

Perfect Storms?  
Political Instability in Imposed Polities & the Futures of  
Iraq & Afghanistan\*

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## Abstract

What explains variation in domestic political instability in polities imposed by foreign powers? We formulate a framework grounded in four sources of political instability in imposed polities: (1) the initial conditions under which a polity is imposed; (2) policy choices made by the imposer; (3) the prevailing domestic conditions within states hosting the imposed polity; and (4) the international environment within which the host state is embedded. Employing a sample of 94 imposed polities during the period 1816–1994 to test expectations from the framework, we find, in part, that ethno-religious heterogeneity coupled with democratic institutions, pre-imposition military defeat, colonial experience, dissimilarity of neighboring political institutions, hostility from neighboring states, and the presence of the imposing state, each stimulate political instability. The analysis suggests a bleak prognosis for domestic peace in post-invasion Afghanistan and Iraq, as the causal factors that militate against domestic stability are manifold and likely reinforcing.

## Introduction

How stable will the new democratic political systems be in Iraq and Afghanistan? To what degree will political leaders in these states experience domestic political challenges to their authority? Prior to the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2002 and 2003, respectively, one policy perspective suggested that a modicum of political stability could be attained relatively rapidly in these two states. Democratic political institutions cultivated from abroad, coupled with economic prosperity and the provision of internal and external security, would generate stable domestic political environments anchored to mutually reinforcing peace, prosperity, and democracy (Bush, 2003). Central to this perspective is the assumption of an innate preference by individuals for a government system fundamental to which is individual freedom in the economic and political arenas, a preference reinforced by a negative reaction to the authoritarian excesses of the Taliban and Hussein regimes in pre-invasion Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively.

In turn, the coupling of democratic individualism with a negative memory of authoritarianism would enable citizens in post-invasion Afghanistan and Iraq to set aside historic, socially grounded divisions and work toward stable, prosperous democracies. Proponents of this perspective pointed to the successes of the post-WWII democracies and market economies in West Germany and Japan as evidence supporting the feasibility of establishing stable democratic political institutions in authoritarian regimes defeated in war. Finally, in addition to serving as beacons of democracy in their respective regions, post-WWII West Germany and Japan were central to the Western Cold War security system, policy behavior that was argued to augur well for the potential contributions of Afghanistan and Iraq in the prosecution of the contemporary War on Terror.

An alternative perspective suggests that, despite the success of the market economies in post-WWII West Germany and Japan, for several reasons these cases serve as poor analogues for post-invasion Afghanistan and Iraq. First, West Germany and Japan were developed industrial states prior to WWII, thereby providing a ready economic foundation

upon which to embed democratic institutions, and in turn generating the critical synergy between freedom of choice and resulting economic reward. In contrast to West Germany and Japan, the economies of Afghanistan and Iraq are non-industrial, with Afghanistan's economy primarily agrarian and Iraq's economy solely dependent on the export of crude oil. Second, Germany and Japan had prior, if brief, experiences with democratic institutions, while Iraq and Afghanistan had little or no experience with democracy, certainly too little to embed in their respective citizenries a civic culture grounded in respect for democratic institutions.

Perhaps the sharpest distinction between the post-WWII and contemporary cases lies in the degree to which these societies reflect social cleavages. Post-WWII West Germany and Japan were among the most socially homogenous states in the international system, homogeneity that prevented the politicization of social groups, outbidding, and zero-sum politics that can threaten nascent democratic institutions. Contemporary Afghanistan and Iraq reflect longstanding, sharp cleavages, primarily between ethno-religious groups. For example, the rivalry between Afghanistan's majority Pashtuns and its large Tajik minority manifested itself following the end of the Soviet occupation in 1988, at which time the Taliban was largely Pashtun-supported and the Northern Alliance enjoyed Tajik support. In Iraq, the historic conflict between the Shias and Sunnis, as well as the north-south divide between Arabs and Kurds, resulted in a modern political history marked by regular, often extremely violent, cleavage-based conflict.

Given these attributes, this alternative perspective suggests that cultivating democratic institutions in the social environments manifest in Afghanistan and Iraq is likely to be a difficult task, one exacerbated by the necessity of creating democracy, prosperity, and security simultaneously (Diamond, 2005; Huntington, 1968). As such, this perspective suggests that more appropriate analogues for the trajectories of post-invasion democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq might be the Philippines following the Spanish American War (1898) and the subsequent lengthy American stewardship, or Sri Lanka following independence from

Britain in 1948, two cases notable for their political instability, rebellion, inter-ethnic conflict, and fragile or intermittent democracy.

Clearly, each of the two aforementioned perspectives on the prospects for democracy in post-invasion Afghanistan and Iraq can be substantiated with reference to examples from the history of the modern state system. Yet, neither perspective is grounded in a generalizable analysis of political stability polities cultivated by foreign powers, and such an analysis is absent from the social scientific literature.<sup>1</sup> Some recent scholarship scrutinizes the prospects for success and failure in the contemporary cases (e.g., Byman, 2003), but these studies are based primarily on analysis of the cases that are themselves the subjects of the forecasts (i.e., Afghanistan and Iraq), and as such do not furnish a scientific evaluation of the two competing perspectives.

Here, we provide such a generalizable analysis by formulating a model of domestic political instability, or what we refer to as *domestic political challenge*, in polities that are imposed by foreign states.<sup>2</sup> To do so, we develop a framework reflecting four general sources of political challenge to imposed polities: (1) the initial conditions under which a polity is imposed; (2) policy choices made by the imposer; (3) the prevailing domestic conditions within the host state; and (4) the international environment within which the host state is nested. We employ this framework to derive expectations regarding patterns of domestic political challenge, and we test these expectations on a sample of 94 imposed polities enduring in the modern state system, 1816–1994.

Our analysis leads us to draw several conclusions regarding patterns of political challenge in imposed polities, as well as understanding the likely trajectory of the imposed democracies in contemporary Afghanistan and Iraq. For instance, we find that ethno-religious heterogeneity coupled with democratic institutions, pre-imposition military defeat, colonial experience, hostility from neighboring states, and the presence of the imposing state each spark domestic political challenges to imposed polities. In contrast, relatively few factors, such as economic development and the increased political similarity of

states neighboring the host state, decrease the incidence of political challenges. Our analysis underscores that central to the occurrence of domestic political challenges are prior political challenges, a cycle of challenge that is difficult for an imposer and an imposed polity to stop once underway. Collectively, our analysis suggests a bleak prognosis for domestic peace in post-invasion Afghanistan and Iraq, as the causal factors that militate against domestic peace, the sources of which are domestic, regional, and international, are manifold.

We structure the remainder of this article as follows. First, we discuss the concept of an imposed polity, followed by a similar treatment of domestic political challenge. In turn, we set out a framework of the aforementioned four stimulants and deterrents of domestic political challenges in imposed polities. The research design and statistical analysis are executed thereafter, followed by a forecasting analysis of political challenge in Iraq. We close the paper with a discussion of the implications of the study for scholarship and policymaking.

## **Imposed Polities**

Theoretically, a state seeking to exert influence upon the affairs of another state has a variety of potential methods at its disposal. For example, such a state might employ exhortations, inducements, threats, and punishments as a means of enticing or compelling a target state to adjust its policies in a more favorable direction. Additionally, modifying the policies of another state can be accomplished by stimulating a change in leadership in the target state, with the expectation that a new leader will bring more favorable and consistent policies from the perspective of the state encouraging domestic change (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow, 2003). A more significant, but costly, method of altering the policies of another state involves not merely encouraging or facilitating leadership change, but rather a complete restructuring of the domestic political system in the target state. In doing so, the existing political structure in the target state is dismantled

and remade by an intervening state and new political leaders are installed to head these institutions. This strategy was pursued following the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2002 and 2003, respectively, with the removal of the Taliban and Hussein regimes, and the cultivation of democratic institutions by the United States and its coalition partners.

Given the range of policy options available to states and the commitment required to cultivate new political institutions in target states, why impose a polity at all? Imposing states might seek to enhance their access to resources by pursuing a policy of conquest (Lieberman, 1996), and a new political system might enhance the likelihood of long-term access to goods stimulating the conquest. Similarly, Owen (2002) concludes that major power states are most likely to impose political institutions in other states when international ideological conflict is present, a conclusion that jibes with Meernik's (1996) reasoning that the cultivation of democratic regimes by the United States is driven by security interests, as well as Werner's (1999) observation that imposing a domestic regime on a defeated state significantly reduces the likelihood of subsequent threats to the victorious state by the defeated state.<sup>3</sup>

Thus, while imposing a political system on a target state generally demands a significant investment in resources by the imposer, the central benefit to the imposer lies in their potential for *self maintenance*. That is, imposed political institutions cultivate and select political leaders exhibiting consistent norms, goals and policy preferences suitable to the imposer, and as such obviate the necessity of overt maintenance by the imposer in the form of repeated interventions. Additionally, political institutions may be central to an imposers' strategy, such as demonstrating the viability of one type of political institution versus another. For example, during the Cold War the West's demonstration of the benefits of capitalist economies coupled with democratic ideology competed with the East's demonstration of the benefits of socialist economies coupled with communist ideology. Similarly, central to the American strategy in post-invasion Afghanistan and Iraq is the notion that democratic institutions will generate political leaders that will consistently support Ameri-

can security preferences and serve as reliable “partners for peace” and allies in the War on Terror, while demonstrating the viability of democratic institutions in a region notable for its authoritarian history.

In light of the costs and benefits associated with imposing a polity, we assume that imposers prefer to impose polities that are stable. A stable imposed polity is likely to exhibit consistent policy behavior, and in doing so reduces the costs to the imposer for subsequent interventions to stabilize an imposed polity and realign the polity’s policy preferences. Despite this general preference for a stable imposed polity, achieving this outcome might be a function of a number of causal forces internal and external to the host state, forces that are subject to varying degrees of control by the imposer. In the remainder of this article we investigate the causes political stability in imposed polities. Prior to addressing this question, in the following section we elaborate the idea of political stability as it relates to imposed polities.

## Domestic Political Challenges

Conceptually, political stability is the “regular flow” of “political exchanges,” while political instability is the irregular flow of these exchanges (Ake, 1975). While political instability broadly defined is frequently identified as a causal effect on domestic political outcomes (e.g., Lichbach, 1987; Moore, 1998), domestic economics (e.g., Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi, 2000), and foreign policy (e.g., Mansfield and Snyder, 2005; Maoz, 1996), our chief concern in this article is analyzing domestic political instability as the outcome of interest.

As evidenced by the scholarly literature on the subject, the array of the causes of political instability is quite broad. For example, studies of rebellion and revolution, two extreme and violent manifestations of domestic political instability, anchor causality to deprivation (Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970), economic inequality (Booth, 1991; Muller and Selig-

son, 1987; Paige, 1975), economic and population growth (Olson, 1963), political opportunity structures (Piven and Cloward, 1977), the emergence of multiple sovereignty (Goldstone, 1991; Tilly, 1978), social mobilization structures (Tarrow, 1998), the capacity and responsiveness of state structures (Gurr, 1974; Skocpol, 1979), as well as structural factors, such as decolonization and terrain (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Political instability is also conceived of as a function of domestic regime change, with democratization proposed as a panacea for instability (Goodwin and Skocpol, 1989), as well as a source of political instability, particularly when ethnic cleavages are present (Snyder, 2000). Finally, research suggests that foreign policy outcomes influence political stability and institutional change in states (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003), strong evidence of the presence of feedback processes that bridge the domestic–foreign policy divide.

Several of the aforementioned causal processes that influence the occurrence of political instability are likely to manifest themselves when political institutions are imposed. Here, we argue that central to the idea of political instability is a phenomenon that we refer to as one of *domestic political challenge*. Our conceptualization of domestic political challenge is derived from Hibbs’s (1973) treatment of mass political violence. Hibbs (7, emphasis present) argues that political violence exhibits the following qualities: (1) it is “*anti-system* in character, in the sense of being at odds with existing political authority; (2) “it must have direct and fairly immediate *political significance*” in that it poses “a threat of at least severe inconvenience to the normal operation of the political elite”; and (3) it “must involve *collective* or ‘*mass*’ activity”, rather than individual acts of conflict (e.g., robbery, murder). Ultimately, the emergence of political challenges is an indicator of a political system’s weak legitimacy and incapacity to execute policies in an efficient and timely fashion (Jackman, 1993; Schatzman, 2005; Tilly, 1978).

By virtue of their mode of creation, imposed polities are prime candidates for political challenges. First, as they are by definition imposed by foreign parties, imposed polities come into existence with very little inherent political legitimacy. Therefore, popular confi-

dence in the capacity of the imposed institutions to establish the rule of law in the political and economic arenas is initially likely to be low. Popular perceptions regarding an imposed polity's political capacity is further undermined by the necessity of imposing states remaining in occupation to provide support to the imposed polity, principally in the form of domestic security, the presence of which can incite nationalist-based political challenges in reaction to continued occupation by an imposer.

Second, polities are sometimes imposed following a defeat in war, or the failure of a domestic political system. In the case of war, post-war states often suffer significant human and material losses during the course of the conflict. Subsequently, an imposed polity has, at least initially, a reduced economic capacity and therefore is less capable of delivering economic goods that provide a foundation for political stability. In terms of failed states, political institutions that are imposed under such conditions are initially neither likely to exhibit a monopoly over the use of force domestically, nor the capacity to collect and redistribute revenue central to governance.

In general, then, imposed political systems are deficient in two key qualities central to the capacity to limit the occurrence of political challenges: political legitimacy and capacity. In their absence, imposed polities are likely to experience domestic political challenges that can undermine the viability of the political institutions. This said, the historical record reflects a diverse pattern of political challenges in imposed political systems. Some imposed polities, such as post-WWII West Germany and Japan experience few domestic political challenges. However, other cases, such as the autocratic polity imposed in Iraq in 1924 and the democratic polity imposed in India in 1950, are characterized by the chronic occurrence of domestic political challenges of varying manifestations and severity. It is this variation in the occurrence of domestic political challenges in imposed polities that we seek to explain in the remainder of this article. To do so, in the following section we develop a framework of the causes of domestic political challenges in imposed polities.

## **A Causal Framework**

Given the explanations for domestic political stability and instability identified in the extant literature, we reason that the degree to which imposed polities experience domestic political challenges is primarily the result of causal stimulation originating from four primary sources: (1) the initial conditions under which the polity is imposed; (2) policy choices made by the imposer; (3) the prevailing domestic conditions within the host state; and (4) the international environment within which the state host state is nested. We outline our expectations pertaining to each source of political challenge next.

### **Imposition Conditions**

We anticipate that the conditions, or context, preceding the imposition of political institutions by foreign powers influence the likelihood of domestic political challenges once political institutions are imposed. We focus on two important conditions that are likely to set the initial trajectory of challenge in imposed polities: (1) colonial experience; and (2) defeat in war.

#### **Colonial Experience**

Whether or not a polity is imposed following a period of colonialism can condition the occurrence of domestic political challenges. Colonial impositions generally occur over an extended period of time, one that can facilitate the elimination of threatening political groups, the establishment of civil administration, and the development of political norms. Colonial metropolises are likely to have a greater familiarity with the demographics and culture of a colony, and this knowledge facilitates imposing political institutions better suited to minimizing domestic political challenges. However, said familiarity is double-edged for an imposer, as short-term stability is obtained often through ruthless methods, such as ethno-religious favoritism and repression, methods that sow the seeds of

post-independence political instability. Additionally, colonial impositions can also reflect a hasty implementation process, chronic institutional illegitimacy, and continued resource and security dependence on the former colonial power, each of which can stimulate domestic political challenges to the imposed polity.

### **Military Defeat**

Political institutions that are imposed following defeat in war are more likely to be viewed as illegitimate by the target state's population, and this illegitimacy might serve as focal points for political dissatisfaction, which manifests itself in the form of political challenges to the imposed polity. Elements of the military of the defeated state may, for example, choose to continue their fight against the imposing power in the form of an insurgency. Finally, the destruction wrought by defeat in war can weaken, even eliminate, the capacity of the imposed polity to meet the material needs of its citizens, thereby exacerbating dissatisfaction with these institutions and stimulating political challenges. The negative consequence of war notwithstanding, defeat in war can generate stability. The imposer can capitalize on the unpopularity of the defeated state's political institutions, thereby gaining legitimacy for the imposed institutions which in turn engenders stability. Furthermore, a military marked by defeat might find it difficult to mobilize popular support against the imposer and the new political institutions, a dynamic that effectively eliminates a natural opponent of an imposer and its polity.

### **Imposer Policy Choices**

The policy choices implemented by the imposing state are likely to be fundamental to the stability of the imposed polity. While we assume, above, that imposing states prefer to impose stable polities, imposers employ a number of different strategies to achieve said stability. Here, we focus on three fundamental policy choices: (1) the authority patterns,

democratic or autocratic, that characterize the imposed polity; (2) the imposer's commitment to the imposed polity; and (3) the degree to which the host state is militarized.

### **Authority Pattern**

An important policy choice facing an imposing power concerns whether democratic or autocratic authority patterns are imposed. The former authority pattern, one reflective of democracy, is clearly central to the imposition processes in the contemporary cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, and is therefore central to our discussion. Two distinct causal logics link the presence of democratic institutions with the likelihood of domestic political challenges in an imposed polity. The first argument builds on the idea that democratic institutions provide formal, institutionalized mechanisms for relatively large electorates to engage the political process with their policy preferences. By design, democratic institutions should encourage expressions of political preferences through non-violent political participation (Gurr, 1974; Snyder, 1992; Snyder, 1999). In this respect, by increasing the stake a citizenry has in an imposed polity as well as the polity's legitimacy, imposed democratic institutions should be less vulnerable to political challenge than their autocratic counterparts, and in turn the former should be marked by greater political stability.

Alternative reasoning focuses on the influence of institutional consolidation on political stability, with some evidence suggesting that poorly consolidated regimes are more likely to experience domestic political instability, even civil war (Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates and Gleditsch, 2001). By definition, nascent imposed polities are institutionally unconsolidated, and perhaps to a greater degree than are nascent, indigenously founded polities. As such, imposed polities are less capable of responding to the demands of various domestic constituencies (Deutsch, 1961; Huntington, 1968; Tilly, 1978), thereby generating low levels of political legitimacy and capacity (Jackman, 1993; Linz, 1978; Lipset, 1959). The problem of institutional consolidation might very well be exacerbated in fledgling democratic institutions, wherein policymaking power is diffused across rival institutions, the

absence of institutional prerogatives, and the tendency of the democratic process to be distorted in the presence of strong social cleavages, such as ethnicity or religion (Snyder, 2000). By this reasoning, imposed democratic polities are more likely to experience political challenges relative to their autocratic counterparts, the latter of which is often anchored to a smaller constituency and more readily resorts to overtly repressive instruments to deter and eliminate sources of political challenge.

### **Imposer Commitment**

The degree of commitment by the parties imposing a polity is one of the key contributions to the stability and longevity of an imposed polity (Dobbins, McGinn, Crane, Jones, Lal, Rathmell, Swanger and Timilsina, 2003). The imposing parties play a central role in augmenting an imposed polity's capacity with financial support and commitment of military and civilian personnel. Imposing parties serve to insulate the new polity from efforts by domestic political groups to undermine the legitimacy of the new polity by disrupting the latter's political, economic, and social infrastructure. Imposing states also provide the financial and diplomatic resources necessary for the new polity to carry out the tasks essential to a political system, such as taxation and revenue collection, education, and public works. Additionally, the commitment of the imposer can moderate the impact of foreign policy threats. As such, the presence of an imposer can moderate challenges to the imposed polity.

However, the simple physical presence of an imposer reflects an imposed polity's incapacity and increases perceptions of illegitimacy (Davis, 2005; Edelstein, 2004). In turn, weak capacity and legitimacy signal to opponents of an imposed polity that political challenges may be effective in undermining, even overthrowing, the polity. This dynamic represents a *Catch-22* for the imposing state, as extending its physical presence in support of the imposed polity furnishes security for the fledgling polity. However, the longer an imposer continues to be a visible supplier of security and related goods to an imposed polity,

the greater the likelihood of a popular backlash against perceived occupation and colonization, and the implications of this perception for the domestic legitimacy of the imposed polity. The presence of the imposer, then, can translate into an increase in the likelihood of domestic political challenge in an imposed polity.

## **Militarization**

Imposed polities are likely to contend with significant challenges to establishing domestic security in an environment in which political institutions have weak legitimacy and capacity. These polities often respond to this insecurity by increasing the capability of the domestic security apparatus, such as the police, security, and military agencies, as the first step in establishing the rule of law and reducing the likelihood of political challenges. Increasing security, then, often takes the form of militarization. Militarization of the state hosting the imposed polity raises the cost to individuals for mounting political challenges, as well as exerting positive effects on other political, economic, and social processes associated with “nation-building” (Dixon and Moon, 1986), and in turn this impact might reduce the domestic incentives to engage in political challenges.

While the militarization of an imposed polity can furnish domestic security and the institutional strength necessary to maintain popular confidence and bolster the new polity’s legitimacy, militarization might stimulate a cycle marked by an over-reaction by the imposed polity to minor expressions of public discontent, a response that results in violent expressions of discontent (Gurr, 1970; Huntington, 1968; Poe, Tate and Keith, 1999), and the stimulation of a vicious cycle of protest and repression (Hibbs, 1973; Lichbach, 1987; Moore, 1998). Thus, while militarization can furnish much needed institutional capacity in an imposed polity, increasing the strength of the military might inadvertently spark domestic political challenges to the imposed polity.

## **Domestic Conditions**

While imposing states can make policy choices that affect the likelihood of domestic political challenges directed at imposed polities, these political institutions are necessarily embedded in a domestic context that also conditions the likelihood of political challenges. In this section, we focus on two elements of this domestic system in the host state that are likely to influence the likelihood of domestic political challenges: (1) the degree of social heterogeneity; and (2) the level of economic development.

### **Social Heterogeneity**

The social fabric of the host state provides a critical context into which a polity is imposed. A primary manifestation of a society's social fabric concerns the differences between, as well as the relationships among, various societal groups. Ethnic identities (i.e., the physical, cultural, linguistic, customary, historical attributes associated with groups of individuals) are visible symbols of the varied nature of a society's social fabric, and as such provide convenient vehicles for political leaders seeking to consolidate political power with appeals to nationalism (Gurr and Harff, 1994; Snyder, 2000). Nationalist appeals grounded in ethnic differences, and the attendant emergence of "winners" and "losers" from these policies, are likely to increase the probability of domestic political challenges in imposed polities.

While the above logic suggests a general relationship between the frequency of ethnic groups and political challenge, this positive relationship may be a function of the type of polity imposed; that is, whether democratic institutions are present or absent. Specifically, democratic polities experience greater difficulty in environments characterized as multiethnic, because democracies require power sharing between political groups. Several studies suggest that the democratization of ethnically heterogeneous states is likely to increase the probability of extreme political violence, much of it inter-ethnic, as ethnic cues furnish convenient and efficient political vehicles, and more importantly, stimulate political outbid-

ding (Hibbs, 1973; Horowitz, 1985; Snyder, 2000). Below, we explore whether the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity is mediated by the presence of democratic institutions in imposed polities.

### **Economic Development**

Economic prosperity serves to satisfy the material needs of the population in an imposed polity. This view is consistent with much of the scholarly literature linking economic performance and political instability (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Przeworski et al., 2000). The economic performance of a state provides a key signal to the populace of its political system's capacity to govern, such that in order to persist, fledgling polities must deliver security, stability, and economic growth (Easterly, 2001; van de Walle, 2001). Central to this thinking is the expectation that unmet economic expectations represent a fundamental source of domestic violence (Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970; Hibbs, 1973; Huntington, 1968). Following this logic, an imposed polity is most likely to be regarded as successful by its constituents to the degree to which it is able to deliver a more prosperous society. Furthermore, economic development is more likely to constrain elites (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992), and therefore instill greater confidence in a citizenry regarding the political system's management of the economy. In sum, higher levels of economic development should correspond to a decreased likelihood of domestic political challenges to an imposed polity.

### **International Environment**

Imposed polities are likely to have a strong impact on the degree of interstate security in the regional sub-systems into which they are imposed. For example, Maoz (1996) suggests that domestic political regime changes stimulate neighboring states to target the new revolutionary state or regime as a threat to the regional status quo. In turn, imposed polities themselves are threatened by neighboring states, and the former are compelled to divert

precious resources away from delivering public goods toward security policies. Doing so, however, decreases the capacity of the imposed polity to satisfy its citizens' domestic demands. This tradeoff, in turn, increases domestic dissatisfaction and increases the probability of domestic political challenges.

Second, some scholarship suggests that political leaders prefer the presence of external threats because these threats afford the state a rationale for centralizing power, mobilizing resources, and eliminating rival domestic power centers, all goals that facilitate the state-making process (Thies, 2005; Tilly, 1978). The presence of an external threat encourages competing political groups to set aside their differences and strengthen a polity's policy-making prerogatives in order to create a united domestic front for dealing with the external threat (Levy, 1989). This logic suggests that imposed polities might benefit from the presence of interstate threats because threatening behavior from abroad enables political leaders to increase the polity's control over domestic policy outcomes, as well as cohering the policy preferences of individuals and groups. In this latter scenario, increased state strength combined with a public "rally" around the imposed polity in the face of foreign threats, should correspond to a reduction of domestic political challenges.

## Research Design

### Identifying Imposed Polities

To identify our sample of imposed polities, we begin with the identification of polity origin contained in the *Polity III*d dataset (version November 2000) (McLaughlin, Gates, Hegre, Gissinger and Gleditsch, 1998) covering the period 1816–1994.<sup>4</sup> Specifically, we rely on *Polity III*d's coding of the variables *ORIG1* (Origin of New Nation's Polity), *ORIG3* (Established Nations, External Conflict), and *MODEL* (Source of [Polity] Model) to identify our preliminary sample.<sup>5</sup> The variable *ORIG1* coding values of 1 and 2 reflect new polities imposed in new states. The *ORIG3* coding values of 2 and 3 reflect polities imposed

in existing states. And the variable *MODEL* coding value of 1 allows us to identify several additional imposed polities.

In addition to our reliance upon the *Polity III*d sample, we also rely on evidence of polity imposition reported in *The Encyclopedia of World History* (Stearns, 2001) and the electronic version of *Keesing's Record of World Events* (Keesing's, 1997) (the latter source is employed for the period 1960 to 1994) to identify polities that were imposed, cultivated, or established by other states. We exclude from our sample polities that emerge primarily as the result of indigenous political processes (e.g., the United States following the American Revolution and independence from England in 1787.) Based on these coding criteria, 103 imposed polities are identified as enduring in the 1816–1994 period in the *Polity III*d sample.<sup>6</sup> Eight polities are removed from our sample due to our merge of the *Polity III*d sample with the state system identified by the *Correlates of War* (*COW*) project (Singer and Small, 1994).<sup>7</sup> Two additional polities are excluded from our analysis due to missing data on our measure of social cleavage, the operationalization of which is discussed below.<sup>8</sup> Thus, we employ the remaining 94 imposed polities in the subsequent empirical analysis. This sample is reported in Table 1.

[Table 1 About Here]

Given our interest in forecasting developments in the contemporary cases, central to our analysis of imposed polities is whether these polities reflect democratic or autocratic authority patterns. Having identified the set of 94 imposed polities, we use the *Polity III*d composite regime score (i.e., the difference between the *Polity III*d ordinal democracy and autocracy scales, sometimes referred to as *DEMAUT*) in the imposed polity's first year of existence to determine when a case is democratic or autocratic. In turn, we track the trajectory of imposed autocratic and democratic polities as they endure until they change into the opposite polity by crossing the zero value on the ordinal *DEMAUT* scale, another polity is installed, or the terminal observation of our sample, the year 1994, occurs. We report the first *DEMAUT* score for each imposed polity in the sample resulting from the

merge of the *Polity III*d and *COW* system samples in Table 1.<sup>9</sup> Therefore, an imposed polity can span several “polities,” or case numbers, as defined in the *Polity III*d data.

By way of example, consider the case of imposed democratic institutions in Sri Lanka, reported in Table 2. We code the imposed democratic polity in Sri Lanka as enduring from 1948, the year that the state receives independence from the United Kingdom, through composite regime score values of 7, 7, 8, -88, 5, 3, 7, respectively, until the terminal year of our analysis, 1994.

[Table 2 About Here]

We employ the *EUGene* (Version 3.40) data generation program (Bennett and Stam, 2000) to generate a sample based on the *COW* state membership list, a procedure that results in a sample for analysis of 2971 observations for the period 1816-1994. Due to the large frequency of imposed polities in the post-WWII period (68 of 94, or 72%), as well as the availability of more precise data for measuring some of the covariates that we wish to include in our statistical models, we derive two samples for our hypothesis testing: (1) a “full sample” including the period 1816–1994, and (2) a “truncated sample” including the period 1946–1994. The unit of analysis in each sample is the *imposed-polity-year*. We estimate a more parsimonious model for the full sample and a more detailed model for the truncated sample.<sup>10</sup>

## Dependent Variable

We rely on *The Encyclopedia of World History* (Stearns, 2001) and *Keesing’s Record of World Events* (Keesing’s, 1997) to identify intervals during which political instability, or what we refer to as “domestic political challenges,” are ongoing in each imposed-polity-year.<sup>11</sup> Domestic political challenges are operationalized very broadly, including the following events: armed attacks; assassinations (successes and attempts); bombings; civil war; coups (successes and attempts); insurgency; insurrections; protests; rebellion; riots; and

strikes.<sup>12</sup> We create a dichotomous variable coded a value of 1 when an imposed-polity-year in our sample reflects one or more of the aforementioned domestic political challenge events, and is coded a value of zero otherwise. In our 1816–1994 sample of 2971 imposed-polity-years, 1091 imposed-polity-years (36%) reflect the occurrence of at least one domestic political challenge event. In our 1946–1994 sample of 1725 imposed-polity-years, 704 imposed-polity-years (41%) reflect the occurrence of at least one domestic political challenge event. In general, only two of the 94 imposed polities (2%) reported in Table 1, Singapore and Madagascar, are free from domestic political challenges in our sample.

## Independent Variables

### Imposition Conditions

We code a dichotomous variable, *Military Defeat*, identifying whether or not the polity imposition followed the military defeat of the host state by the imposer. Of the 94 imposed polities in our full sample, 17 (18%) are implemented following the military defeat of the host state, while in the truncated sample 10 (15%) are marked by war defeat. Additionally, for the truncated sample we code an additional dichotomous variable, *Colony*, differentiating those cases in which a polity is imposed following a period of colonization by the imposing power. In the post-WWII analysis, 54 (79%) of imposed polities are created through a colonial process.

### Authority Pattern

Our first operationalization of the presence of democratic institutions, *Democracy<sub>t</sub>* ( $> 6$ ), employs a conservative standard for polity qualification as a democracy, such that only those imposed polities with a *DEMAUT* score  $> 6$  in an imposed-polity-year qualify as imposed democratic polities. In the truncated sample, we also employ a more liberal standard for democracy *Democracy<sub>t</sub>* ( $> 0$ ), creating a dichotomous variable differentiating democratic from non-democratic imposed polities in each imposed-polity-year using the

threshold  $DEMAUT > 0$ . In full sample, 24% of our imposed-polity-years have a  $DEMAUT$  score  $> 6$ . The truncated sample reflects a similar representation of democratic authority patterns, with 27% of the imposed-polity-years corresponding to a  $DEMAUT$  score  $> 6$ , and 31% of the imposed-polity-years corresponding to a  $DEMAUT$  score  $> 0$ .

## **Militarized**

We rely on *EUGene* to identify the number of military personnel (in thousands) of each host state. To account for the skewness inherent in data on military personnel, we generate the continuous variable,  $Militarized_t$ , by computing the natural logarithm of the raw military personnel value. For the full sample, the minimum value for the variable  $Militarized_t$  is 0, the maximum is 8.52, and the mean value is 3.28, while in the truncated sample minimum value is 0, the maximum is 7.42, and the mean value is 3.19. Due to the fact that we expect that increased militarization might carry costs with it that can increase the likelihood of domestic political violence, at least for intermediate values, we square the natural log value of  $Militarized_t$  to operationalize a second variable,  $Militarized_t^2$ , so that we might explore the presence of this curvilinear effect.

## **Economic Development**

We rely on *EUGene* to create the variable *Development* by calculating the natural log of the sum of two components of the Composite Indicator of National Capabilities (CINC) data from Singer, Bremer and Stuckey (1972), Energy Consumption and Iron and Steel Production, in each imposed-polity-year. While this operationalization of the level of economic development is inferior to a measure based on Gross National Product (GNP), for example, our reliance on this more imprecise measure accommodates our desire to analyze political challenge in the pre-WWII period and provides a greater level of comparability between the full and truncated samples. We add a value of 1 to the summed components to avoid calculating the natural log of a zero value. This variable ranges from a minimum

of 0 to a maximum value of 13.36, with a mean of 7.04 in the full sample, and ranges from a minimum of 0 to a maximum value of 13.36, with a mean of 7.48 in the truncated sample.

### **Social Heterogeneity**

We rely on Krain's (1997) measure of ethnic fractionalization to create a variable reflecting the degree of ethnic heterogeneity in our sample of imposed polities, *Diversity*. The chief benefit of the Krain data on ethnic fractionalization is that, rather than a temporally invariant measure of ethnicity across time, it re-calculates ethnic fractionalization every decade for the period 1948–1990.<sup>13</sup> In our sample, the variable *Diversity* ranges in value from a minimum of 0.01 to a maximum of 0.89, with higher values reflecting a greater degree of ethnic fractionalization. The mean value for *Diversity* is 0.39. Due to the fact that we anticipate that ethnic heterogeneity may be particularly challenging to imposed democratic polities, we interact the variable *Diversity* with our two measures of democratic authority patterns in the truncated sample.

### **International Environment**

We measure the degree of foreign policy threats faced by an imposed polity in three ways. First, we rely on the *Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID)* data file (Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer, 2004) to code a dichotomous variable, *Interstate Dispute<sub>t</sub>*, identifying if an imposed polity is involved in a militarized dispute in a given imposed-polity-year, scored a value of 1 and zero otherwise. Regardless of sample, approximately one-third of imposed-polity-years reflect the occurrence of a *MID* (34% in the full sample and 32% in the truncated sample.)

Second, we create the variable, *Similar Neighbors<sub>t</sub>*, to differentiate whether states neighboring the host state (a distance less than or equal to 500 miles, or if the two states share a land border) reflect similar authority patterns. We employ the *Polity IV* sample (Marshall

and Jagers, 2000) to code the combined regime score for each state in the neighborhood of an imposed polity in each imposed-polity-year. Neighboring states are treated as having a similar polity if their polity score, or *DEMAUT*, is within three intervals of that of a neighboring imposed polity.<sup>14</sup> In the full sample, the variable *Similar Neighbors<sub>t</sub>* ranges in value from 0 to 12 with an average imposed polity having 2.6 similar neighbors, while in the truncated sample, the variable *Similar Neighbors<sub>t</sub>* ranges in value from 0 to 11 with an average imposed polity having approximately three similar neighbors.

Last, due to the fact that other states apart from the imposing state(s) can intervene militarily in an imposed polity with an interest in stabilizing or destabilizing an imposed polity, we rely on Stearns (2001) and *Keesing's* (Keesing's, 1997) to code a dichotomous variable, *Outside Intervention<sub>t-1</sub>*, identifying whether or not an intervention occurs in each imposed-polity-year. We lag this variable by one time period to better distinguish the causal direction. In our full sample of imposed-polity-years, 207 (7%) reflect the presence of an outside intervention, while in the truncated sample 171 (10%) reflect the presence of an outside intervention.

### **Imposer Commitment**

We rely on Stearns (2001) and *Keesing's* (Keesing's, 1997) to identify intervals during which the imposing state(s) maintained military forces in the host state. We code a variable for the truncated samples, *Initial Imposition<sub>t</sub>*, recording whether an imposer is present in the host state as part of the initial intervention during an imposed-polity-year. By way of example, contemporary Iraq achieved its sovereignty in summer 2004, yet military forces of the allied coalition, principally personnel from the United States and Britain, remain in Iraq as of this writing in summer 2008. By our coding rules, the presence of allied personnel would be qualify as an initial imposition in Iraq. In the truncated sample, the imposer is present in 462 imposed-polity-years (27%).

## Controls

The ability of an imposed polity to exert control over its citizens may be a function of population, so we employ *EUGene* to operationalize the variable,  $Population_t$ , reflecting the natural logarithm of an imposed polity's total population (in thousands) in each imposed-polity-year. The smallest population in our sample is 218,000 (Bahrain, 1971), while the largest population is 899,953,000 (India, 1994). As a result, in the full sample, the variable  $Population_t$  ranges in value from a minimum of 5.38 to a maximum of 13.71, with a mean of 8.72, while in the truncated sample it ranges in value from a minimum of 5.38 to a maximum of 13.71, with a mean of 8.75.

Next, as a control for states most at risk of political instability, we code a dichotomous variable, *Civil War*, in our analysis of the truncated sample. We employ Stearns (2001) to identify those imposed polities that are imposed under, or following, conditions of severe domestic conflict, such as civil war, rebellion, and insurrection. Twenty-four of the 68 (35%) imposed polities in our truncated sample are imposed under, or following, conditions of severe domestic conflict.

Last, for our analysis of the full and truncated samples we create a variable, *System Concentration<sub>t</sub>*, to gauge the overall level of international system stability and the capacity of the major power states to limit domestic political challenges within the state system. To operationalize this variable, we employ *EUGene* to generate a variable describing the level of power concentration in the international system for each imposed-polity-year in the sample based upon Singer, Bremer and Stuckey (1972). In the full sample, this variable ranges in value from 0.22 to 0.42 with a mean of .29, and in the truncated sample ranges in value from .22 to .41 with a mean of 0.27.

## Methodology

We employ *STATA* 9.2 (StataCorp, 2005) to estimate three multivariate logistic regressions. To correct for time dependence in our estimates of domestic political challenge, we

employ the correction developed in Beck, Katz and Tucker (1997), which requires the inclusion of a counter variable, *Time Since Previous Political Challenge*, identifying the duration at time  $t$  since an imposed polity's prior experience with a domestic political challenge in our samples, in addition to three spline parameters to model the decay function of the probability of a political challenge at times  $t+n$ .<sup>15</sup>

## Analysis

We report the results of our logit estimations in Table 3 and marginal effects in Table 4. Due to the similarity of the performance of the covariates specified in models 1–3 reported in Table 3, we focus our discussion on the results reported for model 1, highlighting notable departures in models 2–3. First, we consider the authority pattern–diversity nexus. The analysis underscores the challenges that ethnic heterogeneity presents imposed polities in terms of domestic political challenges, as well as the integral role of regime type in this relationship. Specifically, increasing the degree of ethnic heterogeneity (the variable *Diversity*) in an imposed polity from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the sample mean translates into an increase in the probability of domestic political challenge by 62% in the 1816–1994 sample.

[Table 3 About Here]

We observe a different effect, however, when we analyze the truncated sample. Among post-WWII polities, polities most proximate historically to the contemporary cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, an imposed democracy in the most ethnically divided state is nearly *three times more* likely to experience a domestic political challenge than an imposed democracy in the least ethnically heterogeneous state. This relationship holds regardless of whether or not we employ a strict operationalization of democracy.<sup>16</sup>

[Table 4 About Here]

The analysis indicates that the ease by which an imposed polity can control its population significantly conditions the occurrence of domestic political challenges, such that increasing the population of an imposed polity significantly increases the likelihood of a political challenge. For example, a host state with a population of 25 million people has a 43% greater probability of experiencing domestic political challenges than a host state with a population of 1.5 million. We observe a similar population–instability link in the truncated sample.

One means to limit the potential for domestic political challenges is to increase the size of the host state’s military forces. Yet, a policy of militarization involves important trade-offs and does not improve the domestic stability in an imposed polity in a linear fashion. As illustrated in Figure 1, increasing the size of the military forces in an imposed polity corresponds to an *increase* in the probability of domestic political challenge, at least at lower degrees of militarization. In an average imposed polity in the post–WWII period, increasing the size of the military from 50,000 to 100,000 personnel, an increase of .008 troops per capita, increases the probability of domestic political challenge by 5%.

[Figure 1 About Here]

Ultimately, however, greater increases in force strength translates into lower levels of domestic political challenge, as the security contribution of the larger force begins to overcome the drain on economic resources and the increased threat to societal groups in an imposed polity created by the larger military. This tipping point in terms of the security contribution of the military begins to occur at approximately the level of 300,000 military personnel. Beyond this point, as militarization increases, domestic political challenges reflect a relative decrease. For example, increasing the size of an average imposed polity’s military personnel from 100,000 to 400,000 decreases the probability of political challenge by 5%. For an average polity, this amounts to an increase in the number of soldiers per capita from .016 to .064.

The modest impact that greater military personnel exerts upon the likelihood of political violence makes it difficult for increased militarization to overcome the domestic political challenges associated with large populations and social cleavages. For example, in order to maintain the same probability of political challenge in an imposed polity with a population 25% larger than that of the average population size in our sample, the number of military personnel must be increased by a factor of 84 relative to the average. Overcoming the political challenge fostered by ethnic divisions is even more difficult for an imposed polity's military forces. In order to maintain the same probability of political challenge as an average polity in our sample, an imposed non-democratic polity with a 25% higher degree of ethnic diversity (roughly equivalent to the difference between Mauritania and Nicaragua in our sample) would need to increase the size of its military forces by more than a factor of 100, from about 30,000 to nearly 3.1 million military personnel. The magnitude of the increase in the size of the military forces necessary for an imposed polity to overcome challenges linked to ethnic divisions is even greater if the imposed polity is democratic.

If it requires massive, even herculean, increases in the size of an imposed polity's military forces to mitigate the positive impact of a large population or ethnic cleavages on the incidence of domestic political challenges, perhaps policies pursued by the imposing power might reduce challenges in an imposed polity. However, we locate no such effect for the presence of the imposer. For instance, during the initial intervention period, the presence of the imposer *increases* the likelihood of domestic political challenge in the truncated sample by 23%.<sup>17</sup> These results suggest that once the imposition process is set in motion, the options available to an imposer are limited.

Our analysis suggests that increasing the level of economic development in an imposed state from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above reduces the probability of political challenge by 38%. This result underscores that not only is the imposition process likely to be characterized by fewer political challenges when car-

ried out in more economically developed states, but encouraging economic development can also serve to counteract the destabilizing effects that a large population and many ethnic divisions carry for imposed polities. Increasing the level of economic development in an imposed polity by about 45% is sufficient to overcome the increase in the probability of domestic political challenge produced by increasing the polity's population size by 25%. Increasing the degree of ethnic diversity in an imposed polity by 25% requires that the economic development of an average imposed polity be almost tripled in order to maintain the same probability of domestic political challenge.

The analysis also suggests that one of the most effective means of promoting stability is to prevent the outbreak of domestic political challenges in the first place and, failing that, to quickly stop political challenges when they do occur. Although this conclusion rings tautological, it suggests that the longer an imposed polity persists absent such challenges, the less likely the imposed polity is to experience such a challenge in the future.<sup>18</sup> For instance, an imposed polity that experiences domestic political challenge in time  $t-1$  has roughly double the probability of experiencing a political challenge in time  $t$ , relative to an average imposed polity. An imposed polity one year removed from a previous political challenge has a 36% lower probability of experiencing domestic political challenge than a polity experiencing a challenge in the previous year. By the fifth year since the previous political challenge, the probability of a domestic political challenge reduces by an additional 29%. In this respect, political challenge has a tendency to beget political challenge, a fact reinforced by our finding in the full sample that imposed polities with a previous history of civil war prior to the imposition of the polity experience a 25% greater probability of domestic political challenge than do polities devoid of civil war prior to the imposition. This finding undermines the reasoning that newly democratized states benefit from a period of "venting." Rather, we conclude that the lawlessness, score-settling, and emergence of criminal elements that can accompany genuine expressions of post-authoritarian

freedom can contribute to a cycle of violence that is difficult to stop and can generate irreversible negative outcomes (e.g., ethnic cleansing.)

The broader international environment in which a state hosting an imposed polity is nested also influences the occurrence of political challenges. For example, as the frequency of foreign threats that an imposed polity confronts increases, the greater the likelihood of domestic political challenges to the imposed polity. An imposed polity involved in a militarized interstate dispute has a 37% greater probability of experiencing a domestic political challenge, while intervention into the imposed polity by a non-imposer state increases the probability of domestic political challenge following the intervention by nearly 57%. By contrast, the introduction of an imposed polity into a region of states with similar polity type reduces the probability of domestic political challenges in the imposed polity; indeed, each similar state within 500 miles of an imposed polity decreases the probability of political challenges in the imposed state by approximately 8%.

Thus, while Enterline and Greig (2005) document that strong imposed democratic polities are a force for regional peace, here we find evidence that the national–regional causality is likely bi-directional, with an imposed polity affecting region, and regional influences affecting the stability of imposed polities. The concentration of capability in the interstate system inversely affects the probability of domestic political challenges in imposed polities. This negative relationship squares with the argument that the de-concentration of power in the interstate system corresponds to a reduction in the capacity of major power states to control political stability in peripheral states, such as in imposed polities. Taken together, these findings underscore the relevance of system-level factors for national-level political performance (e.g., Kadera, Crescenzi and Shannon, 2003; Pevehouse, 2005; Russett and Oneal, 2001).

Last, we find little evidence that the type of imposition process itself can dampen the outbreak of political conflict. One expectation pertaining to the domestic stability of colonial imposed polities is these are likely to be stable, but we find no evidence to support

this expectation; indeed, colonial imposed polities during the post–WWII period are more likely to experience domestic political challenges. Similarly, an imposed polity implemented in the wake of a military defeat has a 35% greater probability of experiencing a domestic political challenge in a given year. Polity imposition following a military defeat during the post-WWII period is especially destabilizing, increasing the probability of political violence by 63%, thereby undercutting the notion that vanquished states are pliable and prone to tranquility, as might be suggested by the cases of post–WWII Japan or Germany. This finding is consistent with the experience of defeated countries, such as contemporary Afghanistan and Iraq, in which former members of the defeated military force retain their military capacity and form the core of a post-invasion insurgency.

## **Simulations of Post-Invasion Iraq**

Although there is some debate in the literature as to whether policy prescriptions derived from social science research are useful to policymaking (Doran, 1999; Mack, 2002), we argue that they can be, in addition to serving as important elements of theory development and testing (Cioffi-Revilla, 1991; Pevehouse and Goldstein, 1999; Bennett and Stam, 2006). In this vein, the research design employed in this study, one that relies on a data sample that terminates in the year 1994, facilitates out-of-sample predictions based on simulations of domestic political challenge in the contemporary cases. For purposes of illustration, in this section we develop simulations pertaining to post-invasion Iraq under various causal conditions, the parameters for which are derived from the model 3 results reported in Table 3. The results of these simulations are reported in Table 5.

[Table 5 About Here]

To provide a baseline for comparisons, we initially simulate the probability of domestic political challenge in an average imposed democratic polity during the post–World War II period. These polities demonstrate a strong tendency toward stability, reflecting a slightly

less than .20 probability of domestic political challenge in a given imposed-polity-year. The prospects of stability in Iraq, however, are considerably bleaker. Four key factors in our analysis serve to increase the likely probability political challenges in post-invasion Iraq: (1) the process by which the democratic polity was imposed; (2) population; (3) the interaction between polity type and the ethnic diversity; and (4) prior domestic political challenges in a given imposed polity. Considered collectively, these causal forces correspond to a distinct increase in the predicted probability of domestic political challenges in Iraq in year five, one that, as we report at the bottom of Table 5 (see “Scenarios,” “Iraq, Base Conditions (158k troops, Democratic, Pre-war Development)”) is upwards of 83%.

One source of instability in Iraq stems from the fact that the Iraqi democracy was imposed following the defeat of Iraq in an interstate war. Such defeats tend to foster instability in host states as residual elements from the prior regime often continue to fight the imposing power as well as the imposed polity. One might draw this conclusion regarding contemporary Iraq, as former Sunni Baathists and former members of the Iraqi military mounted an increasingly deadly insurgency against both American forces and, more broadly, against the newly imposed polity. This move toward violence by former members of the Iraqi military was further encouraged by the dissolution of the Iraqi military which created an environment in which a pool of unemployed individuals with military training, access to arms, and grievances against both the United States and the Iraqi democracy provided the foundation for insurgency.

Another challenge faced by the imposed polity in Iraq is the sheer size of the Iraqi population. As we discussed above, the greater the size of the population of the state hosting an imposed polity, the more difficult it is to stabilize the political system, which in turn increases the likelihood of political challenge to an imposed polity. Iraq’s population is roughly 4.8 times larger than that of an average imposed polity in our sample. The size of the Iraqi population alone is likely to correspond to an increase in the probability of political challenge in an average five-year old imposed polity by nearly 26%.

Central to the explanation for the current violent political challenge in Iraq are ethnic divisions in Iraqi society that sharply divide the Iraqi people and serve as the fault lines for challenges. Yet, it is not the frequency of ethnic divisions that is the most important cause underlying this instability. Indeed, Iraq's degree of ethnic heterogeneity reflects almost exactly the population average of all imposed polities in our sample. Rather, we conclude that it is the degree of ethnic heterogeneity *coupled with the democratic political institutions* that serves to increase the probability of political challenges in contemporary Iraq.

Our simulations suggest that changing course and cultivating an authoritarian polity in Iraq would reduce the probability of domestic political challenge in the year 2008 by about 4%, given the current Iraqi military force strength and level of economic development. This reduction likely occurs for two reasons. As the degree of ethnic divisions increases, democratic polities become more difficult to stabilize. The imposition of authoritarian rule would provide a means of limiting sectarian violence and neutralizing extremists. Additionally, an authoritarian polity in Iraq would be relatively more stable because it would be nested in a region marked by authoritarian polities. Given a nominal democracy in contemporary Iraq, only Iran and Turkey are neighbors with a similar polity type. An authoritarian Iraq could have as many as three neighboring states reflecting similar polities, specifically Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.

Although Iraq's large population, ethnic divisions, democratic institutions, and neighboring political environment increase its risk of future domestic political challenges, the key element of Iraq's high propensity for future challenges is the currently ongoing insurgency. For example, if the domestic political challenges occurring shortly after the toppling of the Hussein regime had ceased in the year 2003, producing a five-year absence of political challenges, the probability of political challenge in 2008 would decrease by nearly 33%. Furthermore, if American and coalition forces, along with the newly constituted Iraqi se-

curity forces, had been capable of eliminating domestic political challenge in Iraq in 2007, the probability of political violence in the year 2008 would decrease by 20%.

Clearly, Iraq cannot return to the year 2003 and implement policy choices that would reduce the likelihood of political challenges on the order of those occurring in contemporary Iraq. However, our analysis suggests two additional means by which increased stability can be stimulated in Iraq: Expansion of the Iraqi military and economic development. For example, increasing the size of the Iraqi military from 158,000 to 300,000 military personnel, as well as expanding American military forces in Iraq to 300,000 combat forces, would decrease the probability of political violence in Iraq by a little more than 2%. Although the magnitude of the return is small, this expansion of military capabilities depresses the probability of political violence in 2008 even further if implemented in conjunction with a rethinking about the feasibility of imposing democracy in Iraq. If an expansion of military forces is accompanied by the implementation of an authoritarian regime friendly to the U.S., the probability of political challenge in 2008 would decrease by 4%. Apart from expanding the size of the Iraqi military, increasing the level of economic development can also reduce the prospects for continued violence in Iraq by expanding the resources available to the population and reducing the incentives for violence, but only weakly, such that increasing development by 50% reduces the probability of violence in 2008 by a little more than 1%.

Combining these policy strategies can significantly reduce the likelihood of political challenge in Iraq in the future. If the democratic polity currently in Iraq is transformed into an authoritarian polity, the size of both the American military in Iraq and Iraqi military is doubled, and the level of economic development increased by 50% relative to pre-war levels in Iraq, the probability of political challenge in 2008 would decrease by slightly more than 5%. If such a policy had been implemented and violence halted in 2007, the probability of political challenge in 2008 would decline by 28%.

Clearly, deterring the outbreak of domestic political challenges, or terminating a succession of such challenges, early in an imposed polity's existence is critical to the maintenance of the polity's stability. Failing to do so, as evidenced by developments in contemporary Afghanistan and Iraq, is likely to generate successive domestic political challenges that are difficult to stop. Additionally, our simulation analysis demonstrates that the impact of policy choices by the imposer and host state on domestic political challenges are a function of the timing of polity deployment. As such, an increase in the degree of host state militarization once an environment of domestic political challenge is underway in an imposed polity exerts a much different effect than if such militarization occurs when the polity is imposed.

## Conclusion

At this outset of this article, we introduce two antipodal perspectives regarding the attainment of domestic political stability in the post-invasion, imposed democracies in Afghanistan and Iraq. We argued that while each perspective could be supported with selective evidence from historical cases, a more robust understanding of the performance of imposed polities—past, present and future—required a representative, rather than a selective, sample. Here, we do so by considering the performance of 94 imposed polities enduring in the modern state system, 1816–1994. Our sample facilitates developing out-of-sample predictions of the contemporary cases, developing an understanding of political stability in these polities, and providing policy relevant recommendations.

Our analysis prompts some sobering conclusions regarding the imposition of democratic institutions in Afghanistan and Iraq, conclusions that might easily have been derived prior the invasion of each country. Indeed, we find that, when placed in historical context, the democracies in the contemporary cases confront a gauntlet of conditions that are likely to stimulate domestic political instability that might ultimately undermine de-

mocratic institutions. For instance, key to the long-term stability of imposed polities is the neutralization of domestic political challenges early in an imposed polity's existence. Absent their cessation, the momentum of repeated challenges is extremely difficult to stop, and may very well result in a vortex of positive reinforcement, with additional causal forces, such as militarily aggressive neighboring states, a faltering economy, and the presence of the imposing state, perpetuating further challenges to democracy.

By definition, imposed polities are products of international behavior by states, while the outcome is national-level. We demonstrate that the performance of imposed polities, such as their political stability, is a function of causal forces originating from national, regional and international sources. In turn, accounting for these causal forces proves critical to understanding political stability in imposed polities. Thus, our study of imposed polities underscores the necessity of bridging the traditional divides between the sub-fields of comparative politics and international relations. Absent such a bridge, the risk of missing critical components of the causal puzzle increases, in turn hampering the accuracy of policy prescriptions.

A primary criticism of social scientific research is that it devotes too little space to policy matters, in addition to the fact that the policy analysis that is carried out is too imprecise and generally post-hoc. Herein, we embrace the case of post-invasion Iraq as an opportunity to assess our analysis of a large-N sample with the performance of out-of-sample cases, an exercise that enables us to evaluate the accuracy of our modeling approach, as well as developing policy insights. Based on this exercise, we argue that, if employed proactively, social science can provide tangible, *a priori* knowledge of political behavior. In terms of the democratic polity in Iraq, we provide accurate assessments of patterns of domestic political challenge to these polities, assessments that we argue could be performed prior to the imposition of democracy in these two states.

The analysis contained herein reflects merely an initial inquiry into the stability of political systems cultivated by foreign powers. Clearly, improvements can be made to the

empirical analysis contained herein in terms of refinement and stratification of the sample of imposed polities, as well as richer operationalizations of several of our causal factors, such as the commitment of the imposer, militarization, economic development, authority patterns, and social heterogeneity. Ample avenues for subsequent research remain to be explored. Comparison of the performance of imposed polities with their counterparts—i.e., indigenous polities—in terms of stability, longevity, and external impact, is likely to prove fruitful. At present, our study excludes non-state cultivation of political systems, such as those institutions shepherded by the League of Nations following WWI and the United Nations following WWII. Finally, it is important to assess the potentially manifold costs and benefits that accrue to imposers from the polities that they impose, perhaps in the form of alliance reliability, trade and access to resources, as well as the consistency of imposer and host state foreign policy preferences.

Postwar Germany and Japan are generally considered exemplars of the successful cultivation of democratic institutions by foreign powers. Yet, emphasis on the end product of these impositions—stable, prosperous, peaceful and democratic societies—minimizes acknowledgement of the risks and difficulties required to transform the political systems in these two states following the World War II. Indeed, treatments of postwar Japan and Germany by Dower (1999) and Judt (2005), respectively, underscore, in part, the precarious condition of these two defeated states early in the postwar period and the very tangible possibility that the ‘democratic revolution from above’ (Dower, 1999, 69) might fail. Thus, with respect to the fates of the democratic institutions in contemporary Afghanistan and Iraq, we argue that Germany and Japan are instructive as cases, because they suggest the tremendous time and resources necessary to build democracy in two host states exhibiting relatively advantageous conditions for national building.

Are the insurgencies and chronic violence in post-invasion Afghanistan and Iraq functions of “perfect storms,” such that this violent instability should be surprising to policymakers?<sup>19</sup> The analysis contained herein suggests not. Rather, our study demonstrates

that the two contemporary cases map to the prevailing historical patterns of political instability in imposed polities during the modern state system. Furthermore, we conclude that the stability of post-war West Germany and Japan, those cases identified as models for political development in Iraq and Afghanistan, are best described as exceptional cases. The combination of ethnic homogeneity, high levels of economic development, and the early prevention of political violence, conditions present in neither Iraq nor Afghanistan, furnished, in part, the perfect storms of conditions that set West Germany and Japan on the path toward stable and durable democracy.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>Reasons underlying the dearth of scholarship in this area might be twofold. Despite the success of democratic institutions in postwar West Germany and Japan, the imposition of democracy was considered to be the function of an anachronistic policy strategy, i.e., the “constitutional engineering” of political institutions, and one unlikely to be reemployed in the future (Gurr, 1974). Furthermore, externally stimulated democratic transitions were of little interest to political scientists because their timing and success as democracies were unsurprising (Olson, 1993).

<sup>2</sup>First, as we explain in greater detail below, we operationalize the category of “imposed polities” broadly, including political institutions that are primarily attributable to foreign influence, such as overt intervention (e.g., Japan following WWII), covert intervention (e.g., Chile following the overthrow of the Allende regime in 1973), or the result of long-term, often colonial, periods of cultivation (e.g., Sri Lanka in 1948 following British colonialism.) We employ the term “imposer” to refer to the primary source state of the imposition, and employ the term “host state” to refer to the state that is the target of an imposed polity.

<sup>3</sup>This said, it is not altogether clear that the similarity between the polity type of the imposer and polities imposed is a key to increasing state security (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Peceny, 1999).

<sup>4</sup>The *Polity III*d’s terminal year of 1994 has the advantage of being unrelated to the contemporary cases of interest, post-Taliban Afghanistan and post-Hussein Iraq. Therefore, this sample facilitates out-of-sample predictions of domestic political challenges in the contemporary cases of Afghanistan and Iraq.

<sup>5</sup>Although our operationalization of imposed polities is unique, studies by Maoz (1996, 127-129) and Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003, 437) each rely to some degree on the *Polity* data sample for the timing and type of polity origination and termination.

<sup>6</sup>The German Federal Republic (West Germany) endures for the period 1949–1990, at which time the unification of the two Germanies results in a single Germany state for the 1990–1994 period. We combine these two intervals to reflect the 1949–1994 period for the imposed German polity.

<sup>7</sup>The imposed polities that do not appear in the COW sample are as follows: Baden (1819–1871), Modena (1842–1860), Parma (1851–1860), the Papal States (1816–1860), the Two Sicilies (1816–1860), Tuscany (1816–1849), and Tuscany (1849–1860).

<sup>8</sup>The two excluded polities are as follows: United Arab Emirates (1971–1994) and Lesotho (1966–1970).

<sup>9</sup>Two imposed polities reflect *DEMAUT* scores of 0 (Burundi, 1961, and Swaziland, 1968). Burundi becomes autocratic in 1963 with a *DEMAUT* score of -3, and Swaziland becomes autocratic in 1973 with a *DEMAUT* score of -10. Three imposed polities, Laos, Singapore, and Zaire I reported in Table 1, reflect initial *DEMAUT* scores of -88, -66, and -77, respectively, in the first year of observation in our *COW*-based sample. The *DEMAUT* score for Laos changes from a value of -88 to a value of +8 in 1958, and therefore is coded as an imposed democracy in 1958 until 1959. The *DEMAUT* score for Singapore is coded a value of +7 in 1959 prior to entrance into the *COW* state system and a value of -66 in the year 1965, the first year that Singapore appears in the *COW* state system. In year 1966 the *DEMAUT* score for Singapore assumes a value of -2, thereby terminating the imposed polity according to our coding procedure. Given this relatively unique overlap between the *Polity* and *COW* samples, we code Singapore as an imposed polity, but not as an imposed democratic polity in the observations included in our data sample. Last, the imposed polity in Zaire I (following Belgian colonialism) is scored *DEMAUT* values of -77 in 1960–1963 and -88 in 1963–1965, before a new polity is imposed by the United States in 1965 with a *DEMAUT* value of -9. Therefore, Zaire I is included in our sample of imposed polities, but does not qualify as an imposed democracy. In 1965, when the case Zaire II appears in our

data sample, Zaire is coded as a non-democratic imposed polity. We do not code an imposed polity as ceasing to endure during periods of “interregnum,” “interruption,” or “transition,” as defined by *Polity III*d, as long as the *DEMAUT* score following one of these interludes continues on a democratic or autocratic trajectory.

<sup>10</sup>For robustness, we also estimated the more detailed model for the full sample. None of the variables excluded from the analysis in the full sample were significant and the overall model results were substantively similar to those that we report here. The results of the detailed model as applied to the full sample are available in the web appendix for this article available on the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* data archive located at <http://jcr.sagepub.com/supplemental>.

<sup>11</sup>One strategy for operationalizing our concept of domestic political challenge in imposed polities is to rely upon readily available sources of data recording instances of severe domestic conflict, such as the *COW* data on intrastate conflicts (Sarkees, 2000), or the Banks (1996) *Cross-Polity-Time-Series* data on domestic political conflict. Yet, the *COW* sample is restricted to the most severe forms of domestic conflict (i.e., civil and extra-systemic wars), while the *Cross-Polity-Time-Series* sample is restricted to the post-1918 period.

<sup>12</sup>Our decision to include riots, strikes, and protests in our operationalization of domestic political challenge alongside more violent challenges, such as insurgency and rebellion, might appear imprudent. Our rationale for doing so is grounded in the logic that these manifestations of popular discontent are likely to represent a more significant threat to some imposed polities. The relevance of events that are often associated with lower degrees of violence is underscored in the actions of the Solidarity movement that emerged in Poland in the 1970s. The Solidarity movement was neither an insurgency nor a rebellion, yet it represented a severe challenge to the very core of imposed authoritarian political institutions in Poland following the Second World War. The fact that such a movement took root and precipitated the collapse of a polity imposed decades earlier by the Soviet Union, provides further reason

to believe that imposed polities are particularly sensitive to these types of movements, and supports our belief that less violent events should be included in our measure of domestic political challenges. However, as a robustness check on the statistical analysis that we discuss on page 24, we also conducted our analysis with the occurrence of civil wars as our dependent variable, using civil wars identified by the *COW Intra-state Wars* sample (Sarkees, 2000) for the 1816-1994 period, as well as the sample of civil wars identified by Fearon and Laitin (2003). The results were very similar to the results obtained using our measure of political challenge, and therefore we employ our own operationalization. This auxiliary analysis is available in the web appendix for this paper available on the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* data archive located at <http://jcr.sagepub.com/supplemental>.

<sup>13</sup>For imposed-polity-years corresponding to the period prior to the year 1948, we assign the level of ethnic fractionalization Krain identifies for 1948; for the period 1991–1994, we assign the values Krain identifies for 1990. Although the lack of full temporal coverage of the ethnicity data is certainly a weakness of this strategy, 90% of the observations in our data occur within 50 years of a Krain data point, a period in which large-scale changes in the ethnic diversity of a state are unlikely to occur.

<sup>14</sup>We also estimated models operationalizing similar neighbors as states within both one and two polity intervals of a host state's *DEMAUT* value. The results obtained were nearly identical to what we report below in Table 3. Therefore we report the results using the broader operationalization—i.e., with three intervals of the host state *DEMAUT*—of political similarity in neighboring states.

<sup>15</sup>To conserve space, the coefficients corresponding to the three splines are not reported in Table 3.

<sup>16</sup>One might reasonably question the decision to focus our attention on a result that is only significant at the .10 level using a two-tailed test. However, given that we observe very

similar findings employing very different standards for democracy we believe that this result warrants fuller discussion.

<sup>17</sup>Similarly, tests of the full sample reveal no significant link between the presence of the imposer and the likelihood of political violence.

<sup>18</sup>We, however, locate no link between the duration a polity persists and the likelihood of political challenge. In this sense, it is the duration without political challenge that is decisive to stability, not simply the duration the polity survives, suggesting that imposed polities cannot simply wait out domestic political challenges.

<sup>19</sup>The metaphor of the perfect storm, in addition the title of this article, is inspired by Junger's (1997) bestselling book, *A Perfect Storm: A True Story of Men Against the Sea*.

Table 1: Imposed Polities, 1816–1994.

| Polity               | <i>DEMAUT</i> | <i>Polity</i> Start Yr. | <i>COW</i> Start Yr. | <i>COW</i> End Yr. |
|----------------------|---------------|-------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|
| Albania              | -2            | 1914                    | 1914                 | 1939               |
| Algeria              | -8            | 1962                    | 1962                 | 1989               |
| Angola               | -7            | 1975                    | 1975                 | 1994               |
| Austria I            | 8             | 1920                    | 1920                 | 1934               |
| Austria II           | 10            | 1946                    | 1955                 | 1994               |
| Bahrein              | -10           | 1971                    | 1971                 | 1994               |
| Benin                | 2             | 1960                    | 1960                 | 1965               |
| Botswana             | 10            | 1966                    | 1966                 | 1994               |
| Brazil               | -6            | 1824                    | 1826                 | 1946               |
| Bulgaria I           | -9            | 1879                    | 1908                 | 1918               |
| Bulgaria II          | -6            | 1946                    | 1946                 | 1990               |
| Burma                | 8             | 1948                    | 1948                 | 1962               |
| Burundi              | 0             | 1961                    | 1962                 | 1994               |
| Cameroun             | -6            | 1960                    | 1960                 | 1994               |
| Canada               | 9             | 1867                    | 1920                 | 1994               |
| Central African Rep. | -9            | 1960                    | 1960                 | 1993               |
| Chad                 | -9            | 1960                    | 1960                 | 1994               |
| Chile                | -7            | 1974                    | 1974                 | 1989               |
| Congo                | 4             | 1960                    | 1960                 | 1963               |
| Cuba                 | 3             | 1901                    | 1902                 | 1955               |
| Cyprus               | 8             | 1960                    | 1960                 | 1994               |
| Fiji                 | 9             | 1970                    | 1970                 | 1987               |
| France I             | -4            | 1814                    | 1816                 | 1848               |
| France II            | -9            | 1940                    | 1940                 | 1946               |
| Gabon                | -7            | 1960                    | 1960                 | 1994               |
| Gambia               | 10            | 1965                    | 1965                 | 1994               |
| German Dem. Rep.     | -8            | 1949                    | 1954                 | 1990               |
| German Fed. Rep.     | 10            | 1949                    | 1955                 | 1994               |
| Ghana                | -8            | 1960                    | 1960                 | 1970               |
| Greece               | -3            | 1833                    | 1833                 | 1864               |
| Guatemala            | -6            | 1954                    | 1954                 | 1966               |
| Guinea               | -9            | 1958                    | 1958                 | 1994               |
| Guyana               | 2             | 1966                    | 1966                 | 1980               |
| Haiti                | 2             | 1918                    | 1934                 | 1950               |
| Honduras             | 5             | 1908                    | 1908                 | 1936               |
| Hungary I            | -7            | 1919                    | 1919                 | 1948               |
| Hungary II           | -7            | 1948                    | 1948                 | 1989               |
| India                | 9             | 1950                    | 1950                 | 1994               |
| Iran (Persia)        | -1            | 1941                    | 1941                 | 1994               |
| Iraq                 | -4            | 1924                    | 1932                 | 1994               |
| Ireland              | 8             | 1922                    | 1922                 | 1994               |

Table 1 continued on next page.

Table 1 —continued from previous page.

| Polity           | <i>DEMAUT</i> | <i>Polity</i> Start Yr. | <i>COW</i> Start Yr. | <i>COW</i> End Yr. |
|------------------|---------------|-------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|
| Italy/Sardinia   | -10           | 1815                    | 1816                 | 1947               |
| Ivory Coast      | -9            | 1960                    | 1960                 | 1994               |
| Jamaica          | 10            | 1959                    | 1962                 | 1994               |
| Japan            | 10            | 1952                    | 1952                 | 1994               |
| Jordan           | -10           | 1946                    | 1946                 | 1993               |
| Cambodia I       | -7            | 1949                    | 1953                 | 1979               |
| Cambodia II      | -7            | 1979                    | 1979                 | 1993               |
| Kenya            | 2             | 1963                    | 1963                 | 1969               |
| Korea (North)    | -7            | 1948                    | 1948                 | 1994               |
| Korea (South)    | -6            | 1948                    | 1949                 | 1960               |
| Kuwait           | -8            | 1963                    | 1963                 | 1994               |
| Laos             | -88           | 1954                    | 1954                 | 1959               |
| Lebanon          | 2             | 1941                    | 1946                 | 1990               |
| Malagasy         | 1             | 1960                    | 1960                 | 1966               |
| Malawi           | -9            | 1964                    | 1964                 | 1994               |
| Malaysia         | 10            | 1957                    | 1957                 | 1994               |
| Mali             | -7            | 1960                    | 1960                 | 1992               |
| Mauritania       | -4            | 1960                    | 1960                 | 1994               |
| Mauritius        | 9             | 1968                    | 1968                 | 1994               |
| Mozambique       | -8            | 1975                    | 1975                 | 1994               |
| New Zealand      | 10            | 1857                    | 1920                 | 1994               |
| Nicaragua        | -3            | 1909                    | 1909                 | 1990               |
| Niger            | -7            | 1958                    | 1960                 | 1992               |
| Nigeria          | 8             | 1960                    | 1960                 | 1966               |
| Pakistan         | 2             | 1948                    | 1948                 | 1958               |
| Panama           | 7             | 1989                    | 1989                 | 1994               |
| Papua New Guinea | 10            | 1976                    | 1976                 | 1994               |
| Paraguay         | -3            | 1870                    | 1870                 | 1937               |
| Philippines      | 2             | 1935                    | 1946                 | 1972               |
| Poland           | -7            | 1947                    | 1947                 | 1989               |
| Rumania I        | -7            | 1866                    | 1878                 | 1947               |
| Rumania II       | -7            | 1947                    | 1947                 | 1990               |
| Rwanda           | -5            | 1961                    | 1962                 | 1994               |
| Senegal          | -1            | 1960                    | 1960                 | 1981               |
| Sierra Leone     | 6             | 1961                    | 1961                 | 1967               |
| Singapore        | -66           | 1959                    | 1965                 | 1965               |
| Somalia          | 7             | 1960                    | 1960                 | 1969               |
| South Africa     | 4             | 1910                    | 1920                 | 1994               |
| Spain            | -6            | 1823                    | 1823                 | 1871               |
| Sri Lanka        | 7             | 1948                    | 1948                 | 1994               |
| Sudan            | 8             | 1954                    | 1956                 | 1958               |
| Swaziland        | 0             | 1968                    | 1968                 | 1994               |

Table 1 continued on next page.

Table 1 —continued from previous page.

| Polity           | <i>DEMAUT</i> | <i>Polity</i> Start Yr. | <i>COW</i> Start Yr. | <i>COW</i> End Yr. |
|------------------|---------------|-------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|
| Syria            | 5             | 1944                    | 1946                 | 1950               |
| Tanzania         | -7            | 1962                    | 1962                 | 1994               |
| Togo             | -6            | 1960                    | 1960                 | 1994               |
| Tunisia          | -9            | 1959                    | 1959                 | 1994               |
| Uganda           | 7             | 1962                    | 1962                 | 1967               |
| Burkina Faso     | -7            | 1960                    | 1960                 | 1978               |
| Vietnam, Rep. of | -3            | 1955                    | 1955                 | 1975               |
| Zaire I          | -77           | 1960                    | 1960                 | 1965               |
| Zaire II         | -9            | 1965                    | 1965                 | 1994               |
| Zambia           | 2             | 1964                    | 1964                 | 1972               |
| Zimbabwe         | 4             | 1923                    | 1965                 | 1987               |

*Note:* N= 94. *DEMAUT* value corresponds to *COW* start year.

Table 2: Imposed Democratic Polity in Sri Lanka, 1948-1994.

| Start Year | End Year | <i>DEMAUT</i> |
|------------|----------|---------------|
| 1948       | 1960     | 7             |
| 1960       | 1970     | 7             |
| 1970       | 1977     | 8             |
| 1977       | 1978     | -88           |
| 1978       | 1982     | 5             |
| 1982       | 1993     | 3             |
| 1993       | 1994     | 7             |

*Note:* Data are from *Polity III*d (McLaughlin et al., 1998). Rows constitute unique polity “cases.”

Table 3: Domestic Political Challenge in Imposed Polities (Logit Models).

|  | 1816–1994           |                               | 1946–1994                     |  |
|--|---------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|--|
|  | (1)                 | (2)                           | (3)                           |  |
| Colonial                                 |                     | 0.461 <sup>+</sup><br>(0.277) | 0.489 <sup>+</sup><br>(0.275) |  |
| Military Defeat                          | 0.428**<br>(0.145)  | 0.708*<br>(0.316)             | 0.767*<br>(0.316)             |  |
| Democracy <sub>t</sub> (> 0)             |                     | -0.231<br>(0.270)             |                               |  |
| Democracy <sub>t</sub> (> 6)             | -0.177<br>(0.132)   |                               | -0.316<br>(0.273)             |  |
| Initial Imposition <sub>t</sub>          |                     | 0.301*<br>(0.146)             | 0.308*<br>(0.146)             |  |
| Outside Intervention <sub>t-1</sub>      | 0.676**<br>(0.177)  | 0.561**<br>(0.214)            | 0.552**<br>(0.214)            |  |
| Militarized <sub>t</sub>                 | 0.663**<br>(0.125)  | 0.896**<br>(0.157)            | 0.881**<br>(0.158)            |  |
| Militarized <sub>t</sub> <sup>2</sup>    | -0.067**<br>(0.014) | -0.091**<br>(0.020)           | -0.090**<br>(0.020)           |  |
| Development <sub>t</sub>                 | -0.095**<br>(0.023) | -0.133**<br>(0.034)           | -0.131**<br>(0.034)           |  |
| Diversity                                | 1.160**<br>(0.225)  | 1.096**<br>(0.344)            | 1.129**<br>(0.336)            |  |
| Diversity × Democracy <sub>t</sub> (> 0) |                     | 0.911 <sup>+</sup><br>(0.551) |                               |  |
| Diversity × Democracy <sub>t</sub> (> 6) |                     |                               | 0.964 <sup>+</sup><br>(0.569) |  |
| Interstate Dispute <sub>t</sub>          | 0.458**<br>(0.102)  | 0.477**<br>(0.138)            | 0.490**<br>(0.139)            |  |
| Similar Neighbors <sub>t</sub>           | -0.120**            | -0.077*                       | -0.088**                      |  |

Table 3 continued on next page.

Table 3 —continued from previous page.

|  | 1816–1994            | 1946–1994            |                      |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
|  | (1)                  | (2)                  | (3)                  |
|  | (0.023)              | (0.032)              | (0.029)              |
| Population <sub>t</sub>                    | 0.169*<br>(0.068)    | 0.204*<br>(0.082)    | 0.207*<br>(0.081)    |
| System Concentration <sub>t</sub>          | -12.136**<br>(1.501) | -13.963**<br>(2.377) | -13.758**<br>(2.367) |
| Civil War                                  |                      | 0.316*<br>(0.140)    | 0.329*<br>(0.140)    |
| Time Since Previous<br>Political Challenge | -0.796**<br>(0.060)  | -1.030**<br>(0.123)  | -1.023**<br>(0.122)  |
| Constant                                   | 1.408*<br>(0.570)    | 0.545<br>(0.909)     | 0.487<br>(0.906)     |
| Wald $\chi^2$ (15, 19, 19)                 | 652.24               | 388.83               | 387.32               |
| Prob> $\chi^2$                             | <0.0000              | <0.0000              | <0.0000              |
| Log PseudoLL                               | -1472.37             | -900.63              | -900.77              |
| N  | 2971                 | 1725                 | 1725                 |

*Note:* Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

Two-tailed significance: \*\*p< .01, \*p< .05, +p< .10.

Cubic splines not shown.

Table 4: Simulated Impact of Covariates on Domestic Political Challenge in Imposed Polities.

|  | $\Delta$     | 1816–1994 |              | 1946–1994 |              |
|--|--------------|-----------|--------------|-----------|--------------|
|  |              | <i>p</i>  | % $\Delta p$ | <i>p</i>  | % $\Delta p$ |
| Colony                                 | 0            | —         | —            | 0.198     |              |
|  | 1            | —         | —            | 0.284     | 43           |
| Military Defeat                        | 0            | 0.268     |              | 0.284     |              |
|  | 1            | 0.361     | 35           | 0.462     | 63           |
| Imposer Present                        | 0            | —         | —            | 0.284     |              |
|  | 1            | —         | —            | 0.350     | 23           |
| Militarized                            | Min.         | 0.098     |              | 0.078     |              |
|  | Max.         | 0.193     | 97           | 0.295     | 279          |
|  | -1 Std. Dev. | 0.201     |              | 0.184     |              |
|  | +1 Std. Dev. | 0.350     | 74           | 0.411     | 123          |
| Population                             | Min.         | 0.173     |              | 0.169     |              |
|  | Max.         | 0.464     | 168          | 0.521     | 208          |
|  | -1 Std. Dev. | 0.224     |              | 0.227     |              |
|  | +1 Std. Dev. | 0.319     | 43           | 0.350     | 54           |
| Development                            | Min.         | 0.418     |              | 0.510     |              |
|  | Max.         | 0.169     | -60          | 0.159     | -69          |
|  | -1 Std. Dev. | 0.337     |              | 0.374     |              |
|  | +1 Std. Dev. | 0.210     | -38          | 0.208     | -44          |
| Militarized Dispute                    | 0            | 0.268     |              | 0.284     |              |
|  | 1            | 0.367     | 37           | 0.395     | 39           |
| Similar Neighbors                      | Min.         | 0.334     |              | 0.340     |              |
|  | Max.         | 0.107     | -68          | 0.166     | -51          |
|  | -1 Std. Dev. | 0.307     |              | 0.320     |              |
|  | +1 Std. Dev. | 0.215     | -30          | 0.249     | -22          |
| Other Intervention                     | 0            | 0.268     |              | 0.284     |              |
|  | 1            | 0.421     | 57           | 0.407     | 43           |
| System Concentration                   | Min.         | 0.463     |              | 0.445     |              |
|  | Max.         | 0.074     | -84          | 0.060     | -87          |
|  | -1 Std. Dev. | 0.378     |              | 0.378     |              |
|  | +1 Std. Dev. | 0.182     | -52          | 0.205     | -46          |
| Time Since Previous Challenge          | 0            | 0.510     |              | 0.465     |              |
|  | 1            | 0.325     | -36          | 0.258     | -45          |
|  | 5            | 0.115     | -65          | 0.183     | -29          |
| Diversity                              | Min.         | 0.193     |              | 0.198     |              |
|  | Max.         | 0.395     | 105          | 0.398     | 101          |
|  | -1 Std. Dev. | 0.209     |              | 0.222     |              |
|  | +1 Std. Dev. | 0.339     | 62           | 0.356     | 61           |
| Diversity $\times$ Democracy ( $> 0$ ) | Min.         | —         | —            | 0.153     |              |
|  | Max.         | —         | —            | 0.518     | 238          |

Table 4 continued on next page.

Table 4 —continued from previous page.

|           | $\Delta$     | 1816–1994 |               | 1946–1994 |               |
|-----------|--------------|-----------|---------------|-----------|---------------|
|           |              | $p$       | $\% \Delta p$ | $p$       | $\% \Delta p$ |
| Civil War | -1 Std. Dev. | —         | —             | 0.191     |               |
|           | +1 Std. Dev. | —         | —             | 0.448     | 134           |
|           | 0            | —         | —             | 0.284     |               |
|           | 1            | —         | —             | 0.355     | 25            |


*Note:* Simulated with *CLARIFY* (Tomz, Wittenberg and King, 2001).

Table 5: Simulated Probability of Domestic Political Challenge in Post-Invasion Iraq.

| Parameter                        | Value   | $p$   | $\% \Delta p$ |
|----------------------------------|---|-------|---------------|
| Population                       | Mean Post-WWII Imposed Polity   | 0.198 |               |
|                                  | Mean Imposed Polity, Iraq's Population  | 0.250 | 26.15         |
| Authority Pattern                | Democratic  | 0.829 |               |
|                                  | Autocratic  | 0.793 | -4.34         |
| Militarization                   | Iraq 158k Troops, Democratic  | 0.829 |               |
|                                  | Iraq 300k Troops, Democratic  | 0.808 | -2.50         |
|                                  | Iraq 300k Troops, Autocratic  | 0.797 | -3.82         |
| Time Since<br>Previous Challenge | Iraq in 2008: 0 (i.e., challenge each year)   | 0.829 |               |
|                                  | Iraq in 2008: 1 year (challenge ends in 2007)   | 0.661 | -20.31        |
|                                  | Iraq in 2008: 5 years (challenge ends in 2003)  | 0.558 | -32.73        |
| Development                      | Prewar development  | 0.829 |               |
|                                  | Prewar Development +25%   | 0.825 | -0.49         |
|                                  | Prewar Development +50%   | 0.817 | -1.40         |
| Scenarios                        | Iraq, Base Conditions (158k Troops, Democratic, Pre-war Development)                    | 0.829 |               |
|                                  | Iraq, Best Case I (300k Troops, Democratic, Development +50%)                           | 0.784 | -5.42         |
|                                  | Iraq, Best Case II (300k Troops, Autocratic, Development +50%, 1 year gap in challenge) | 0.594 | -28.33        |

*Note:* Simulations generated with *CLARIFY* (Tomz, Wittenberg and King, 2001). Parameters are from Table 3, Model 3.

Figure 1: Militarization & Domestic Political Challenge.



Note: Simulated with *CLARIFY* (Tomz, Wittenberg and King, 2001) from the logit estimation reported in Table 3, Model 3.

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