastate

³Subsequent analysis with a five-year post-intrastate war intervention window produced substantively identical results.

interventions) during the period 1816–1997. Those conflicts ending in 1997 were then excluded to avoid including right censored conflict intervals, leaving a sample of 181 conflicts, 60 of which were civil wars.

Next, we differentiate between interventions by democratic and non-democratic third parties, and we do so by relying on a series of variables from the Banks (1996). We adopt a liberal coding rule that codes democratic third parties as those third-party states that were identified by Banks (1996) as civilian regimes, with an elected president or prime minister system of government during the observation interval.⁴ Doing so reduces the sample to 133 cases of democratic third party intervention (97 extra-systemic and 36 intrastate.) The sub-samples of democratic third party interventions into civil and extra-systemic wars are reported in Tables 1 and 2, respectively.

(Tables 1 & 2 About Here.)

Finally, we use the COW data to identify the end year of a democratic third party’s intervention into an extra-systemic or intrastate war in our sample, and then specify an additional ten-year window following this end year. This observation period (i.e., the period of democratic third party intervention plus a post-intervention window of ten years) is illustrated in Figure 1.

(Figure 1 About Here.)

4.2 Dependent Variable

We operationalize institutional executive change as an instance in which executive power changes hands between two or more competing political parties via an institutionalized procedure in a democratic third party during the observation period. In turn, we identify the total frequency of these executive changes for each democratic third party during an observation period, a procedure that results in 552 instances of peaceful changes in power.

⁴These variables were “type of regime” (1=civilian), “type of effective executive” (2=president or 3=premier) and “method of selection of effective executives” (1=direct election or 2=indirect election).

The regime changes coded for democratic third parties in civil and extra-systemic wars are reported in Tables 3 & 4, respectively.

(Tables 3 & 4 About Here.)

Last, the distribution of the frequency of executive changes in democratic third parties, as well as their representation in the extra-systemic and civil war samples, are reported in Tables 5 and 6, respectively.

(Tables 5 & 6 About Here.)

4.3 Independent Variables

4.3.1 Victory

To operationalize whether a democratic third party was on the victorious side in an intervention, we rely on two variables from the *COW* extra-systemic and intrastate war data (Sarkees 2000). First, we rely on the variable *inside* to determine on which side of a conflict a democratic third party intervened. Second, we rely on the variable “winner” to determine whether the democratic third-party intervenor joins the side that is either victorious or defeated in an intrastate conflict.⁵ We code a dichotomous variable, *Victory*, a value of 1 if the democratic third party is on the victorious side in an internal war, and zero otherwise. In 20 of the 133 observations (15 percent), the democratic third party is on the winning side in an intrastate conflict.

4.3.2 Casualties

To operationalize casualties incurred by the democratic third party for intervening in extra-systemic and intrastate wars, we collected information on third-party armed force members that were wounded, killed, or lost to disease during the duration of the intervention. We relied primarily on Clodfelter (2002), as well as country monographs to collect this information.

⁵The variable “winner” relies on the following coding scheme, as stated in the online codebook: “1 =state, 2 =nonstate, 3 =state post Iwar, 4 =nonstate post Iwar, 5 =none, 6 =stalemt”. We rely solely on coding values of 1 and 2 to determine the side joined by third party.

These total casualty values were then divided by the democratic third party's total pre-intervention armed forces and the natural log computed to measure third-party casualty levels. This variable, *Casualties*, exhibits a minimum value of 0, a maximum value of 6.72, a mean value of 1.94, and a standard deviation of 1.66 for the extra-systemic sample, and a minimum value of 0, a maximum value of 7.59, a mean value of 1.27, and a standard deviation of 1.93 for the intrastate war sample.

4.3.3 Retribution

We rely on Clodfelter (2002) and various monographs to code a dichotomous variable, *Retribution*, a value of 1 if historical accounts indicate that a democratic third-party intervention was undertaken to avenge some egregious action by the opposition and zero otherwise. Previous attacks on civilians or foreigners that precipitate such interventions, as well as a previous policy failure were used to identify these cases. In our two sub-samples, 47 of the democratic third-party interventions into extra-systemic wars and 8 of the interventions into civil wars were undertaken for the sake of retribution.

4.3.4 Opposition Mass Killing

We anticipate that interventions by democratic third parties into extra-systemic and intrastate conflicts reflecting the intentional mass killing of civilians could possibly influence the domestic audience's evaluation of the overall costs and benefits of a conflict. To assess this effect, we code a dichotomous variable, *Opposition Mass Killing*, that measures the presence of intentional killings of civilians during a conflict by the opposition. A threshold of 1,000 deaths was selected to represent large-scale attacks on civilians. The opposition side represents those actors opposing the intervener and thus this variable identifies mass killing of supporters of both the intervener and the intervention target by the opposition. Clodfelter (2002) and various country monographs were used to construct this variable. There were 16 instances of mass killings perpetrated by the opposition in intrastate wars, and 18 in extra-systemic wars.

4.3.5 Simultaneous Interventions

Each foreign intervention that a democratic third party undertakes requires material costs in the form of personnel and material. We expect that simultaneous interventions by a democratic third party magnify these intervention-related costs to the third party. To measure the impact of multiple interventions on a third-party state, we create a dichotomous variable, *Simultaneous Interventions*, that is coded a value of 1 if the democratic third-party state is involved in more than one intervention into internal conflicts at time t . Forty-five of the 97 extra-systemic interventions reflect a democratic third party engaged in simultaneous interventions, while 13 of the 36 civil conflicts reflect a third party involved in simultaneous interventions.

4.3.6 Distance to Intervention

Geographic distance is central to the cost that a democratic third party bears to intervene abroad, and it also provides insight into the influence of strategic interest, such that proximate internal conflicts are of potentially greater threat than are distant internal conflicts. We rely on the geographic distance between the third-party state and the state in which the extra-systemic or intrastate conflict occurs by relying on inter-capital distance data from the *EUGene* software package (Bennett & Stam 2000). We add a value of 1 to this value, and compute the natural log of this sum to create the variable, *Distance*. This variable exhibits a minimum of 0, a maximum of 9.37, a mean of 7.55, and a standard deviation of 2.22, for extra-systemic wars, and a minimum of 0, a maximum of 8.97, and a mean of 6.74 and a standard deviation of 2.55 for intrastate wars.

4.3.7 Third-Party Competition

If a third-party state is intervening into an internal conflict in which an additional third-party state is participating on the opposing side in the internal war, a strategic competition between the third parties is likely occurring. Such a competition might underscore the strategic benefits of intervening, as well as facilitate a democratic third party regime's capacity to

translate this competition into domestic benefits associated with public rallies in the face of notable threats. We code a dichotomous variable, *Third-Party Competition*, a value of 1 when a democratic third-party intervention occurs under conditions when another third party intervenes on the opposite side of the internal conflict. Third-party competition only occurs in civil, not extra-systemic, wars. As such, of the 36 democratic third-party interventions into civil wars, 6 reflect conditions of third-party competition.

4.3.8 Economic Crisis

Domestic economic crises and government reactions to these hardships have long been identified as major causes in both institutionalized (Lewis-Beck 1990) and non-institutionalized (Brinton 1965) regime changes. To control for the presence of economic crisis in a democratic third party during intervention into an internal war, we first rely on the COW Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) to identify the sum of a democratic third party's iron production and energy consumption during each year of an intervention, as well as the 10-year post-intervention period, values that are accessible during the 1816–2000 period. In turn, we compute the natural log of this value plus 1 (to avoid computing the log of zero.) Next, we compute the inter-year change in this value. Last, we create a dichotomous variable, *Economic Crisis*, that is coded a value of 1 in years when a democratic third-party experiences a negative value of this inter-year change computation. Eighty-four of the extra-systemic interventions were characterized by economic crises, while 31 of the interventions in civil wars reflect conditions of economic crisis.

4.3.9 Democracy Type

The nature of the democratic regime—i.e., presidential versus prime ministerial—may also impact the likelihood of institutional executive change. To control for differences across regime type, a variable measuring the presence of a prime ministerial system was coded. This dichotomous variable, *Prime Ministerial System*, was coded as 1 if the democratic executive was organized along a prime ministerial system, and zero otherwise. This variable was

primarily coded from Banks (1996). In our sample 85 of the 97 extra-systemic interventions were undertaken by prime ministerial systems and 22 of the 36 civil interventions were characterized by prime ministerial systems.

4.4 Method

Examination of the frequency distributions of executive changes during each observation interval in both the extra-systemic and civil war samples displayed in Tables 5 and 6 indicates that the dependent variable is not normally distributed. These distributions suggest that institutional executive changes are Poisson-distributed, and thus an event-count regression approach is employed to examine the impact of third-party involvement in intrastate wars. A Poisson distribution, however, assumes equi-dispersion in that the mean and the variance are roughly equal and that each event is independent.

Here, we anticipate that intervention in a previously occurring extra-systemic or civil war is unlikely to be independent of a subsequent intervention. Such a dependence between events typically produces over-dispersion, in which the variance exceeds the mean. One method to compensate for over-dispersion is to model the phenomenon of interest with a negative binomial distribution, a distribution in which the variance is often assumed to exceed the mean and thus can accommodate over-dispersion.

To estimate the event-count regression models, a Generalized Linear Model (GLM) approach is used. In contrast to traditional regression procedures, the GLM approach allows the researcher to specify the variance and link functions of the model. Utilizing this approach developed by Nelder & Wedderburn (1972), one may specify the relationship between the mean and the variance of the dependent variables in situations in which the variance must be calculated under conditions of non-normality (Gill 2001). Additionally, the link function in GLM models allows the researcher to specify the non-linear relationship between the mean of the dependent variable and the linear right-hand side of the equation. Thus, no transformation of the dependent variable is required and the variance can be properly calculated.

This enables a greater degree of freedom not only in specifying the model but also in the employment of regression diagnostics.

To model institutional executive changes, the log link function was selected to link the mean of the dependent variable with our independent variables and the variance function was selected after estimating a series of models. In the GLM context, the ratio of the deviance statistic to the degrees of freedom is used to evaluate over-dispersion. Our analysis indicated that over-dispersion was present in the sample of democratic interventions into extra-systemic wars, but absent in the civil war sample. Therefore, we employ the negative binomial variance function for the sample of interventions into extra-systemic wars and the Poisson variance function for analysis of the democratic interventions into civil wars.⁶ All models were estimated with *STATA* 10.0.

5 Analysis

We examine the cost-benefit feedback of third-party intervention into extra-systemic and civil wars, in turn. The results for the negative binomial regression analysis of the costs and benefits to democratic third parties for intervening into extra-systemic wars are reported in Table 7. Model 1 presents the negative binomial regression estimates for the full sample containing 97 observations. The analysis suggests a rather weak fit of the model to the data as indicated by the pseudo R^2 value of .06. This weak fit notwithstanding, our analysis of interventions into extra-systemic wars provides some insight into the cost-benefit feedback of intervention to the survival of democratic third-party leaders.

(Table 7 About Here.)

First, consider hypothesis one that postulates that greater distance should increase the likelihood of regime change. The positively signed and statistically significant coefficient

⁶The length of democratic third-party interventions into internal conflicts, as well as the post-intervention period, are not uniform across the sample. As such, we anticipate that longer conflicts exert a different impact on the third-party executive than shorter conflicts. To accommodate this variability, we control for the length of time that a democratic third party was observed in our sample, information that is specified in the count models via the option `-exposure-` in the *STATA* statistical package.

for the variable *Distance* supports the notion that the greater material cost of intervention to the democratic third party, the greater the expected frequency of institutional executive change in a democratic third party during the observation period. For the extra-systemic wars, rival interventions were not present and thus hypothesis two is not applicable to this analysis. Hypothesis three, which examines the impact of material costs on the expected frequency of institutionalized regime change finds some mixed support. The presence of an economic crisis is positively and statistically significantly associated with a greater expected frequency of institutionalized regime change. In contrast, neither *simultaneous interventions* nor *casualties* were statistically related to the frequency of regime change, producing mixed support for the impact of material costs. Surprisingly, intervention in a victorious conflict, actually produces an effect that contradicts hypothesis four, as interventions on the victorious side are associated with a higher expected frequency of institutionalized regime change. Lastly, these estimates do not produce any support for hypothesis five, as neither opposition mass killings or retribution based interventions were statistically significant.

Further analysis utilizing studentized Pearson residuals for small samples revealed three cases which produced values exceeding an absolute value of 2.5, and these cases were identified as outliers.⁷ Therefore, we exclude these observations from the sample of democratic interventions into extra-systemic wars, re-estimate the negative binomial model, and report the results of this re-estimation in Table 7, Model 2. The re-analysis yields a slightly better fit to the sample. Specifically, the magnitude corresponding to the variable *Distance* increases, producing additional support for hypothesis one. Furthermore, the performance of the variable *Victory* remains statistically significant and positively signed, a finding that challenges the expectation that foreign policy success translate into domestic dividends for third-party regimes. We observe that the variable *Simultaneous Interventions* is, somewhat surprisingly, inversely related to executive changes, indicating that the electorate does not punish policy leaders for multiple ongoing interventions, which further questions the impact

⁷These cases are the French interventions in the Franco-Syrian, the Franco-Druze, and the Franco-Indochinese of 1945 extra-systemic wars.

of material costs on institutionalized regime changes. This may be a function of nationalism with regard towards colonial policies at the time. In contrast to the full model, there is some weak support for hypothesis five as the performance of the variable *Retribution* suggests that extra-systemic interventions undertaken for retribution purposes are inversely related to institutionalized executive changes, indicating that such policy endeavors are rewarded by the electorate.

We turn now to our analysis of the frequency of executive changes in the civil war sample of third-party interventions. In contrast to our negative binomial analysis of extra-systemic wars, in our analysis of civil wars we control for the type of democratic executive in the third parties, given that a third of our civil war intervention sample was comprised of presidential systems. Additionally, since only intrastate conflicts experience competitive interventions, a variable reflecting the presence of competitive third-party interventions is specified in the Poisson model. The results of our Poisson analysis are reported in Table 8. The analysis indicates an overall better fit of the model to the data than was observed for extra-systemic conflicts, yielding a pseudo R^2 statistic of .45. Although this sample is relatively small (36 observations, as to 97 cases in our full extra-systemic war sample), the specified model better accounts for the impact of third-party interventions on the frequency of executive changes in third parties.

(Table 8 About Here.)

Comparing the results in our Poisson analysis of institutionalized executive changes in democratic third parties reported in Table 8 to those of the negative binomial analysis reported in Table 7, we observe some similarities and differences. Perhaps somewhat puzzling is the lack of support for hypothesis one in the civil war analysis. In contrast to hypothesis one, and the results for the extrasystemic interventions, *Distance* is significant and negative, suggesting that the greater the distance traveled by the third party the lower the expected frequency of institutional executive changes. In terms of the geographic distance from a democratic third party to an intervention, we can only surmise that distant civil wars have

an a priori anticipation of value by political leaders and their constituencies, that is, a selection effect of sorts, in which third-party interventions into distant civil wars that are observed in the historical record are valued.

This analysis also produces support for hypothesis two, which postulates that the presence of an intervention into a conflict with a rival third party, is valued by the electorate. *Third-party competition* is negatively and statistically significantly associated with a lower expected frequency of institutionalized regime changes. This finding suggests that interventions in opposition of a rival appear to be rewarded by the electorate.

Surprisingly, material costs impact the expected frequency of institutionalized regime change in a different manner than interventions in extrasystemic wars, and contradict the predictions of hypothesis three. For civil wars, the presence of a economic crisis was not related to the frequency of institutionalized regime changes, and the loss of blood appears to actually help regimes in retaining power. The performance of the variable *Casualties*, suggests that interventions in civil wars with high numbers of casualties, actually reduces the expected frequency of institutionalized regime changes. This finding might reflect sunk costs, such that investments of material and personnel improve support for a democratic regime, but challenges the belief that the electorate will punish leaders involved in more costly conflicts.

Conversely, symbolic costs appear to exert significant impact on the political survivability of regimes, but not in the expected manner. Although hypothesis four, which postulates that victorious interventions are more likely to be supported by the electorate, was not supported in the analysis, results do indicate that interventions undertaken to rectify past injustices influenced the duration of political regimes. The performance of the variable *Opposition Mass Killings* suggests that the existence of mass killings by the opposition is positively related to institutional executive changes. This finding indicates that the electorate will punish governments that become embroiled in civil wars containing significant killing of civilians by the opposition. Additionally, the coefficient for the variable *Retribution* is positively associated

with an increased expected frequency of institutionalized regime change, suggesting that the electorate punishes political leaders who engage in policies based on retaliation. Thus, symbolic costs in civil war actually increase the expected frequency of institutionalized regime change, as the electorate is more likely to punish leaders who undertake interventions for symbolic reasons.

Outlier analysis indicates that two cases were exerting undue influence on the estimates reported in Model 1.⁸ As in the previous analysis, these cases produced a studentized Pearson residual with an absolute value greater than 2.5. Thus, we removed these cases from the sample of democratic third-party interventions into civil wars and re-estimated the Poisson model, reporting the results of this specification in Table 8, Model 2. This analysis indicates that the model does not fit the data as nicely as the full model. Furthermore, removal of the outlying cases results in minor performance differences; specifically, the coefficient corresponding to the variable *Distance* becomes statistically insignificant.

The previous analysis provides some insight into the cost-benefit structures of third parties considering intervention in extra-systemic and civil wars. These structures appear to be different across war type. For instance, the outcome of civil wars appears to exert less of an effect on political survivability than the characteristics of the conflict, such as the motives for intervention or the presence of mass killings by the opposition, both of which significantly increase the probability of an institutionalized executive change. Conversely, both symbolic and material costs exert a significant impact on political survivability for democratic states involved in extra-systemic wars as successful, distant interventions, and economic crises all increase the risk of institutionalized executive change. Surprisingly, the costs of the conflict, as measured in casualties, are inversely associated with institutionalized executive changes in civil wars, perhaps resulting from public perception of sunk costs.

These findings suggest, in contrast to extra-systemic wars, intervention in civil war contains little if any reward in terms of political survival, for leaders of democratic states, but

⁸These two cases are the Finish intervention in the Russia vs. Anti-Bolsheviks and the U.S. intervention in the Laos vs. Pathet Lao civil wars.

may contain higher risks, a conclusion that illuminates the stark reality of a third-party democratic leader's decision to intervene in civil wars. Thus, despite the humanitarian atrocities taking place in civil conflicts abroad, and the seeming capacity of some democratic third parties to mitigate such loss of life and property, democratic political leaders are deterred by the risk to political survival associated with intervention and are in fact exhibiting political prudence. We consider in the next section whether such prudence might explain the reluctance of third parties to intervene in Darfur.

6 Application to Darfur

In contemporary international politics, the continuing atrocities in the Darfur region of Sudan represent a civil conflict that would seem most appropriate for democratic third-party intervention. Yet, repeated calls by the international community to respond to events in Sudan have met with a muted response, despite acknowledgement of genocidal policies by the combatants. What possible costs could such an intervention bring? Typically, the United States, United Kingdom, and France are the most widely mentioned democratic states with the capacity to intervene in Sudan.

To assess the implications of our analysis for the cost-benefit feedback of third-party intervention into the Darfur conflict, we simulate the impact that American, British, and French intervention would have on the frequency of institutionalized executive changes in these respective democratic third parties. After calculating the inter-capital distance between the United States, Britain, and France and Sudan, expected frequencies of executive change were simulated for a scenario in which retribution, casualties, economic decline, victory, opposition mass killing, and competition were not present. The length of the conflict was set at the value for the American intervention in Somalia, which was 290 days in duration. In turn, as per the design of our statistical analysis reported in Table 8, Model 1, we simulate the frequency of institutionalized executive changes likely to occur during an intervention of

290 days, in addition to the ten-year post-intervention observation period, as our baseline model. The results of these simulations are reported in Table 9.

(Table 9 About Here.)

Our baseline simulation suggests that during the ten-year post-intervention period following an intervention of 290 days, nearly one executive change occurs in the American, British and French political systems. Next, we vary the values of several parameters from the Poisson model, and in turn examine changes in the expected frequency of institutional executive changes in these three potential democratic interveners. For example, if the baseline scenario resulted in a victory of the third-party side of the conflict, the expected frequency of executive changes in the United States, Britain, or France decreases to roughly one-half of an institutional regime change for the presidential systems and to over one change for the parliamentary system. Contrast this with the presence of mass killing of civilians by the opposition, as is ongoing in contemporary Darfur, and the expected frequency of institutionalized executive changes increases to over two changes for the United States and France, and exceeds four changes for the British system.

If the Darfur intervention was undertaken in the name of retribution, this would not only result in increased costs to the incumbent government in a democratic third party; this increase in symbolic costs would also exceed the simulated impact of the presence of opposition mass killings as the British system nears six changes. Although higher casualty rates are inversely associated with institutionalized executive changes, this impact is relatively small in magnitude in comparison to the presence of an intervention grounded in retribution. Increasing casualty rates to the maximum value in the sample only reduces the number of expected executive changes from roughly one to less than .10, in contrast to the threefold increase in the expected number of changes resulting from the presence of an intervention undertaken for retribution purposes. Thus, intervention into civil wars produces little material and symbolic benefits for a democratic third-party government in terms of remaining

in office; indeed, the simulation analysis suggests that such interventions result in significant symbolic costs.

Last, to underscore this dynamic, consider Darfur from the perspective of a democratic third party. Given that opposition mass killing of civilians is present in this civil war, and if the United States, Britain, and France are experiencing some form of economic crisis, such as a recession, then significant risks to the incumbent government are stimulated by intervention. Consider a scenario in which an intervention is undertaken in the absence of retribution, yet it results in the defeat of the third party and casualties amount to the first quartile in the sample. For the United States we expect that greater than one institutionalized executive changes will occur in the the subsequent 10-year observation period, the United Kingdom almost three changes, and the French system greater than one change.

Considering the potential risk to political survival faced by democratic third-party leaders, one is left to wonder how the benefits of intervention affect political survival of the third-party government. For instance, one might expect that competitive intervention could provide the strategic benefit of enhancing national security and that this might be a motivation strongly supported by the public in the intervening state. The simulation in fact reveals that competitive interventions appear to reduce the expected number of institutionalized executive changes to roughly a fourth of an executive change for the presidential systems, and slightly more for the British system. This said, the substantive impact of competitive intervention on political survival is much less than that of the costs affecting political survival, such as those imposed by conflicts involving opposition mass killings. Clearly, these findings suggest that intervention under reasonable conditions is risky for incumbent governments, even when intervention is linked to national security interests, and this by extension sheds light on why third parties are reluctant to undertake such endeavors.

7 Conclusion

We began this study by observing the reluctance of democratic third parties to intervene in Darfur, given the atrocities taking place and the general capacity of the international system's leading democratic states to intervene into the Sudan. We find that despite the potential benefits of intervention, such as the preservation of life, mitigation of refugee flows, and, thus, perhaps the mitigation of the spread of conflict, the risk to the political survival of democratic third-party leaders provides some indication of why democratic third parties rationally refrain from intervention, on average.

This leads us to the primary question posed in this study: How does intervention in another country's civil war affect the political survival of a third-party democratic government? That is, how do the costs and benefits of intervention, taken together, translate politically? We find that third-party democracies have some reason to be prudent in their decision to intervene, as our analysis reveals that the costs to democratic third-party governments for intervention seem to outweigh the potential benefits, regardless of a victorious outcome, at least politically speaking. In fact, it seems that intervention either for the sake of alleviating humanitarian crises or for the sake of retribution may be enough to instigate executive change, without consideration of the number of casualties or other material costs. That is, the motivation behind the intervention is just as important, if not more important, than other factors related to intervention that one would expect to affect the political survival of a third-party democratic government.

This is an interesting finding considering the commonly held belief that politicians are often driven to intervene in foreign humanitarian crises by their own publics, who themselves are moved by horrific images of the atrocities taking place abroad (Dowty & Loescher 1996, Jentleson & Britton 1998). Jentleson & Britton (1998), in fact, find that public support, determined by polling U.S. citizens, of the U.S. use of force abroad is significantly driven by the purpose behind the use of force, and they find that humanitarian interventions receive the greatest public support. Why would the citizens of a democratic state encourage their

leaders to intervene in a humanitarian crisis, either explicitly or in polls, only to punish them for intervening in such situations come the next election? This is a question that could have important implications for our understanding of the relationship between the dynamics of domestic politics and foreign policy. For now, we understand the dilemma faced by democratic political leaders when considering whether or not to intervene in civil conflicts taking place abroad, and that prudence seems to be warranted, at least when considering the expected utility of intervention from a rational-choice perspective. Until the cost-benefit structure for third parties of intervening in humanitarian crises such as Darfur changes, political leaders of democratic states have little if any incentive to intervene into these conflicts.

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Table 1: Civil Wars with Democratic Third Party Interventions.

Civil War	Date	Intervenor
Portugal vs. Conservatives (507)	1829–1834	United Kingdom
Netherlands vs. Belgians (509)	1830–1831	United Kingdom
Spain vs. Carlists of 1834 (515)	1834–1840	United Kingdom
Ottoman Empire vs. Mehmet Ali (519)	1839–1840	United Kingdom
China vs. Taipings (540)	1860–1864	United Kingdom
Morocco vs. Fez Caid of 1907 (590)	1907–1908	France
Iran vs. Constitutionalists (591)	1908–1909	Russia
Morocco vs. Fez Caid of 1911 (593)	1911–1911	France
Russia vs. anti-Bolsheviks (600)	1917–1921	France
		Japan
		United States
		United Kingdom
		Finland
China vs. Koumintang (612)	1926–1928	Japan
Spain vs. Fascists (629)	1936–1939	Italy
		Germany
Greece v Communists (630)	1944–1945	United Kingdom
Lebanon vs. Leftists of 1958 (650)	1958–1958	United States
Republic of Vietnam vs. NLF (654)	1961–1965	United States
Zaire vs. Katanga Leftists (655)	1960–1965	Belgium
Laos vs. Pathet Lao of 1963 (662)	1963–1973	United States
		Dem. Rep. of Vietnam
Dominican Republic vs. Leftists (665)	1965–1965	United States
Chad vs. Froinat of 1966 (669)	1966–1971	France
Cambodia vs. Khmer Rouge of 1970 (675)	1970–1975	United States
Lebanon vs. Leftists of 1975 (691)	1975–1990	Israel
Angola vs. UNITA of 1975 (693)	1975–1991	South Africa
Chad vs. Froinat of 1980 (705)	1966–1971	France
Somalia vs. Clan Factions (713)	1982–1997	United States
		France
		Nigeria
		Italy
Sri Lanka vs. Tamils (715)	1987–1990	India
Liberia vs. Anti-Doe Rebels (727)	1989–1990	Nigeria
Azerbaijan vs. Nagorno-Karabakh (737)	1991–1994	Armenia
Liberia vs. NPFL and ULIMO (742)	1992–1995	Nigeria

Note: COW war number in parentheses.

Table 2: Extra-Systemic Wars with Democratic Third Party Interventions.

Extra-Systemic War	Date	Intervenor
British–Mahrattan (301)	1817–1818	United Kingdom
British–Kandyian (302)	1817–1818	United Kingdom
British–Burmese of 1823 (305)	1823–1826	United Kingdom
British–Ashanti of 1824 (306)	1824–1826	United Kingdom
British–Bharatpuran (309)	1825–1826	United Kingdom
British–Zulu of 1838 (311)	1838–1840	United Kingdom
British–Afghan of 1838 (313)	1838–1842	United Kingdom
First Opium (315)	1839–1842	United Kingdom
Franco–Algerian of 1839 (317)	1839–1947	France
Peruvian–Bolivian (318)	1841–1841	Peru
British–Baluchi (319)	1843–1843	United Kingdom
Uruguyan Dispute (320)	1843–1843	Argentina France United Kingdom
Franco–Moroccan (321)	1844–1844	France
British–Sikh of 1845 (322)	1845–1846	United Kingdom
British–Kaffir of 1846 (323)	1846–1847	United Kingdom
British–Sikh of 1848 (326)	1848–1849	United Kingdom
British–Kaffir of 1850 (327)	1850–1853	United Kingdom
British–Burmese of 1852 (329)	1852–1853	United Kingdom
British–Santal (330)	1855–1856	United Kingdom
Second Opium (331)	1856–1860	United Kingdom
Indian Mutiny (335)	1857–1859	United Kingdom
Franco–Indochinese of 1858 (337)	1858–1862	France
Argentine–Buenos Aries (338)	1859–1859	Argentina
British–Maorin (339)	1860–1870	United Kingdom
Spanish–Santo Dominican (341)	1863–1865	Spain
British–Bhutanese (342)	1865–1865	United Kingdom
British–Ethiopian (343)	1867–1868	United Kingdom
Spanish–Cuban of 1868 (345)	1868–1878	Spain
Franco–Algerian of 1871 (346)	1871–1872	France
British–Ashanti of 1873 (347)	1873–1874	United Kingdom
Franco–Tonkin (349)	1873–1885	France
Dutch–Achinese (350)	1873–1878	Netherlands
British–Kaffir of 1877 (353)	1877–1878	United Kingdom
British–Afghan of 1878 (356)	1878–1879	United Kingdom
British–Zulu of 1879 (358)	1879–1879	United Kingdom
Gun War (359)	1880–1881	United Kingdom
Boer War of 1880 (360)	1880–1881	United Kingdom
Franco–Tunisian of 1881 (362)	1882–1882	France
Franco–indochinese of 1882 (363)	1882–1884	France

Table 2 continued on next page.

Table 2 —continued

Extra-Systemic War	Date	Intervenor
British–Mahdi (364)	1882–1885	United Kingdom
Franco–Madagascan of 1883 (366)	1883–1885	France
British–Burmese of 1885 (367)	1885–1886	United Kingdom
Mandingo (368)	1885–1886	France
Italo–Ethiopian of 1887 (372)	1887–1887	Italy
Franco–Dahomeyan (373)	1889–1892	France
Franco–Senegalese of 1890 (375)	1890–1891	France
British–Ashanti of 1893 (377)	1893–1894	United Kingdom
Dutch–Balian (379)	1894–1894	Netherlands
Franco–Madagascan of 1894 (380)	1894–1895	France
Spanish–Cuban of 1895 (381)	1895–1898	Spain
Italo–Ethiopian of 1895 (384)	1895–1896	Italy
Spanish–Philippino of 1896 (385)	1896–1898	Spain
Mahdi Uprising (387)	1886–1899	France
		United Kingdom
United Kingdom British–Nigerian (388)	1897–1897	United Kingdom
Indian Muslim (389)	1897–1898	United Kingdom
Hut Tax (391)	1898–1898	United Kingdom
American–Philippino (392)	1899–1902	United States
Somali Rebellion (393)	1899–1905	United Kingdom
Boer War of 1899 (395)	1899–1902	United Kingdom
British Conquest of Kano and Sokoto (396)	1903–1903	United Kingdom
British–Zulu of 1906 (400)	1906–1906	United Kingdom
First Moroccan (401)	1911–1912	France
		Spain
Sino–Tibertan of 1921 (402)	1912–1913	China
Second Moroccan (404)	1916–1917	France
		Spain
Sino–Tibetan of 1918 (405)	1918–1918	China
Caco Revolt (406)	1918–1920	United States
British–Afghan of 1919 (408)	1919–1919	United Kingdom
Franco–Syrian (409)	1920–1920	France
Iraqi–British (410)	1920–1921	United Kingdom
Italo–Ethiopian (412)	1920–1932	Italy
Riff Rebellion (413)	1921–1926	France
		Spain
Moplah Rebellion (414)	1921–1922	United Kingdom
Franco–Druze (416)	1925–1927	France
Saya san’s Rebellion (417)	1930–1932	United Kingdom
British Palestine (418)	1936–1936	United Kingdom
Indonesian (420)	1945–1946	Netherlands
		United Kingdom

Table 2 continued on next page.

Table 2 —continued

Extra-Systemic War	Date	Intervenor
Franco–Indochinese of 1945 (421)	1945–1954	France
Franco–Madagascan of 1947 (422)	1947–1948	France
Malayan Rebellion (424)	1948–1957	United Kingdom
Indo–Hyderabad (425)	1948–1948	India
Franco–Tunisian of 1952 (428)	1952–1954	France
British Mau Mau (429)	1952–1952	United Kingdom
Moroccan Independence (430)	1953–1956	France
Franco–Algerian of 1954 (432)	1954–1962	France
Cameron (433)	1955–1960	France
		United Kingdom
Angolan-Portugese (434)	1961-1975	Portugal
Guinean-Portugese (436)	1962-1974	Portugal
Mozambique-Portugese (437)	1964-1974	Portugal
Nambian (440)	1975–1988	South Africa

Note: COW war number in parentheses.

Table 3: Institutional Regime Changes (Civil Wars).

Civil War	Country	Incoming Regime (Year)
Portugal vs. Conservatives	United Kingdom	Tory (1841)
Netherlands vs. Belgians	United Kingdom	Whig (1830), Tory (1841)
Spain vs. Carlists of 1834	United Kingdom	Tory (1841), Liberal (1846)
Ottoman Empire vs. Mehmet Ali	United Kingdom	Tory (1841), Liberal (1846)
China vs. Taipings	United Kingdom	Liberal (1868), Conservative (1874)
Morocco vs. Fez Caids of 1907	France	SFIO (1909), RRRS (1911), RAD (1911), PRP (1912), SFIO (1913), GR (1913), RRRS (1913), RM (1914), PSR (1914), RM (1917), PSR (1917), RAD (1917)
Morocco vs. Fez Caids of 1911	France	RAD (1911), PRP (1912), SFIO (1913), GR (1913), RRRS (1913), RM (1914), PSR (1914), RM (1917), PSR (1917), RAD (1917), PSR (1920), GR (1920), PSR (1921)
Russia vs. anti-Bolsheviks	France	PSR (1920), GR (1920), PSR (1921), PRP (1922), PRN (1924), RAD (1924), PSR (1925), RAD (1926), PRP (1926), PSR (1929), GR (1929)
	Finland	NPP (1918), KOK (1920), NPP (1921), None (1922), ML (1922), ED (1924), KOK (1924), ML (1925), SDP (1926), ML (1927), NPP (1928)
	Japan	FC (1918), Military (1922), None (1923), Conservative (1924), FC (1927), CD (1929)
	United Kingdom	Conservative (1922), Labor (1924), Conservative (1924), Labor (1929)
	United States	Republican (1921)
China vs. Koumintang	Japan	CD (1929), FC (1931), Military (1932), None (1936), Military (1937), None (1937)
Spain vs. Fascists	Italy	AP (1945), DC (1945)
Greece v Communists	United Kingdom	Labor (1945), Conservative (1951)
Lebanon vs. Leftists of 1958	United States	Democrat (1961)
Republic of Vietnam vs. NLF	United States	Democrat (1961), Republican (1969)

Table 3 continued on next page.

Table 3 —continued

Civil War	Country	Incoming Regime (Year)
Zaire vs. Katanga Leftists	Belgium	BSP (1973)
Laos vs. Pathet Lao of 1963	United States	Republican (1969), Democrat (1977), Republican (1981)
Dominican Republic vs. Leftists	United States	Republican (1969)
Chad vs. Frolinat 1966	France	RI (1974), PS (1981)
Cambodia vs. Khmer Rouge of 1970	United States	Democrat (1977), Republican (1981)
Lebanon vs. Leftists of 1975	Israel	HER (1977), AVODA (1984), LIK (1986), AVODA (1992), LIK (1996),
Angola vs. UNITA of 1975	South Africa	ANC (1994)
Chad vs. Frolinat of 1980	France	RPR (1995)
Somalia vs. Clan Factions	United States	Democrat (1993)
	France	RPR (1995)
	Italy	None (1993), FI (1994), None (1995), PDS (1998), None (2000)
Sri Lanka vs. Tamils	India	JD (1989), INC (1991), BJP (1996), NF (1996), BJP (1996)
Azerbaijan vs. Nagorno-Karabakh	Armenia	None (1998)

Table 3 continued on next page.

Table 3 —continued

Civil War	Country	Incoming Regime (Year)
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Sources: (Banks 1996, Cahoon 2008, Stearns 2001).

Key:

AP=Action Party; AVODA=Mifleget Avoda Hayisraelit;

BJP=Bharatiya Janata; BN=Bloc National;

BSP=Parti Socialiste Belge-Belgische Socialistische Partij; CD=Rikken Minseito;

DC=Partito Democratico del Cristiano;FC=Rikken Seiyukai;

FI=Forza Italia; GR=Gauche Républicaine;

HER=Herut; INC=Indian National Congress;

JD=Janata Dal; Lik=Likud; NF=National Front;

PDS=Democratici di Sinistra; PRN=Parti Républicain National;

PRP=Parti Républicaine Progressiste;

PS=Parti Socialiste; PSR=Parti Socialiste Républicain;

RI= Fédération Nationale des Républicains Indépendants;

RPR= Parti Républicaine Progressiste;

RRRS=Républicains Radicaux et Radicaux-Socialistes;

SFIO=Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière.

Table 4: Institutional Regime Changes (Extra-Systemic Wars).

Extra-Systemic War	Country	Intervenors
British-Burmese of 1823	UKG	Whig (1830)
British-Ashanti of 1924	UKG	Whig (1830)
British-Bharatpuran	UKG	Whig (1830)
British-Zulu of 1838	UKG	Tory (1841), Liberal (1846)
British-Afghan of 1838	UKG	Tory (1841), Liberal (1846), Conservative (1852)
First Opium	UKG	Tory (1841), Liberal (1846), Conservative (1852)
British-Baluchi	UKG	Liberal (1846), Conservative (1852)
Uruguyan Dispute	UKG	Liberal (1846), Conservative (1852), Liberal (1955)
British-Sikh of 1845	UKG	Liberal (1846), Conservative (1852), Liberal (1855)
British-Kaffir of 1846	UKG	Liberal (1846), Conservative (1852), Liberal (1855)
British-Sikh of 1848	UKG	Conservative (1852), Liberal (1855), Conservative (1858)
British-Kaffir of 1850	UKG	Conservative (1852), Liberal (1855), Conservative (1858), Liberal (1859)
46 British-Burmese of 1852	UKG	Liberal (1855), Conservative (1858), Liberal (1859)
British-Santal	UKG	Liberal (1855), Conservative (1858), Liberal (1859), Conservative (1866)
Second Opium	UKG	Conservative (1858), Liberal (1859), Conservative (1866), Liberal (1868)
Indian Mutiny	UKG	Conservative (1858), Liberal (1859), Conservative (1866), Liberal (1868)
British-Maorin	UKG	Conservative (1866), Liberal (1868), Conservative (1874)
Spanish-Santo Dominican	Spain	PPG (1871), PL (1871), PM (1872), PPG (1872), PR (1873)
British-Bhutanese	UKG	Conservative (1866), Liberal (1868), Conservative (1874)
British-Ethiopian	UKG	Liberal (1868), Conservative (1874)
Spanish-Cuban of 1868	Spain	PPG (1871), PL (1871), PPG (1872), PRF (1873), PR (1873), PPG (1883), PL (1884)
Franco-Algerian of 1871	France	MacMahon (1873), RC (1879), RO (1879), GR (1880), RO (1881)
British-Ashanti of 1873	UKG	Conservative (1874), Liberal (1880)

Table 4 continued on next page.

Table 4 —continued

Extra-Systemic War	Country	Intervenors
Franco-Tonkin	France	MacMahon (1873), RC (1879), RO (1879), GR (1880), RO (1881), GR (1882), RAD (1883) GR (1883), RRRS(1885), RO (1886), RAD (1886), RO (1887), GR (1887), RAD (1888), GR (1889), RO (1890), GR (1892), RM (1892), GR (1893), RM (1895), RAD (1895)
Dutch-Achinese	Netherlands	Conservative (1874), Liberal (1877), Conservative (1879), ARP (1888)
British-Kaffir of 1877	UKG	Liberal (1880), Conservative (1885), Liberal-Conservative (1886), Conservative (1886)
British-Afghan of 1878	UKG	Liberal (1880), Conservative (1885), Liberal-Conservative (1886), Conservative (1886)
British-Zulu of 1879	UKG	Liberal (1880), Conservative (1885), Liberal-Conservative (1886), Conservative (1886)
Gun War	UKG	Conservative (1885), Liberal-Conservative (1886), Conservative (1886)
Boer War of 1880	UKG	Conservative (1885), Liberal-Conservative (1886), Conservative (1886)
Franco-Tunisian of 1881	France	RO (1881), GR (1882), RAD (1883) GR (1883), RRRS(1885), RO (1886), RAD (1886), RO (1887), GR (1887), RAD (1888), GR (1889), RO (1890), GR (1892)
Franco-indochinese of 1882	France	GR (1882), RAD (1883) GR (1883), RRRS(1885), RO (1886), RAD (1886), RO (1887), GR (1887), RAD (1888), GR (1889), RO (1890), GR (1892), RM (1892), GR (1893)
British-Mahdi	UKG	Conservative (1885), Liberal-Conservative (1886), Conservative (1886), Liberal (1892), Conservative (1895)
Franco-Madagascan of 1883	France	RRRS(1885), RO (1886), RAD (1886), RO (1887), GR (1887), RAD (1888), GR (1889), RO (1890), GR (1892), RM (1892), GR (1893), RM (1895), RAD (1895)
British Burmese of 1885	UKG	Conservative (1885), Liberal-Conservative (1886), Conservative (1886), Liberal (1892), Conservative (1895)

Table 4 continued on next page.

Table 4 —continued

Extra-Systemic War	Country	Intervenors
Mandingo	France	RRRS(1885), RO (1886), RAD (1886), RO (1887), GR (1887), RAD (1888), GR (1889), RO (1890), GR (1892), RM (1892), GR (1893), RM (1895), RAD (1895), RM (1896)
Italo-Ethiopian of 1887	Italy	DES (1891), PLI (1892), SIN (1893), DES (1896)
Franco-Dahomeyan	France	GR (1889), RO (1890), GR (1892), RM (1892), GR (1893), RM (1895), RAD (1895), RM (1896), RAD (1898), GR (1898), UR (1899), RAD (1902)
Franco-Senegalese of 1890	France	RO (1890), GR (1892), RM (1892), GR (1893), RM (1895), RAD (1895), RM (1896), RAD (1898), GR (1898), UR (1899)
British-Ashanti of 1893	UKG	Conservative (1895)
Dutch-Balian	Netherlands	OFL (1894), LU (1897), ARP (1901);
Franco-Madagascan of 1894	France	RM (1895), RAD (1895), RM (1896), RAD (1898), GR (1898), UR (1899), RAD (1902), RO (1905)
Spanish-Cuban of 1895	Spain	PC (1899), PL (1901), PC (1902), ID (1905), PL (1905), PC (1907)
Italo-Ethiopian of 1895	Italy	DES (1896), CS (1900), SIN (1901), PL (1903), CS (1905), CD (1906), PLI (1906)
Spanish-Philippino of 1896	Spain	PC (1899) PL (1901), PC (1902), ID (1905), PL (1905), PC (1907)
Mahdi Uprising	France	RAD (1898), GR (1898), UR (1899), RAD (1902), RO (1905), Radical (1906), SFIO (1909)
British-Nigerian	UKG	Liberal (1905)
Indian Muslim	UKG	Liberal (1905)
Hut Tax	UKG	Liberal (1905)
Somali Rebellion	UKG	Liberal (1905)
Boer War of 1899	UKG	Liberal (1905)
British Conquest of Kano and Sokoto	UKG	Liberal (1905)
First Moroccan	France	RRRS (1911), RAD (1911), PRP (1912), SFIO (1913), GR (1913), RRRS (1913), RM (1914), PSR (1914), RM (1917), PSR (1917),

Table 4 continued on next page.

Table 4 —continued

Extra-Systemic War	Country	Intervenors
		RAD (1917), PSR (1920), GR (1920), PSR (1921), PRP (1922)
	Spain	PC (1913), PL (1915), PC (1917), PL (1917), PC (1918), PL (1918), PC (1919)
Second Moroccan	France	RM (1917), PSR (1917), RAD (1917), PSR (1920), GR (1920), PSR (1921), PRP (1922), PRN (1924), RAD (1924), PSR (1925), RAD (1926), PRP (1926)
	Spain	PC (1917), PL (1917), PC (1918), PL (1918), PC (1919), PL (1922)
Caco Revolt	USA	Republican (1921)
British-Afghan of 1919	UKG	Conservative (1922), Labor (1924), Conservative (1924), Labor (1929)
Franco-Syrian	France	PSR (1920), GR (1920), PSR (1921), PRP (1922), PRN (1924), RAD (1924), PSR (1925), RAD (1926) PRP (1926), PSR (1929), GR (1929), RRRS (1930), GR (1930), RRRS (1930)
Iraqi-British	UKG	Conservative (1922), Labor (1924), Conservative (1924), Labor (1929)
Italo Ethiopian	Italy	PSRI (1921), PLI (1922), PNF (1922);
Riff Rebellion	France	PSR (1925), RAD (1926) PRP (1926), PSR (1929), GR (1929), RRRS (1930), GR (1930), RRRS (1930), BN (1931), GR (1932), RAD(1932), SFIO (1932), RRRS (1933), ARD (1934), IND (1935), BN (1935), RRRS (1936)
	Spain	PL (1922), PRC (1931), AR (1931), PRR (1933), PC (1935), IR (1935)
Moplah Rebellion	UKG	Conservative (1922), Labor (1924), Conservative (1924), Labor (1929)
Franco-Druze	France	RAD (1926), PRP (1926), PSR (1929), GR (1929), RRRS (1930), GR (1930), RRRS (1930), BN (1931), GR (1932), RAD(1932), SFIO (1932), RRRS (1933), ARD (1934), IND (1935), BN (1935), RRRS (1936), SFIO (1936)
Saya san's Rebellion	UKG	Conservative (1935)
British Palestine	UKG	Labor (1945)
Indonesian	Netherlands	KVP (1946), PVDA (1948)

Table 4 continued on next page.

Table 4 —continued

Extra-Systemic War	Country	Intervenors
	UKG	Conservative (1950)
Franco-Indochinese of 1945	France	MRP (1946), SFIO (1946), MRP (1947), RRRS (1948), MRP (1948), RRRS (1948), MRP (1949), RRRS (1950), UDSR (1950), RRRS (1951), UDSR (1951), RRRS (1952), CNIP (1952), RAD (1953), CNIP (1953), RRRS (1954), SFIO (1956), RRRS (1957), MRP (1958), UNR (1959)
Franco-Madagascan of 1947	France	RRRS (1948), MRP (1948), RRRS (1948), MRP (1949), RRRS (1950), UDSR (1950), RRRS (1951), UDSR (1951), RRRS (1952), CNIP (1952), CNIP (1952), RAD (1953), CNIP (1953), RRRS (1954), SFIO (1956), RRRS (1957), MRP (1958)
Malayan Rebellion	UKG	Conservative (1950), Labor (1964)
Franco-Tunisian of 1952	France	RRRS (1952), CNIP (1952), RAD (1953), CNIP (1953), RRRS (1954), SFIO (1956), RRRS (1957), MRP (1958), UNR (1959)
British Mau Mau	UKG	Labor (1964)
Moroccan Independence	France	RAD (1953), CNIP (1953), RRRS (1954), SFIO (1956), RRRS (1957), MRP (1958), UNR (1959)
Franco-Algerian of 1954	France	SFIO (1956), RRRS (1957), MRP (1958), UNR (1959)
Cameron	France	SFIO (1956), RRRS (1957), MRP (1958), UNR (1959)
	UKG	Labor (1964), Conservative (1970)
Angolan-Portugese	Portugal	none (1978), CDS (1980), PSD (1981), PS (1983), PSD (1985)
Guinean-Portugese	Portugal	none (1978), CDS (1980), PSD (1981), PS (1983)
Mozambique-Portugese	Portugal	none (1978), CDS (1980), PSD (1981), PS (1983), PSD (1985)

Table 4 continued on next page.

Table 4 —continued

Extra-Systemic War	Country	Intervenors
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Sources: (Banks 1996, Cahoon 2008, Stearns 2001).

Key:

ARP=Anti-Revolutionaire Partij; AR=Agrario;ARD=Alliance Républicaine Démocratique;
 BN=Bloc National;CD=Centro-Destra; CDS=Centro Democrático Social;
 CNIP=Centre National des Indépendants et Paysans;CS=Centro-Sinistra; DES= Destra;
 GR=Gauche Républicaine;ID=Izquierda Democratico; IND=Indépendant;
 IR=Izquierda Republicana; KVP=Katholieke Volkspartij; LU=Liberale Unie;
 MRP=Mouvement Républicain Populaire; OFL =Old or Free Liberals;
 PC=Partido Liberal Conservador; PL=Partido Liberal (Spain);PLI=Partito Liberale (Italy);
 PM=Partido Monárquico Constitutional;PNF=Partito Nazionale Fascista; PPG=Partido Progresista;
 PR=Partido Republicano; PRC=Partido Republicano Conservador;PRF=Partido Republicano Federalista;
 PRN=Parti Républicain National;PRP=Parti Républicaine Progressiste;
 PRR=Partido Republicano Radical; PS=Partido Socialista; PSD= Partido Social Democrata;
 PSR=Parti Socialiste Républicain; PSRI=Partito Socialista Reformista Italiano;
 PVDA=Partij van de Arbeid; RAD=Parti Radical;
 RC =Républicain Conservateur; RM=Républicain Modéré; RO=Républicain Opportuniste;
 RRRS=Républicains Radicaux et Radicaux-Socialistes; SFIO=Section Franaise de l'Internationale Ouvrière;
 SIN=Sinistra; UDSR=Union Démocratique et Socialiste de la Résistance; UNR=Union pour la Nouvelle République.

Table 5: Institutionalized Executive Changes in Democratic Third Parties During & Following Intervention in Civil Wars (1816–2000).

Executive Changes	Frequency in Sample
0	7
1	9
2	9
3	1
4	2
5	2
6	2
11	1
12	2
13	1

Note: Includes executive changes occurring during, and ten years following, and intervention into a civil war.

Table 6: Institutionalized Executive Changes in Democratic Third Parties During & Following Intervention in Extra-Systemic Wars (1816–2000).

Executive Changes	Frequency in Sample
0	15
1	16
2	7
3	13
4	15
5	6
6	4
7	5
8	1
9	1
10	1
12	2
13	2
14	3
15	1
17	3
20	1
21	1

Note: Includes executive changes occurring during, and ten years following, an intervention into an extra-systemic war.

Table 7: Democratic Third-Party Institutional Executive Changes During & Following Intervention, Extra-systemic Conflicts (Negative Binomial Models.)

Variable	(1)	(2)
Distance	0.295*** (0.070)	0.358*** (0.065)
Victory	0.832** (0.35)	0.99*** (0.38)
Casualties	-0.013 (0.057)	0.158 (0.22)
Simultaneous Interventions	-0.333 (0.23)	-0.463** (0.19)
Retribution	-0.181 (0.22)	-0.328* (0.18)
Opposition Mass Killing	-0.262 (0.26)	-0.263 (0.20)
Economic Crisis	0.888*** (0.26)	0.646*** (0.24)
Constant	-3.236*** (0.61)	-3.582*** (0.59)
N	97	94
R^2	.06	.08
p	4.67e-09	0
χ^2	52.06	64.65

Note: Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.

Two-tailed significance: * * * $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$

Table 8: Democratic Third-Party Institutional Executive Changes During and Following Intervention, Civil Wars (Poisson Models).

Variable	(1)	(2)
Distance	-0.104*	-0.0018
	(0.058)	(0.069)
Victory	-0.477	-0.394
	(0.30)	(0.33)
Casualties	-0.432***	-0.351***
	(0.085)	(0.085)
Third-Party Competition	-1.514***	-1.233***
	(0.55)	(0.63)
Retribution	1.206***	1.340***
	(0.27)	(0.26)
Opposition Mass Killing	0.905***	0.723***
	(0.26)	(0.27)
Prime Ministerial System	0.620*	0.940***
	(0.35)	(0.31)
Economic Crisis	-0.212	-0.157
	(0.49)	(0.46)
Constant	-0.361	-1.494*
	(0.73)	(0.78)
N	36	34
R^2	.45	.44
p	0	0
χ^2	67.52	104.6

Note: Coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
Two-tailed significance: *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$

Table 9: Simulated Institutional Executive Changes for the United States, United Kingdom & France, Simulated Intervention into Darfur (from Table 8, Model 1).

Variable	United States	United Kingdom	France
<i>Baseline</i>	.91	1.7	.99
Victory	.52	1.1	.56
Opposition Mass Killing	2.6	4.5	2.6
Retribution	3.4	6.2	3.7
Competition	.24	.42	.24
Casualties (1st quartile)	.93	1.7	1.0
Casualties (Median)	.73	1.4	.81
Casualties (3rd Quartile)	.48	.94	.51
Casualties (Max)	.05	.07	.04
<i>Darfur Intervention</i>	1.3	2.7	1.4

Figure 1: Observation Period for Identifying Democratic Third Party Intervenor Institutional Regime Changes.

